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Chapter 1
Main Introduction
The capability of banks and financial institutions to protect them from a downturn period is a ne-
cessity for financial stability. The high interconnectivity of the financial ecosystem contributes
to a domino effect leading to mass defaults. Although other risk types are not to be underesti-
mated, the credit risk has been the major cause for several crisis events, including the financial
crisis and the Euro sovereign crisis. The credit risk framework of the Basel III Accord has been
improved on and updated to address some of its issues and to make it more robust. With time,
the framework is becoming increasingly complex and extensive.
Along with other qualitative measures, the Standardised Approach and the (Foundation and
Advanced) Internal Ratings-Based Approach underlie the quantitative methodology to calculate
the risk weight of each exposure. While the Standardised Approach values simplicity and prac-
ticability, the Internal Ratings-Based Approach focuses on risk sensitivity and flexibility for the
institutions. Addressing unresolved issues from the underlying model and unintended effects
along the various revisions and reforms of these approaches have dominated the discussion on
this topic. This cumulative thesis consists of three essays with focus on related issues concerning
both of these approaches in the credit risk framework.
The first essay discusses the performance of these approaches for non-traditional exposures.
Both approaches are primarily designed for banks. So it is not surprising to observe that some
1
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rules are especially tailored for loans. For other innovative financial instruments, the adequate-
ness is uncertain to some degree. Although leasing is not particularly a recent invention, the
empirical study in the credit risk context has been difficult due to lack of data.
Based on a unique dataset of 2.4 million active leasing contracts during 2007-2011 originated
from twelve major European leasing companies, we analyse the unexpected losses of simulated
leasing portfolios and compare them to the capital requirements of the Standardised Approach
and the Internal Ratings-Based Approach. To the best of our knowledge, there is currently no
empirical study on this topic with a leasing dataset of comparable size. The results are relevant
for regulatory authorities which plan on a treatment change for leases but cannot judge whether
the changed treatment is adequate and neutral. The analysis confirms that the current framework
is excessively conservative and a 30% reduction in the risk weight for lease contracts still fulfils
these criteria, i. e. the required capital covers the unexpected loss adequately and does not create
an incentive for institutions to offer leases instead of secured loans due to the regulatory capital
requirement alone.
The second essay concentrates on the downturn LGD, which is required for the use of the
Internal Ratings-Based Approach. A published guideline by the EBA serves as the baseline how
the downturn LGD has to be estimated. Unfortunately, the downturn definition adopted by the
conditional PD under the Internal Ratings-Based Approach and the downturn definition by the
downturn LGD guideline are inconsistent (latent variable based versus macroeconomic based).
This mismatch will potentially result in a risk underestimation and inadequate capital coverage.
This underestimation is confirmed by Monte Carlo simulations based on an 18 years default
database of over 50 international large banks. The simulation shows that the current regula-
tory downturn LGD does not pass the minimum survival probability of 99.9% as traditionally
required in the Internal Ratings-Based Approach. An alternative method is offered, which incor-
porates latent variables to address the aforementioned inconsistency. It performs with a survival
rate of 99.9%. Further, it also outperforms the Foundation Internal Ratings-Based Approach in
terms of accuracy. In contrast to other conditional LGD models in the literature, our method
3applies not only to market-based LGD but to workout LGD as well.
The last essay of this thesis addresses the strong assumption in the Internal Ratings-Based
Approach that the asset correlation stays constant throughout the years. This parameter holds
the information on how the asset values of firms influence each other. With a high correlation, so
is the co-default probability as well. Argumentatively, co-defaults will lead to a financial crisis.
As the demand in the loan market soared shortly before the financial crisis due to concerns of
the solvency in the banking sector, it may effectively have an impact on the asset correlation in
a financial ecosystem. Corporates with active credit lines may max out their debt to secure their
liquidity. This phenomenon (referred to as a credit run) ensures that there are more loans from
the same borrowers, causing a systematic shift in banks’ portfolio compositions.
Due to its constant asset correlation assumption, the Internal Ratings-Based Approach is
not capable of grasping the impact of a credit run fully. The correlation coefficients in the In-
ternal Ratings-Based Approach have not been recalibrated since their introduction in the Basel
II Accord. In the literature, studies on asset correlations seem to show inconsistent estimates
as well. Many of the available models require indirect proxies or questionable assumptions.
The straightforward explanation for it may be because the underlying assumption may be over-
simplified. The analysis offers evidence that a credit run increases the asset correlation value.
Consequently, the concept downturn asset correlation may be necessary.
The results of this thesis are aimed for the improvement to the current regulatory framework
regarding credit risk. In its current state, the credit risk framework is in urgent need of improve-
ment. The recent reform on the Basel Accord includes many rudimentary fixes to addressed
some of the related issues, but it cannot be the long-term solutions. Further research for an
alternative approach might be appropriate considering the number of issues.
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Chapter 2
Does the Finalised Basel III Accord Treat
Leasing Exposures Adequately? Evidence from
a European Leasing Dataset
Thomas Hartmann-Wendels, Christopher Paulus Imanto
University of Cologne, Albertus-Magnus-Platz, 50923 Cologne, Germany
2.1 Introduction
Leasing has been understood as a viable alternative to loans and serves as the backbone of SME
finance (Kraemer-Eis and Lang (2012)). The incentive for leasing is often price- or tax-related.
Firms may also prefer a lease to a financing loan because of the flexibility that a lease can offer.
Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) show that leasing reduces the cost of financing, especially for firms
with low credit quality. This premise also implies that lessees are more likely to be firms with a
low credit score. They show that the total lease share of low-rated firms that pay no dividends
is 25% higher than the total lease share of high-rated firms that pay dividends. Other literature,
such as Lease et al. (1990), points out that many characteristics of leasing contracts remind of
the characteristics of junk bonds. This observation can be explained by the popularity of leases
5
6 CHAPTER 2. BASEL III TREATMENT ON LEASING EXPOSURES
in SMEs, which typically have lower creditworthiness compared to large corporates.
On the other hand, Eisfeldt and Rampini (2009) argue that the repossession process of leased
assets by lessors is easier than the foreclosure on the collateral of a secured loan. Realdon (2006)
even argues that the credit spread of a financial lease may even decrease in default probability,
as opposed to a secured loan. Comparing both instruments, the relevant differences in the risk
context may include easier asset seize process in case of defaults due to legal asset ownership by
the lessor, internal expertise about the assets, assets’ revenue generation, and higher seniority.
From the overall perspective, leasing may have a higher default risk, but it may also be coupled
with a higher recovery rate as well. From the regulatory perspective, it is difficult to judge
whether the higher recovery rates can compensate for the possible higher default risk.
This question is especially important for the Standardised Approach (SA) since the risk
weight (RW) of the SA is supposed to reflect the aggregated risk profile combining both the
default risk of lessees and the recovery capability of leased assets. Following the finalisation of
the Basel III framework by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2017a), this essay re-
views the adequateness not only of the SA but also the Internal Ratings-Based Approach (IRBA)
to cover unexpected losses (UL) from a portfolio of leasing exposures. Our analysis is based on
a dataset of 2.4 million lease contracts active during 2007-2011, from which over 112,000 are
defaulted, originated from twelve major European leasing companies operating across 25 Euro-
pean countries. Compared to its peers from other studies (see table 2.1), this dataset contains
more contracts and most importantly also includes the 2008/2009 financial crisis. Due to the
extensive amount of data, a Monte Carlo based approach (a Bootstrapping method with a sim-
ulation, to be exact) is chosen for the portfolio analysis. Similar methodologies with related
context can also be found in Carey (1998); Schmit (2004, 2005).
Potential losses from a leasing portfolio usually consist of losses from the credit risk as well
as the market risk. The credit risk of a leasing portfolio is linked to the default risk of the lessees
and their ability to pay the leasing obligations. The market risk of a leasing portfolio is mostly
associated with the residual value risk of the leased object and the selling ability of the lessors,
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either after the contract’s termination or after seizing the object due to a default event. This essay
focuses on the credit risk since it is the risk type, which usually takes the biggest portion of the
required capital.
We primarily investigate the question whether the current capital regulation for leasing expo-
sures cover the ULs adequately or any substantial under-/overestimation can be observed. The
simulation confirms that leases, in general, are not as risky as the capital regulation suggests
and we are not alone with this conclusion (Schmit (2004, 2005); Pirotte and Vaessen (2008);
Eisfeldt and Rampini (2009)). However, it is well within the design that the Basel Accord is
built to be conservative to act as a fail-safe. How much conservative this fail-safe should be is
to some extent a political discussion. In our simulation, the risk weights (RW) can exceed five-
to eight-fold the ULs and are only weakly risk-sensitive for the SA. Unfortunately, we do not
have a comparable non-leasing dataset to investigate whether this level of conservatism can also
be observed for loan exposures. An excessively conservative and weakly risk-sensitive capital
requirement can be detrimental for the economy. Any risk reduction strategies should always be
reflected accordingly in the capital requirement. Otherwise, there are no incentives to reduce the
overall portfolio risk. Whether the new Basel III framework has already addressed these issues
cannot be answered by similar methodology since some of the changes in the new framework
are fundamental, e. g. corporate exposures have to be evaluated with the foundation IRBA, so
a direct comparison is no longer relevant. Nevertheless, we can expect this gap between the
RWs and the ULs to get wider. On average, a higher minimum regulatory requirement is to be
expected for banks, as reported by the European Banking Authority (2019).
A change in the regulatory treatment is entirely the decision of the relevant regulatory au-
thorities. Apart from the over-conservatism issue, other aspects may influence this decision as
well. In this essay, two aspects are essential: adequateness and neutrality. Not only should a
regulatory treatment be adequate to cover the ULs, but also neutral as the regulatory framework
does not have the intention to favour one financial instrument over the others. We share the
concern that by favouring a particular asset class from the regulatory perspective, there is more
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incentive for institutions to prefer this particular financing instrument to others, ultimately caus-
ing a systematic effect. Some institutions may shift their portfolio to a particular asset class, as
some banks may not necessarily see big differences between a loan with a physical collateral
and a finance/capital lease (Bayless and Diltz (1988)). This essay does not propose a concrete
change in the regulatory treatment for leasing exposures. Instead, we look for the most such a
treatment change can be, before it starts to give incentives for banks to offer leases rather than
other similar financial instruments. Assuming everything else (risk profile, profit margin, de-
mand, etc.) is similar, the decision whether to offer leases instead of other instruments boils
down to the regulatory capital requirement for each exposure. We show that a 30% reduction in
leases’ RW is the maximum which fulfils the aforementioned conditions and confirms this result
further by using a reverse stress test.
This essay is structured as follows: section 2.2 reviews the relevant literature on the credit
risk profile of leasing, section 2.3 shows an overview of the dataset, section 2.4 explains our
methodologies and assumptions within the simulation, section 2.5 shows the comparison of the
current capital requirement regulations and the UL, section 2.6 presents the lowest bound of the
RW reduction can be, which still fulfils the adequateness and neutrality conditions, and section
2.7 concludes the essay.
The PhD candidate is responsible for the code architecture as well as its implementation,
a part of the methodology design, and the writing of this essay with consultations from and
discussions with the co-author.
2.2 Literature Review
The research on the credit risk of leasing portfolios has been focused too much on the exposure
itself but ignores who most likely leases. If firms resort to leases only as debt substitutes, because
they cannot get a cheap loan, then a leasing portfolio may have a higher level of credit risk than a
loan portfolio on average. From the lessee’s perspective, it often does not play an important role
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whether the asset is financed through a finance lease or a debt. For financial institutions, a lease
and a collateralised loan share many common characteristics. Bayless and Diltz (1988) find
out through queries that financial institutions, which offer both, do not treat the outstanding of
capital leases and debts differently in the case of a term loan decision. However, this perspective
may change as the leasing industry grows with time and gains more acceptance and popularity.
Since the most popular reason to lease is tax-related, it is reasonable to believe that lessees
are typically firms, which otherwise cannot fully profit from the tax shield by buying the asset.
Without getting into details which accounting, taxation, or bankruptcy law are discussed, the
right for depreciation is generally only granted to the book owner of the asset. Although Finu-
cane (1988); Mehran et al. (1999) report that tax-related factors are not significantly associated
with the leasing level of firms, the contrary is reported by Barclay and Smith (1995); Sharpe and
Nguyen (1995); Graham et al. (1998). They find out that companies with a high proportion of
tax losses rely more on leasing as financing means. Lasfer and Levis (1998) argue that both can
be true after controlling for firm size. They find that tax savings are not a major determinant
for leasing decisions for small firms, but lessees tend to have higher tax losses. By analysing
financial statements, they also find other typical lessees’ characteristics, which are a higher debt-
to-equity ratio, larger in size, and invest more than non-lessees. While SMEs see leases as sub-
stitutes for debt, large firms use leases complementary to debts, which is also reported by Ang
and Peterson (1984). Further, Lasfer and Levis (1998) observe that small firms lease due to their
growth opportunities, while large firms lease because of tax incentives. Moreover, they report
that small less-profitable companies are more likely to lease, while large lessees are generally
more profitable. Krishnan and Moyer (1994) report that less stable firms (cash-flow-wise) are
more likely to use leasing. Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) also come to the same conclusion in
regard to the credit quality. Newer evidence from Eisfeldt and Rampini (2009) also shows that
financially constrained firms lease more.
While Krishnan and Moyer (1994) argue that leases reduce bankruptcy costs, Sharpe and
Nguyen (1995) report the leasing’s reduction effect of financing cost, especially for firms with
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a low credit score. Ang and Peterson (1984) report that firms with more leases tend to be more
levered. Eisfeldt and Rampini (2009) argue that leasing preserves capital. Although these effects
are positive for lessees, it can also be argued that e. g. firms with low debt capacity are more likely
to lease in order to preserve their debt capacity. While the legal ownership of leased assets can be
seen as an advantage by removing the ownership from the right to use, it also creates an agency
problem. Flath (1980); Wolfson (1985) argue that lessees have reduced incentives to preserve
the asset value. In practice, adequate insurance coverage or a purchase option may alleviate
the problem (Krahnen (1990)) and are often mandatory requirements. Contradicting to this
argument, Hendel and Lizzeri (2002) report that leased cars are of higher quality than non-leased
ones. Lease et al. (1990) observe that the actual salvage values of assets from leasing contracts
are significantly higher than the expected residual values, although unexpected inflation may also
play a role. In summary, the literature highlights a possible higher default chance of lessees, but
also a higher recovery rate in defaulted leasing contracts.
Although Schmit (2004); De Laurentis and Riani (2005) report a high recovery rate in
general for leasing exposures, this fact should not be generalised since Han and Jang (2013);
Frontczak and Rostek (2015) point out that the recovery rates depend on many factors such as
the actions taken during the workout processes, the internal disposal costs, and the lender’s dis-
posal policies, which may differ from one lessor to another. Lessors have to deal not only with
the credit risk (default and recovery rate) but also with the market risk (residual value) at the
same time. By studying an automotive leasing dataset, Pirotte and Vaessen (2008) not only sug-
gest that physical collaterals should be recognised in the capital adequacy regulation to reflect
its low-risk profile better, but also that the residual value risk should not be separated from the
credit risk model for a better risk valuation. In contrast, Miller and Töws (2018) use a multi-
step approach which differentiates between asset-based recovery and miscellaneous recovery,
to accommodate a better understanding of both types of recovery and to acquire a stable and
more accurate recovery estimation. Pirotte and Vaessen (2008)’s analysis on automotive leasing
shows an anti-cyclical effect for recovery rates. Other works, such as Schmit and Stuyck (2002);
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Hartmann-Wendels and Honal (2010), confirm the independence of vehicle leasing’s recovery
rates from macroeconomic variables. While others see the residual values of leased assets as a
risk, Tsay (2003) proposes residual values to be potential hedging components. By extending
the lease valuation model by Grenadier (1996), Realdon (2006) shows that a financial lease’s
credit spread may decrease in the lessee’s default probability, as opposed to secured loans, if the
model considers initial prepayments or terminal options which are typical for leasing contracts.
From a qualitative standpoint, the repossession of a leased asset is easier than the foreclosure on
the collateral of a secured loan, as argued by Pirotte and Vaessen (2008). With a method similar
to this essay’s, Schmit (2004, 2005) confirms the excessiveness of the Basel capital requirements
for leasing exposures. He argues that the retail portfolio loss based on a leasing dataset in nature
is more idiosyncratic than systematic. While we agree that the current Basel capital requirement
might be excessive for leasing, we lack an adequate comparison to confirm that the estimated
ULs from leasing exposures are indeed lower as opposed to the ULs of e. g. secured loans or
bonds.
2.3 Data
Our analysis is based on a historical leasing dataset containing active1 contracts during 2007-
2011 originated from twelve major European leasing companies, which is collected by Leaseu-
rope2. The dataset contains more than 2.4 million lease contracts with mobile assets and an
outstanding sum of over e45 billion by the end of 2011. The portfolio covers 25 European
countries3. To the best of our knowledge, there is no literature based on a leasing dataset
with more than 100,000 defaulted contracts (see table 2.1). Note also that the source of the
dataset is twelve major European bank-owned leasing companies, which have survived the pe-
1All contracts in the portfolio of the participating companies during these years, which are not yet closed.
2Leaseurope is a European federation of leasing company associations with currently 45 member associations
across 32 countries. For details: http://www.leaseurope.org
3These include: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hun-
gary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, and the UK.
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Table 2.1: Dataset size comparison on some selected literature with similar context.
Dataset Size Years
Schmit and Stuyck (2002) 37,259 defaulted lease contracts issued between 1976-2002
Schmit (2004) 46,732 completed lease contracts issued between 1990-2000
De Laurentis and Riani (2005) 1,118 financial lease operations written off in 2000
Schmit (2005) 35,861 auto. lease contracts issued between 1990-2000
Pirotte and Vaessen (2008) 4,828 defaulted auto. lease contracts issued between 1990-2001
Miller and Töws (2018) 1,493 defaulted lease contracts executed between 1996-2009
riod 2007-2011. This case is a typical example of survivorship bias, i. e. the dataset consists only
of survivors, although the analysis aims to study the non-survivors. However, we argue that the
magnitude remains small in this case. Nevertheless, it remains difficult to investigate this issue
further since obtaining a portfolio dataset from a defaulted leasing company or any defaulted
institution is not possible in most situations. Other bias types, e. g. bank-ownership, cannot be
ruled out either. Independent leasing companies or captives may exhibit different behaviours or
strategies. However, the relevance to the capital adequacy regulation for them is to some extent
also limited.
From originally thirteen leasing companies, we exclude one due to its extremely low default
rate and abnormally high recovery rate. Benford’s test is performed on the outstanding amounts
of the remaining dataset; no significant deviation can be observed from the Benford’s distribu-
tion. Exclusion of single contracts may occur, e. g. if there are missing variables or multiple data
points with the same contract ID. Granular statistics are avoided for the economic interest of
the participating companies as well as to enable further data collection for future research. The
dataset is the same as used by Hartmann-Wendels and Imanto (2019) and largely overlaps with
the one used by Deloitte (2013b,a).
The dataset is gathered explicitly with the purpose to assess the implicit RWs of the leasing
activity. The definition of a lease may differ across different accounting standards. In this essay,
the definition of a lease is oriented towards the IFRS definition (at the time of data collection,
the relevant standard was IAS 17), which is an agreement whereby the lessor conveys to the
lessee in return for a payment or series of payments for the right to use an asset for an agreed
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Table 2.2: Number of active leasing contracts in the dataset split by active years and all-time
default status. The default definition relies on the Basel’s default definition, which is either
unlikeliness to pay or 90 days past due. The total number of contracts is lower than the sum of
each year because the statistic is calculated by active years.
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total
Defaulted 6,085 25,657 57,967 71,368 75,719 112,726
Non-defaulted 659,865 1,211,075 1,392,199 1,420,417 1,400,477 2,289,076
Totals 665,950 1,236,732 1,450,166 1,491,785 1,476,196 2,401,802
period of time. Furthermore, the default definition relies on the Basel definition at the time of
the data collection. Table 2.2 depicts the composition of the dataset. Note that the total number
is lower than the sum over all the years. Since the analysis is portfolio-based, it is crucial to
view the dataset by active years (instead of e. g. contract begin). One of the consequences is
also that the ratio of defaulted contracts to the total number of contracts of a particular year will
not result in the default rate but rather the default proportion in the portfolio. In general, default
rates are lower than default proportions in the portfolio, if the workout processes take more than
one year on average. From the regulatory requirement perspective, the default proportion is
more important since these defaults have to be backed with capital, regardless of how long the
workout processes will take.
The dataset only includes mobile leasing contracts. Arguably, other asset categories such as
real estates have a different risk profile and a different regulatory treatment. The assets in our
dataset are categorised into:
• Commercial Vehicles: all registered commercial vehicles of all sizes. Unregistered vehi-
cles fall under "Machinery & Industrial Equipment". Caravans and motorbikes are cate-
gorised under "Passenger Cars".
• Passenger Cars: all new and used, private or business-used cars, as well as caravans and
motorbikes.
• Machinery & Industrial Equipment: all machinery for commercial, industrial, or agri-
cultural use, including harvesters, tractors, and earthmovers. If the asset has a license
plate, it should be considered as "Commercial Vehicles".
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Table 2.3: Number of active leasing contracts split by asset type and all-time default status.
Default status is based on the Basel framework.
Defaulted Non-Defaulted Total
Commercial Vehicles 29,189 379,207 408,396
Passenger Cars 17,746 432,149 449,895
Machinery & Industrial Equipment 29,273 502,524 531,797
Computers & Business Machines 28,047 770,672 798,719
Ship, Aircraft, Railway, Rolling Stock 207 4,323 4,530
Other 7,693 180,714 188,407
Unknown 571 19,487 20,058
Totals 112,726 2,289,076 2,401,802
• Computers & Business Machines: all IT equipment and other business machines, such
as photocopiers.
• Ships, Aircraft, Railway, Rolling Stock
• Other
• Unknown
The asset type "Ships, Aircraft, Railway, Rolling Stock" will be excluded from the analysis
because the number of contracts is too small and therefore inappropriate for a Monte Carlo-
based analysis. In contrast, "Other" and "Unknown" are combined for the analysis and are
included. Although we believe that it is not the case with the participating companies, there is a
concerning practice to categorise bad cases as either one of these asset types. We include these
asset types to show that this concern is not justified within our dataset.
From the exposure type, the dataset consists of corporate, institution, retail, and sovereign
exposures, as well as from unknown exposure type. The categorisation of exposure is based on
the Basel II’s asset classes. Typical for a leasing dataset, retail exposures make the majority of
the population.
The average duration until contract termination is about 52 months. Typically, there is a
difference in the duration between the asset types, which is proportionate to its amortisation
period. Passenger cars are leased often for a shorter duration, while ships or aircraft for a longer
duration.
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Table 2.4: Number of active leasing contracts split by exposure type and all-time default status.
Default status and exposure type are based on the Basel framework.
Defaulted Non-Defaulted Total
Corporate 36,187 875,349 911,536
Institution 556 95,105 95,661
Retail 71,580 1,237,014 1,308,594
Sovereign 25 8,181 8,206
Unknown 4,378 734,427 77,805
Totals 112,726 2,289,076 2,401,802
Table 2.5: Average of initial outstanding by asset types and exposure types. Exposure type
is based on the Basel framework. Initial outstanding is the nominal outstanding amount at the
beginning of the contract.
Average initial outstanding
Commercial Vehicles e58,493
Passenger Cars e30,596
Machinery & Industrial Equipment e84,822
Computers & Business Machines e21,555
Ship, Aircraft, Railway, Rolling Stock e624,053
Other & Unknown e68,324
Corporate e72,003
Institution e22,913
Retail e34,114
Sovereign e24,092
Table 2.5 shows that larger assets, such as machinery or commercial vehicle, exhibit a higher
average of initial outstanding. Smaller assets with high depreciation rate, such as office equip-
ment, have a substantially lower amount of initial outstanding due to their lower asset values. As
previously argued, ship and aircraft may have a different risk structure since their asset values
are significantly higher. The initial outstanding of corporates is comparatively higher than of
other exposure types. There is a higher proportion of finance leases to operating leases in the
dataset. Table 2.6 shows that the asset type influences the contract type, e. g. vehicles leases are
often finance leases and office equipments leases are often operating leases.
If the lessee does not meet his obligation, the leasing object can legally be seized by the
lessor. The seized asset can then be sold or re-leased. In some cases, it is not necessarily the
best option to seize the leased assets, since it deprives the cure possibility of the defaulted lessee.
Table 2.7 shows less than 50% selling rate for each asset categories.
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Table 2.6: Distribution of initial outstandings split by contract and asset type. Contract type is
based on the IFRS lease categorisation.
Finance Lease Operating Lease Total
Commercial Vehicles 19.77% 2.46% 22.23%
Passenger Cars 9.24% 1.01% 10.25%
Machinery & Industrial Equipment 36.84% 3.98% 40.82%
Computers & Business Machines 8.66% 6.34% 15.00%
Ship, Aircraft, Railway, Rolling Stock 1.59% 0.19% 1.78%
Other 7.08% 2.11% 9.19%
Unknown 0.66% 0.07% 0.73%
Total 83.83% 16.17% 100.00%
Figure 2.1: Histogram of resolution time of closed defaulted contracts
2.4 Methodologies
The main concept of the analysis is to replicate a representative leasing portfolio in a one-year
period by the mean of a Monte Carlo simulation. A similar analysis can be found in Carey
(1998); Schmit (2004). Based on historical data, a portfolio with a typical number of contracts
will be drawn randomly with replacement. Since the information about the realised loss on each
resolved contract is available, the loss distribution can be estimated empirically. The 99.9% per-
centile of the loss distribution is defined as the Value-at-Risk (VaR). The advantage of such a
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Table 2.7: Number of defaulted leasing contracts broken down by asset type.
Total asset sold
Commercial Vehicles 29,189 12,754
Passenger Cars 17,746 6,027
Machinery & Industrial Equipment 29,273 8,476
Computers & Business Machines 28,047 10,923
Ships, Aircraft, Railway, Rolling Stock 207 37
Other 7,693 2,637
Unknown 571 130
Total 112,726 40,984
non-parametric method is that it only uses minimal assumptions. The estimation of the potential
loss is realistic and is based on historical data. Since the Monte Carlo-based methods are based
on historical data, the derived information should originate from the actual historical observa-
tion. While our dataset includes the financial crisis, which arguably contains information of
downturn effect, others may argue that the 2008/2009 crisis is more about a real-estate bubble.
Thus, it may only have a comparably weak downturn effect on leases. Although the dataset
shows that these downturn years have some impact, we cannot ensure that a leasing-related
downturn period will not have even worse consequences for lessors.
The IRBA is not designed to estimate the VaR directly, but rather the expected loss (EL)
conditional on the latent factor at the 99.9% level. In this model, one single latent factor is used
to represent all systematic factors. Roughly explained, the VaR represents the worst loss (out of
1,000 cases) while the conditional loss represents the associated loss under the most distressed
period (out of 1,000 possible periods). Both are only comparable if the worst loss is also caused
by a distressed period. In general, this association can never be guaranteed without assumptions.
However, as proven by Gordy (2003), the VaR is asymptotically equivalent to the downturn loss
at a given confidence level under the asymptotic-single-risk-factor model with some relevant
assumptions.
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Table 2.8: One-year default rates broken down by active year and exposure type. The default
rate is calculated as a quotient with the denominator as the number of active contracts at t and
the numerator as the number of defaulted contracts from the denominator, of which the default
event occurred at t. Default definition and exposure type are based on the Basel framework.
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 All years
Global 1.12% 1.56% 2.61% 2.13% 1.72% 1.89%
Retail 1.56% 1.96% 2.93% 2.38% 1.74% 2.16%
Corporate 0.72% 1.24% 2.46% 2.11% 1.83% 1.76%
Sovereign 0.17% 0.04% 0.05% 0.13% 0.12% 0.09%
Institutions 0.21% 0.15% 0.33% 0.19% 0.42% 0.27%
Unknown 0.82% 1.22% 2.66% 1.27% 2.00% 1.56%
2.4.1 PD, LGD, and Recovery Rates of Leasing Collateral
The two primary components of the IRBA are the conditional probability of default (PD) and
the downturn loss given default (LGD). Other components such as the exposure amount at de-
fault or the effective maturity usually do not need to be estimated. While the conditional PD
is determined theoretically with a given formula, the downturn LGD is determined individually
in compliance with the downturn LGD guideline (see EBA/GL/2019/03). In practice, the input
parameters (mostly the observed PD and LGD of a particular asset segment) are based on histor-
ical data or external information, e. g. from a rating agency. In our case, where the dataset covers
only five years, an out-of-sample analysis is quite difficult to do. Ideally, the regulatory capital
requirement for the year t can only be calculated using information up to t− 1. Using e. g. the
observed default rate of 2008 for the PD input of 2008 is unrealistic and renders our analysis
insufficiently conservative. However, to show that the current regulatory capital is too conserva-
tive for lessors, this flaw plays in our favour. Even under these obstacles and non-conservative
assumptions, we are still able to show that the regulatory capital requirement far exceeds the
simulated UL.
The dataset shows relatively low default rates with the clear impact of the financial crisis in
2008/2009, as shown in table 2.8. It seems that this contradicts with the conjecture that lessees
are predominantly firms with low credit quality. However, the dataset is originated only from
European major leasing companies. Lessor size and country effects may play a role, but cannot
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Table 2.9: Long-run average default rates broken down by exposure type. The default definition
and exposure type are based on the Basel framework.
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Global 1.12% 1.34% 1.76% 1.85% 1.83%
Retail 1.56% 1.76% 2.15% 2.21% 2.11%
Corporate 0.72% 0.98% 1.47% 1.63% 1.67%
Sovereign 0.17% 0.11% 0.09% 0.10% 0.10%
Institutions 0.21% 0.18% 0.23% 0.22% 0.26%
Unknown 0.82% 1.02% 1.57% 1.49% 1.59%
be controlled in this essay. Compliant with the EBA/GL/2017/16, the long-run average default
rates are used as input parameters, i. e. the arithmetic average of the past default rates. This
procedure ensures to include a mix of good and bad years up to the most recent five years. Since
our dataset only covers five years and includes the financial crisis, the long-run average default
rate is calculated as the mean of the annual observed default rates. Further, it is worth mentioning
that the long-run average default rates in table 2.9 are higher than the newly-set input floors in
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2017a). These long-run average default rates will
be used as PD input parameters in the IRBA.
For calculating the LGD (or the downturn LGD), the realised loss of a defaulted leasing
contract in the dataset has to be analysed. For closed defaults, information on the final realised
loss for each default is available. The ratio of realised loss and its outstanding amount at the
default time is the nominal LGD. The discounted LGD requires detailed information on payment
time and interest rates, which are unfortunately unavailable. Especially for European assets,
there should be no significant difference between the nominal and the discounted LGD due to the
low long-term interest rates. In the case of leasing, the minimum lease payment4 (MLP) is taken
as the initial outstanding amount. For the unresolved cases, the final loss has to be estimated.
This step is crucial to avoid resolution bias, i. e. negative bias originated from excluding defaults
with a long default duration (with a presumably high LGD as well). Either the leasing object has
been sold, then we assume the disposal value after deducting for the residual value to be the sole
4The definition of MLP is based on the International Accounting Standard. At the time, when the dataset is
collected, it was the IAS 17.
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recovery, or the leasing object has not been sold, then we estimate the expected LGD conditional
on the default duration. The expected conditional LGD is calculated with the following formula
E[LGDi|T (i)] = ∑
t≥T (i)
E[LGDi|Tr(i) ∈ τt ] ·P(Tr(i) ∈ τt),
where T (i) and Tr(i) are defined as the time period where the contract i has been unresolved
since the default began and the time period until the resolution respectively. τt is predefined time
intervals in months: τ1 = [0,3],τ2 = (3,12],τ3 = (12,24],τ4 = (24,36],τ5 = (36,48], and τ6 =
(48,60]. The purpose is to estimate the LGD of unresolved defaults without an asset sale. This
technique is based on the method used to estimate the loss in Deloitte (2013b). The population of
resolved defaults without an asset sale is the only appropriate choice for this estimation because
the unresolved defaults without an asset sale can be assumed to behave similarly as the resolved
defaults without an asset sale. Outliers in the data may cause a biased estimation, but since the
goal is to investigate unexpected losses, we only exclude the extreme outliers. We only consider
defaults with calculated LGDs within a [−10.000%;10.000%]-interval for our calculation.
Default
Closed
LGD = Final LossOutstanding MLP
Not closed
Asset sold
LGD = 1− Disposal value−Residual valueOutstanding MLP
Asset not sold
max(0,E[LGDi|T (i)])
Figure 2.2: Tree diagram of LGD calculation/estimation based on contract’s default and sale
status
Table 2.10 shows the average LGD of the resolved defaults without asset sale, which is ap-
plied as the estimated LGD for unresolved defaults without asset sale. In the overall population,
LGD estimates over 140% are excluded in the further calculations and negative losses (profit)
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Table 2.10: LGD estimates applied to unresolved defaults without asset sale as proxy. The
calculation is based of resolved defaults with asset sale.
Tr(i) ∈ τ1 τ2 τ3 τ4 τ5 τ6
All asset types 2.43% 3.64% 7.63% 20.00% 24.94% 7.34%
Commercial Vehicles 2.95% 4.04% 9.64% 28.04% 45.42% 62.84%
Passenger Cars 5.16% 8.91% 20.90% 45.03% 55.04% 1.44%
Machinery & Industrial Equipment 2.18% 3.19% 6.28% 13.04% 11.55% 23.62%
Computers & Business Machines 2.02% 2.71% 3.43% 10.36% 2.83% 0.00%
Other and Unknown 1.39% 2.62% 3.45% 1.29% 0.00% 0.17%
Table 2.11: Average LGD broken down by contract begin and asset type.
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 All years
All asset types 27.09% 27.41% 27.02% 20.14% 10.77% 21.93%
Commercial Vehicles 23.45% 28.59% 24.53% 16.11% 9.96% 19.98%
Passenger Cars 26.61% 23.10% 32.48% 16.49% 11.40% 22.26%
Machinery & Industrial Equipment 22.88% 21.53% 18.75% 15.70% 7.02% 16.22%
Computers & Business Machines 34.44% 33.96% 38.02% 34.51% 14.87% 30.64%
Other and Unknown 22.91% 24.61% 19.62% 16.89% 8.82% 17.72%
are replaced by zero losses. Note that negative LGDs are not rare for leases, as observed by
Hartmann-Wendels et al. (2014); Miller and Töws (2018). The average LGD broken down by
the asset type over the year corrected for resolution bias is shown in table 2.11. The calculated
LGDs produce a bimodal distribution. LGD from leases in other works, such as Laurent and
Schmit (2005); Hartmann-Wendels et al. (2014), also exhibit a bimodal or multimodal distribu-
tion.
Although our dataset is comparatively bigger than datasets used in the literature with a sim-
ilar topic (see table 2.1), the long-run average LGD as defined in EBA/GL/2019/03 cannot be
calculated, which requires at least a five-year period of data and various economic circumstances.
We estimate the long-run average LGD using the average LGD over all previous years. How-
ever, if the current realised LGD is higher than the long-run average, institutions are required
to use the higher LGD instead, as stated in EBA/GL/2019/03. There is no appealing reason to
assume that the years before 2007 are worse (LGD-wise) for leasing exposures than an average
year.
However, the long-run average LGD, as shown in table 2.12, is not yet adequate as input
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Table 2.12: Long-run average LGD broken down by contract begin and asset type.
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
All asset types 27.09% 27.41% 27.14% 24.90% 21.93%
Commercial Vehicles 23.45% 28.59% 25.46% 22.46% 19.98%
Passenger Cars 26.61% 24.55% 32.48% 24.76% 22.26%
Machinery & Industrial Equipment 28.88% 21.96% 20.14% 18.59% 16.22%
Computers & Business Machines 34.44% 34.13% 38.02% 35.54% 30.64%
Other and Unknown 22.91% 24.61% 21.69% 20.19% 17.60%
for the IRBA. The IRBA is designed to calculate EL during a downturn period. Therefore, a
downturn LGD is also required. Both the EBA/CP/2018/07 and the EBA/CP/2018/08 set the
guidelines and requirements for a downturn LGD calculation. In summary, the downturn LGD
is defined as the (either observed or estimated) LGD in a period where various selections of
relevant macroeconomic factors have been most severe over the last 20 years. Typically, banks
will identify 2008/2009 as a downturn period using the GDP growth (and other proxies) as
identifiers and assign the respective LGD as the downturn LGD. As shown in table 2.11 and
2.12, it is clear that the LGDs over the years show a peak in the years 2008 and 2009. Given
the available dataset, using the maximum LGD from table 2.12 per asset type is adequately
conservative. In order to outset the lost effect from missing discounting rate and workout costs,
an additional 3% is added in the downturn LGD.
Similarly to PDs, there are also input floors for the calculated LGDs (in this case, the down-
turn LGDs). As per Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2017a), the input floor is 15%
for a secured exposure with physical collateral and 25% or 30% for an unsecured exposure. In
contrast to the SA, leasing objects can be used as collaterals in the IRBA, which reduces the
RWs through the LGD input. Even with a 40% haircut, it is clear that the LGD parameter floor
lies below the downturn LGD in our dataset, so a further adjustment for the LGD floors is not
necessary.
Although the LGD is a parameter required as an input in the IRBA, it is more natural to
discuss the recovery rate (RR) for leasing objects. A leasing exposure is tied closely to its leased
object. Thus, it makes more sense to analyse the recovery from selling the leased asset. In
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Table 2.13: Direct Comparison of asset recovery rate and 1-LGD from table 2.11 by asset type.
Asset Recovery Rate 1-LGD
Commercial Vehicles 78.13% 80.02%
Passenger Cars 72.49% 77.74%
Machinery & Industrial Equipment 81.67% 83.78%
Computers & Business Machines 65.66% 69.36%
Other 78.21% 82.28%
general, the recovery rate is typically defined as (1-LGD) or vice versa. In terms of the asset
recovery, we can calculate the recovery rate as the quotient of the disposal value (after deducting
the residual value) and the initial outstanding. The residual value risk is more prominent for
leasing exposures than for secured loans. If the lessor misestimates the residual value, it will be
reflected in the asset recovery directly. Assuming the asset is sold, the disposal value should be
available. In the other case, there are two possible outcomes. The default is either closed or not
closed in the dataset. Resolved defaults without an asset sale can occur due to many reasons,
including the lessor writes off the remaining exposure, the default is cured, or the leased asset is
worthless. In this case, we calculate the recovery rate by using the recorded final loss (since the
default is closed). If the default is not closed and the asset is not sold, then we use the estimate
from table 2.10.
Default
Asset sold
RR = Disposal value−Residual valueOutstanding MLP
Asset not sold
Closed
RR = Outstanding MLP−Final LossOutstanding MLP
Not closed
min(1,E[1−LGDi|T (i)])
Figure 2.3: Tree diagram of RR calculation/estimation based on contract’s default and sale
status
Table 2.13 shows a direct comparison between the asset recovery rate and the parameter (1-
LGD). It is not surprising that the latter is often bigger because the recovery typically not only
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consists of the sale value. The fact that they are close to one another highlights the importance
of the asset’s role in the recovery process of defaulted leasing contracts.
2.4.2 Regulatory Risk Weights
There are currently three possible approaches under the credit risk framework to calculate the
regulatory capital requirements: the SA, the foundation IRBA (F-IRBA), and the advanced
IRBA (A-IRBA). These approaches serve mainly as a guideline to assign an RW to a given
exposure. While the SA is quite rigid, the IRBA is designed to be flexible.
The SA sets the RW based on the exposure’s asset classification and its credit quality. At
best, the RW can be 0%, e. g. for sovereign exposures with the highest credit quality, and at worst
150% for exposures with the lowest credit quality. Since lessees are often of an SME or a retail
type, it is in many cases not possible to acquire an external credit rating for these obligors. In
the dataset, such information is also not available. It is realistic to assume that most of the time
lessors do not have a reliable source to classify SME lessees to the given credit quality groups.
Only some of the financial collateral types are eligible for risk mitigation under the SA, while
physical collateral types, i. e. leased assets, are not eligible. This treatment renders a leasing
contract similar to an unsecured exposure. This restriction holds as well in the revision of the
Basel framework. Other changes include the introduction of new asset classes.
The dataset gives clear information on the exposure type for all leasing contracts. We assume
all exposures are unrated, except the sovereign class. The assigned RWs are, therefore:
• Corporate (CRRArt.122): 100% for unrated corporates and since none of the exposure’s
countries has higher RW,
• Institutions (CRR Art.120-121): to be treated similarly to sovereign exposures,
• Retail (CRR Art.123): flat 75%,
• Sovereign (CRR Art.114): 0%-100% based on the worst rating out of Standard & Poor’s
or Moody’s ratings in the given period,
• Unknown: 100% conservatively treated as an unrated corporate exposure,
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• SME (CRR Art.501): apply the SME supporting factor of 0.7619 if the exposure is not
defaulted,
• Defaulted (CRR Art.114, 120-123): flat 150%.
The revision of Basel III introduces different classifications for the SA. A summary of the
changes can be found in the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2017b). One of the
significant changes, which have impacts on our calculation, is the introduction of an RW of 85%
for corporate SME exposures specifically. Due to the RW reduction for SME exposures, it is also
discussed whether the SME supporting factor will be removed. Although it is not yet certain,
the removal is recommended by the EBA/OP/2019/09a, since the supporting factor has not yet
fulfilled its intended purpose as reported by the EBA/OP/2016/04. Overall, the regulatory capital
requirement of an average lessor using the SA will most likely experience a slight increase if its
portfolio composition does not change.
Both the F-IRBA and the A-IRBA require a number of input parameters to calculate the
RWs. For our purposes, the most relevant ones are the PD and the LGD as well as the total
yearly revenue for corporates. While institutions with the A-IRBA have the flexibility to model
and calculate their own LGD, those with the F-IRBA do not. The LGD used for the F-IRBA
is predetermined at 40% for senior secured exposures (by physical assets with a 140% ratio of
collateral to exposure values) and 45% for senior unsecured exposures. These values are gen-
erally conservative, which lead institutions as well as leasing companies to prefer A-IRBA to
F-IRBA. However, the finalisation of the Basel III Accord limits some asset classes to use only
the F-IRBA or the SA, e. g. for corporates with consolidated revenues over e500m. The finali-
sation also reduces the predetermined LGD for senior secured exposures with physical collateral
to 25% and for unsecured exposures on corporates or banks to 40% or 45%, respectively. For
the A-IRBA, an input floor of 15% (for secured exposures), 25% (for unsecured corporate expo-
sures), and 30% (for unsecured retail exposures) are introduced. For leasing exposure, where the
collateral value and the exposure value are equal without taking profit into account, only 71.43%
(≈ 100%/140%) of the outstanding amount can be recognised as collateralised and the remaining
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28.57% as uncollateralised. It implies an effective LGD of
LGDF = 45% · 40%140% +40% ·
100%
140%
= 41.43%.
Note that the effective LGD would be 30.71% for banks or 29.29% for corporate exposures in
the new framework. The effective LGD floor for the A-IRBA would be 17.86% for corporate
exposures (if the A-IRBA is allowed) and 19.29% for retail exposures, assuming there is no addi-
tional collateral. In this essay, the total yearly revenue, which affects the correlation coefficient,
is assumed to be e10m.
For the sake of comparability between the regulatory approaches, we assume that retail ex-
posures are also allowed to be treated with the F-IRBA. If we exclude retail exposures in the
F-IRBA evaluation, any difference in the result between the A-IRBA and the F-IRBA may in-
herently come from the portfolio composition and not necessarily from the regulatory treatments.
Since the main purpose is to evaluate the different regulatory approaches, we decide to apply a
pseudo-F-IRBA for retails, i. e. an effective LGD of 41.43% is used for non-defaulted exposures.
With all the components, the RW for non-defaulted exposures is calculated as follows
RW =
(
LGD ·N
( 1
1−R ·G(PD)+
√
R
1−R ·G(0.999)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≈VaR
−LGD ·PD︸ ︷︷ ︸
≈EL
)
·
MF ·12.5 ·1.06,
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where for corporate, institution, and sovereign exposures:
R = 0.12 · 1− e
−50·PD
e−50
+0.24 ·
(
1− 1− e
−50·PD
e−50
)
−0.04 ·
(
1− min{max{5,S},50}−5
45
)
MF =
1+(M−2.5) ·b
1−1.5 ·b , where
M = max
{
1,min
{∑t t ·CFt
∑t CFt
,5
}}
for A-IRBA or M = 2.5 for F-IRBA, and
b = (0.11852−0.05478 · ln(PD))2
and for retail exposures:
R = 0.03 · 1− e
−35·PD
e−35
+0.16 ·
(
1− 1− e
−35·PD
e−35
)
and MF = 1.
N and G denote the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal random distribution
and its inverse. S represents the total annual group revenue. Given a constant monthly lease
payment, a simple algebraic transformation leads to
M = max
{
1,min
{T +1
12 ·2 ,5
}}
,
where T is the remaining leasing term in months. The factor 1.06 is omitted in the revised Basel.
Defaulted exposures have RWs of 0% under the F-IRBA, and RW = max{0,12.5 · (LGD−
ELBE)} under the A-IRBA, where ELBE stands for the Expected Loss Best Estimate. Despite
the name, the LGD in the IRBA formula is an input parameter for the downturn LGD and is not
the average LGD. Thus, the difference (LGD-ELBE) is the loss ratio, which is not yet covered
by the loss loan provisions. We set the LGD as the downturn LGD explained in section 2.4.1
and ELBE as the long-run-average LGD (table 2.12), assuming leasing companies adequately
predict their average LGD for the year and set the loss provisions accordingly.
The SME supporting factor of 0.7619 is multiplied with the calculated RW if the contract
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does not default. The classification of SME is given in the dataset. In practice, the burden
of proof for this lies on the institutions. Since some may refuse or are not able to give the
information on their revenues, there might be some SME exposures to which the SME supporting
factor cannot be applied.
Although most of the predetermined LGDs for the F-IRBA are lower in the revision and
other changes hints to less strict regulation, some new rules are introduced such as input and
output floors or limitations of which approaches to use for a particular asset class. Overall, a
slight increase in portfolio RW can be expected as reported by the European Banking Authority
(2019).
2.4.3 Portfolio Simulation
The main goal is to estimate the UL of a leasing portfolio. As explained at the beginning of
this section, the EL conditional on the latent factor at 99.9% level (what the IRBA is modelled
for) and the 99.9% loss percentile are different objects. Their equivalence is only guaranteed
asymptotically under some assumptions.
The simplest way to estimate the 99.9% loss percentile is by approximating the loss dis-
tribution. The losses can be closely replicated by simulating randomly i.i.d. portfolios of a
representative lessor. It is easy to calculate the portfolio loss, given its exact composition, since
losses are observed/estimated based on section 2.4.1. As the number of drawn contracts in a
simulated portfolio grows to infinity, the resulted loss distribution converges to the systematic
loss distribution due to the asymptotic equivalence (see Gordy (2003)). However, lessors with
infinitely fine-grained portfolio do not exist. By overdrawing in the simulation, there is an issue
of over-diversification and the fact that the drawing pot does not have infinitely many contracts
are good arguments to limit the number of drawn contracts to an appropriate amount.
To avoid those issues, the portfolio size is assumed conservatively to be 40,000 leasing con-
tracts, which is less than the average portfolio size (vary from years to years). Considering the
fact that the participating companies are big leasing companies or belong to a big group, se-
2.4. METHODOLOGIES 29
Figure 2.4: Histogram of portfolio loss simulation
lecting a relatively lower number of contracts than the average portfolio size is a conservative
assumption for the UL estimation. The choice of portfolio size can affect the 99.9% loss per-
centile. A small portfolio will have a higher loss percentile, which in return implies a higher
UL (see Pirotte and Vaessen (2008)). It might be even more conservative in choosing for a
portfolio size less than 40,000 contracts, but assuming a small number of contracts violates the
fine-granularity assumption. Thus the asymptotic equivalence does no longer apply. In other
words, the UL estimate cannot be compared to the IRBA capital requirements. Repeating this
process 10,000 times ensures the convergence of the sample distribution towards the real loss
distribution of a representative leasing portfolio due to the law of large numbers, and in extension
also towards the systematic loss distribution due to Gordy (2003).
In each random portfolio, there are a number of defaulted contracts. The number of defaults
in each simulation can be controlled by simulating the default rates. This step can e. g. be
done by using the Poisson distribution to generate a random number of defaults and draw a
number of defaulted and non-defaulted contracts accordingly. Such a method can be found
e. g. in Deloitte (2013a). While this step ensures the number of defaults match with the statistics,
30 CHAPTER 2. BASEL III TREATMENT ON LEASING EXPOSURES
there is a mismatch between the proportion of defaulted contracts in a portfolio and the default
rate. Although leasing companies generally try to minimise the workout duration, the overall
process may take longer than one year. During this duration, the defaulted contracts stay in the
portfolio and raise the proportion of defaulted contracts over the observed default rates. For the
calculation of the capital requirement, it is necessary to take long durations into account, since
these defaults have to be covered by capital as well over their workout process. Thereby, we
decide on a simulation, which does not draw defaulted and non-defaulted contracts separately.
Given the simulated random portfolio losses P1, . . . ,P10,000 and let the P(0.999) be the 99.9%-
th biggest loss among the 10,000 simulated losses and P the mean of the simulated random
portfolio losses, the UL can be calculated by
ÛL = P(0.999)−P .
For each simulation type, 10,000 random portfolios (each with 40,000 leasing contracts) will be
drawn. Various simulation types will be considered, e. g. year-specific, asset-specific, exposure-
specific, etc.
As argued before that leasing is more asset-based, a similar analysis can also be done using
recovery rates instead of losses. Let us consider an asset pool where seized collateral items are
collected for further liquidation or re-lease. In particular, we are interested in the one-tailed 1%
quantile of the pool value, which is oriented on the risk mitigation technique for the SA if the
collaterals are eligible (CRR Art.225). Physical assets are in general ineligible as collaterals for
the SA. Consequently, this limitation belongs to the reasons why asset-based finance institutions
(such as leasing companies) prefer the IRBA to the SA, simply due to the fact that physical
assets can be used to mitigate the risk in the IRBA.
Physical assets are generally depreciating assets, so their values depend significantly on their
age. Although, the information on the asset’s age as well as the depreciation rate is not available.
However, typically a leased asset is often new at the beginning of the contract, so the contract
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Table 2.14: Number of defaults broken down by asset type and contract age at default in years.
Default definition is based on the Basel framework.
t < 1 1≤ t < 2 2≤ t < 3 3≤ t < 4 t ≥ 4 Total
Commercial Vehicles 5,383 8,037 7,544 5,277 2,948 29,189
Passenger Cars 4,016 5,049 4,779 3,037 865 17,746
Machinery & Industrial Equipment 5,754 7,510 6,984 4,993 4,032 29,273
Computers & Business Machines 7,569 8,419 6,577 3,729 1,753 28,047
Other and Unknown 2,130 2,340 1,814 1,119 861 8,264
Table 2.15: Average asset recovery rates broken down by asset type and contract age at default
in years. Default definition is based on the Basel framework.
t < 1 1≤ t < 2 2≤ t < 3 3≤ t < 4 t ≥ 4 Total
Commercial Vehicles 72.63% 74.34% 79.05% 81.37% 81.08% 78.13%
Passenger Cars 72.90% 69.93% 71.75% 76.66% 73.36% 72.49%
Machinery & Industrial Equipment 83.87% 79.36% 80.43% 83.93% 81.83% 81.67%
Computers & Business Machines 69.19% 64.35% 63.44% 65.47% 66.58% 65.66%
Other and Unknown 80.24% 77.62% 77.78% 80.38% 76.14% 79.40%
age can act as a proxy. For a defaulted contract, there are generally four available timestamps:
the contract begin, the default date, the sale date, and the resolution date. In the context of
depreciating assets, the duration between the contract begin and the sale event should be the best
choice to be a determinant for their values. Not only does the sale event not necessarily exist
in all cases but both the sale event and the resolution event are also post-default information. If
lessors know the exact sale and resolution dates, then there is less need for volatility analysis.
Henceforth, we use the duration between contract begin and default event (t) to determine the
trend of the recovery rate. Since most of the defaults occur under three or four years in our
dataset, we define five time-buckets: t < 1; 1≤ t < 2; 2≤ t < 3; 3≤ t < 4; and t ≥ 4 years.
Similarly to the previous analysis, the procedures are done with 10,000 repetitions for each
asset type and time bucket. The asset pool size has an impact on the convergence rate of the
loss/recovery distribution. A large pool ensures convergence but may inhibit an over-diversification
effect, while a small pool can be extremely volatile. The appropriate choice for the represen-
tativeness would be the average asset pool size of lessors. We decide on 1,000 assets for each
time-bucket and asset type. In some rare cases, in which the dataset within a time-bucket is too
small (see table 2.14), only about half from the available dataset is drawn randomly.
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Table 2.16: Regulatory capital requirements under three approaches (Standardised Approach,
Foundation and Advanced Internal Ratings-Based Approach) for each EAD unit and the simu-
lated unexpected loss broken down by year. The calculation assumes a solvency ratio of 10.5%.
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 All years
SA 8.17% 7.97% 8.33% 8.44% 8.50% 8.31%
F-IRBA 5.29% 5.41% 5.92% 5.94% 5.92% 5.76%
A-IRBA 4.03% 4.57% 5.56% 6.12% 6.50% 5.55%
UL 1.03% 1.45% 1.29% 0.65% 0.52% 1.09%
2.5 Simulation Result
This section presents the simulation results in two parts: 1) a comparison of the regulatory RWs
and the ULs; and 2) a recovery analysis of the leased assets.
To calculate the regulatory capital requirements of an exposure, the calculated exposure’s
RW is multiplied by its exposure amount at default (EAD). In the portfolio, the total of the risk-
weighted exposure amounts is then multiplied with the capital adequacy ratio of 10.5%. Table
2.16 shows high ULs in the pre-crisis and crisis periods, but low ULs in the post-crisis periods.
This result, in particular, represents a total of 60,000 randomly drawn leasing portfolios (10,000
each for every year and 10,000 for the global simulation). Both the IRBA responds sensitively
with the crisis. As the input parameters, the PD and the LGD, soar high during the downturn
periods, so do the IRBA regulatory capital requirements. These effects typically will not vanish
for the following years afterwards because of the use of long-average default rates. The RWs
under the SA are quite rigid across the years compared to those under the IRBA. In contrast
to the IRBA, the only risk factor that can drive the SA capital requirement up is the default
composition of the portfolio (150% RW for defaulted exposures compared to 75%-100% for
other asset classes). If the regulatory capital requirements are only weakly risk-sensitive (as
observed in table 2.16 for the SA), then there is only a weak incentive for institutions to reduce
their risk profile and to offer better risk management.
In general, we expect the SA capital requirements to be the highest, followed by the F-
IRBA capital requirements and then the A-IRBA capital requirements. The fact that the F-IRBA
2.5. SIMULATION RESULT 33
capital requirements fall below the A-IRBA capital requirements after the financial crisis (2010-
2011) is contra-intuitive and mostly caused by the framework design itself. The A-IRBA capital
requirements are not only sensitive towards the PD and the LGD inputs but also towards the
number of defaults remaining in the portfolio. After the financial crisis, the default composition
in the portfolio increases, which does not necessarily imply a higher workout duration compared
to the pre-crisis period. While the A-IRBA sets a high capitalisation rate for defaulted exposures,
the F-IRBA sets it to zero, which altogether explains the lower percentages for the F-IRBA
capital requirements in 2010-2011 compared to the A-IRBA capital requirements.
From the regulatory perspective, the expectation that the SA capital requirements are higher
than the other approaches is not a desirable property. In practice, it is not surprising that IRBA
institutions have a lower capital ratio compared to SA institutions because institutions need to
actively seek for permission to be allowed to use the IRBA. Institutions which cannot profit
from the IRBA will not actively seek for permission. However, given a particular exposure, the
SA should not put SA institutions in disadvantages compared to IRBA institutions. Typically,
IRBA institutions justify their lower capital ratio due to their extensive and more granular risk
analysis. The results of the analysis, as presented in table 2.16, are not granular. This difference
between the SA and the IRBA capital requirements for leasing gives evidence that lessors are at
a disadvantage if they are not permitted to use the IRBA.
The results of the portfolio simulation in table 2.16 show significant differences between the
regulatory capital requirements and the ULs. In summary, the regulatory capital requirements
from all approaches can reach five to eight times as high as the UL in the same year. However,
the UL alone is not sufficient to explain the loss potential of an exposure. This information
needs to be paired with the information on the EL to understand the total credit risk profile of
an exposure. A gap between the regulatory capital requirement and the estimated UL alone is
not a surprise since the regulatory capital requirements are designed to be higher than the UL to
accommodate for model/measurement error and margin of conservatism (MoC). An excessively
high regulatory capital requirement may lead to negative effects, such as higher social/welfare
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costs (Van den Heuvel (2008); Mikkelsen and Pedersen (2017)) and higher WACC (Kashyap
et al. (2010); Cosimano and Hakura (2011); Miles et al. (2013)), which ultimately leads to a
hindrance in the economy.
Across all of the year-specific simulations and the global simulation, we examine whether
there is any portfolio out of 60,000 simulated portfolios, in which the regulatory capital re-
quirement cannot adequately cover the realised loss. Every single one of the 60,000 portfolios
adequately covers the realised loss, although profits from healthy leasing contracts are not con-
sidered in this analysis. Based on the asymptotic equivalence between the VaR and the con-
ditional loss as explained at the beginning of section 2.4, we would expect about 0.1% of the
simulated portfolio losses to be higher than the regulatory capital requirement. The fact that we
cannot observe any portfolio in which the regulatory capital requirement cannot cover the re-
alised portfolio loss further supports the argument that the regulatory capital requirements may
be too conservative.
We trace back the minimum amount of capital required to fulfil a given condition by using
the reverse stress test method (see table 2.25). We choose the SA capital requirement as the
base for this test5. The SA capital requirement is multiplied by a factor which is increased
incrementally until a given condition is achieved, e. g. the UL is adequately covered. In other
words, the solvency coefficient is reduced to a certain percentage, in which the simulation detects
a breach, e. g. the UL exceeds the regulatory capital requirement. Surprisingly, a factor of merely
15% from the SA capital requirement is needed to cover the UL in the global simulation (in other
words: the SA capital requirement has an 85% buffer) and at most of a 19% during the downturn
period (2008) (which implies an 81% buffer). This analysis assumes that lessors estimated their
ELs correctly and set their loss provision accordingly. If the condition is expanded for the
coverage of both the EL and the UL (i. e. the VaR at 99.9%-level), the minimum percentage
rises to a 37% and at most to a 52% of the SA capital requirement for the global simulation
and the downturn period simulation (2008), respectively. After 42% and at most 58% of the SA
5The reason for this will be explained in details in section 2.6.
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Table 2.17: Comparison of the regulatory capital requirements under three approaches (Stan-
dardised Approach, Foundation and Advanced Internal Ratings-Based Approach) for each EAD
unit and the simulated UL broken down by year and asset type. The calculation assumes a
solvency ratio of 10.5%.
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 All years
Commercial Vehicles
SA 8.15% 7.73% 8.19% 8.39% 8.54% 8.21%
F-IRBA 5.29% 5.25% 5.62% 5.56% 5.51% 5.47%
A-IRBA 4.06% 4.36% 5.56% 6.58% 7.44% 5.79%
UL 0.46% 0.43% 0.38% 0.33% 0.24% 0.37%
Passenger Cars
SA 7.78% 7.81% 7.86% 7.88% 7.92% 7.86%
F-IRBA 5.24% 5.47% 5.73% 5.89% 6.04% 5.74%
A-IRBA 4.33% 4.71% 5.54% 5.76% 5.87% 5.37%
UL 0.42% 1.08% 0.62% 0.34% 0.22% 0.76%
Machinery & Industrial Equipment
SA 7.96% 8.01% 8.40% 8.58% 8.69% 8.38%
F-IRBA 5.15% 5.34% 5.84% 5.80% 5.73% 5.63%
A-IRBA 3.41% 4.09% 5.05% 5.70% 6.16% 5.07%
UL 0.94% 0.88% 0.81% 0.61% 0.48% 0.73%
Computers & Business Machines
SA 8.30% 7.71% 7.85% 7.81% 7.82% 7.85%
F-IRBA 5.30% 5.36% 5.89% 6.05% 6.09% 5.79%
A-IRBA 5.98% 6.13% 7.17% 7.19% 7.41% 6.87%
UL 0.72% 1.30% 1.06% 0.98% 0.95% 1.01%
Other and Unknown
SA 9.14% 8.53% 8.79% 8.84% 8.67% 8.76%
F-IRBA 5.84% 5.90% 6.54% 6.63% 6.48% 6.36%
A-IRBA 4.21% 4.45% 5.51% 5.80% 5.76% 5.33%
UL 0.33% 0.44% 0.38% 0.28% 0.19% 0.33%
capital requirement for the global simulation and the downturn period simulation, every single
simulated portfolios’ loss is covered by the reduced capital requirement.
For a specialised leasing company, which only leases a particular asset type, the results may
differ from table 2.16. For this purpose, similar simulations are conducted by filtering for a
particular asset type. Ships, Aircraft, Railway, and Rolling Stock are excluded. The simulated
asset-specialised leasing portfolio can be interpreted as a random portfolio of a representative
asset-specialised leasing company. This type is particularly popular among captives, as they
seek to offer various financing possibilities for their customers. For comparison, the exact same
bootstrap parameters were chosen (10,000 repetitions with 40,000 portfolio size).
Similar to table 2.16, the estimated ULs are significantly lower compared to the regulatory
capital requirements under all approaches. The ULs of the asset-specific simulations (table 2.17)
are consistently lower than the one from the global simulation (table 2.16). This observation can
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Table 2.18: Comparison of the regulatory capital requirements under three approaches (Stan-
dardised Approach, Foundation and Advanced Internal Ratings-Based Approach) for each EAD
unit and the simulated UL broken down by year and exposure type. The calculation assumes a
solvency ratio of 10.5%.
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 All years
Retail
SA 6.13% 6.32% 6.67% 6.93% 7.07% 6.71%
F-IRBA 4.16% 4.23% 4.29% 4.19% 4.08% 4.14%
A-IRBA 3.36% 3.84% 4.47% 4.85% 4.73% 4.69%
UL 0.70% 0.70% 0.58% 0.52% 0.47% 0.60%
Corporate
SA 9.60% 9.45% 9.73% 9.83% 9.84% 9.52%
F-IRBA 6.04% 6.46% 7.23% 7.42% 7.45% 7.02%
A-IRBA 4.76% 5.56% 6.52% 6.41% 5.92% 6.29%
UL 0.54% 1.13% 1.07% 0.63% 0.49% 0.84%
be explained by the fact that randomly drawn contracts with the same asset types have a similar
loss distribution. Hence, the deviation from the mean is lower compared to the global simulation.
Note that the UL is the difference between the VaR (estimated by the 99,9% percentile of the
loss distribution) and the EL (estimated by the mean of the loss distribution). Henceforth, the
UL is proportional to the standard deviation.
Similarly, the simulation can also be done by segmenting over the exposure type. However,
there are some exposure types of which the amount of data is not appropriate for a Monte Carlo
simulation. A similar exclusion is also done for an asset type (Ships, Aircraft, Railway, Rolling
Stock). For the exposure-specific simulation, we only use retail and corporate exposures with the
same parameters as previous simulations. For the sake of comparability, we also calculate the
F-IRBA capital requirement for retail-specific portfolios using the pseudo-F-IRBA, as explained
in section 2.4.2.
The effect of the SME supporting factor can be clearly seen in table 2.18 since all of the
retail exposures but only a fraction of the corporate exposures are considered SME exposures
in the simulation. While the impact of the financial crisis can be distinctively identified for the
corporate exposures, the ULs for the retail exposures interestingly are quite stable. Another in-
teresting observation is the fact that the retail-specialised portfolios also show higher A-IRBA
capital requirements than the F-IRBA capital requirements in the downturn periods. As men-
2.5. SIMULATION RESULT 37
Table 2.19: Comparison of the regulatory capital requirements under three approaches (Stan-
dardised Approach, Foundation and Advanced Internal Ratings-Based Approach) for each EAD
unit without SME supporting factor and the simulated UL broken down by year. The calculation
assumes a solvency ratio of 10.5%.
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 All years
No Supporting Factor
SA 8.98% 8.75% 9.00% 9.06% 9.12% 9.62%
F-IRBA 5.98% 6.12% 6.57% 6.54% 6.51% 6.76%
A-IRBA 4.63% 5.37% 6.41% 6.46% 6.07% 5.93%
UL 1.03% 1.45% 1.29% 0.65% 0.52% 1.10%
tioned before, the A-IRBA capital requirements are risk-sensitive and typically increase during
the post-crisis period, mainly due to the increase in the PDs. If the F-IRBA capital requirements
exceed the A-IRBA capital requirements, the proportion between defaulted and non-defaulted
contracts must have been shifted. The fact that the retail-specialised portfolio does not follow
this pattern indicates that the default proportion for the retail exposures is not changed signifi-
cantly after the financial crisis.
Due to the recent recommendation for the removal of the SME supporting factor brought
in EBA/OP/2019/09a, it is interesting to see how this particular change will impact the whole
analysis. Note that the introduction of the SME supporting factor does not aim to ensure an
appropriate risk evaluation of SME exposures, but rather to give incentive for banks to increase
SME lending following a crisis, as stated in EBA/OP/2016/04, under the assumption that capital
requirement is one of many determinants affecting lending decisions. Although table 2.19 shows
a significant increase in the capital requirements, which widens the gap between the capital
requirements and the ULs, it does not necessarily imply a stronger incentive to offer one financial
instrument over another. A similar impact will most likely be observable within banks’ portfolios
with similar SME proportion. Note that the ULs from table 2.16 and table 2.19 are identical,
since the SME supporting factor influence only the regulatory capital requirements.
Under the IFRS 16, lessors have to categorise a leasing contract into one of two types: fi-
nance lease or operating lease. Roughly speaking, the first one covers leasing contracts in which
financing the leased asset is the primary purpose of the lease, while the latter one is associated
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Table 2.20: Comparison of the regulatory capital requirements under three approaches (Stan-
dardised Approach, Foundation and Advanced Internal Ratings-Based Approach) for each EAD
unit and the simulated UL broken down by year and contract type. The calculation assumes a
solvency ratio of 10.5%.
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 All years
Finance Lease
SA 8.10% 7.89% 8.29% 8.44% 8.51% 8.28%
F-IRBA 5.27% 5.39% 5.91% 5.91% 5.86% 5.74%
A-IRBA 3.93% 4.45% 5.44% 6.09% 6.54% 5.52%
UL 1.01% 1.44% 1.23% 0.71% 0.54% 1.23%
Operating Lease
SA 8.41% 8.49% 8.64% 8.55% 8.47% 8.52%
F-IRBA 5.37% 5.59% 5.99% 6.25% 6.38% 5.93%
A-IRBA 4.45% 5.34% 6.57% 6.34% 6.23% 5.82%
UL 0.68% 0.71% 0.58% 0.49% 0.20% 0.62%
Table 2.21: 1% percentile of the asset pool’s recovery rates distribution broken down by contract
age and asset type.
t < 1 1≤ t < 2 2≤ t < 3 3≤ t < 4 t ≥ 4 Total
Commercial Vehicles 72.84% 73.74% 74.99% 80.89% 75.30% 74.77%
Passenger Cars 62.41% 65.01% 66.45% 69.77% 67.08% 63.12%
Machinery & Industrial Equipment 72.82% 73.79% 78.89% 80.76% 75.90% 75.25%
Computers & Business Machines 68.70% 59.19% 54.96% 56.78% 62.09% 60.56%
Other and Unknown 68.86% 78.40% 75.12% 76.58% 62.84% 70.45%
with leasing contracts in which a temporary need for the asset for the business’ operation is
the core of the contract. The significant difference between those contract types is the residual
value. Since we disregard the capital requirement for the residual value in this analysis, the
difference between the finance lease and operating lease contains only information on the credit
risk. Table 2.20 shows that the difference between the two contract types in the regulatory re-
quirement is negligible. Although stated earlier that a UL comparison alone cannot say much
without information on the ELs, lower ULs for operating leases may hint to operating leases
being less susceptible to a downturn event compared to finance leases. The indirect influence
due to portfolio composition cannot be excluded in this analysis, e. g. a finance lease is more
popular for automotive, but an operating lease is more popular for office equipment, thus affects
the risk profile explicitly.
The second part of this section presents the results of the recovery analysis of leased assets
from the defaulted cases in the dataset. As stated previously, leasing is more asset-oriented, so
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it makes sense to expand the analysis to an asset pool simulation. From the regulatory point-
of-view, this part can be interpreted as an investigation for the impact, should leased assets be
an eligible collateral type for the SA. The method used for calculating the 1%-th one-tailed
percentile of the asset pool recovery rates is similar to the portfolio simulation. We can interpret
the resulted recovery rates as downturn recovery rates. The samples are divided depending on
the duration between the contract begin and the default event (t) in years. Although the asset’s
book value depreciates linearly, the disposal value may inhibit a different pattern. To support
this argument, we cannot observe a clear falling pattern in table 2.21, as it would be expected
of the book value of a depreciating asset. The downturn recovery rates of commercial vehicles,
machinery and industrial equipment are the highest at about 75% (the equivalent of a 25% LGD),
while the downturn recovery rates of other types may reach 60% (the equivalent of a 40% LGD).
Although the analysis is designed to evaluate the asset recovery, the calculated recovery rate
may include non-asset recoveries in some cases. This is especially the case if the default is not
yet closed in the dataset. In practice, having the legal right to seize the asset may suffice for a
high recovery rate without actually seizing the asset. Office equipment is a typical example of an
asset type with a fast depreciation rate. However, defaulted firms will typically prioritise to pay
their lease obligations during the default process since their priority is to recover. By neglecting
the lease obligations, it will trigger an asset seizure, which may disable them to operate further.
In summary, we observe an overall low UL-level for leasing exposures. The required capital
is conservative in the sense that it can cover the potential UL multiple times. This is only appro-
priate if we argue that the financial crisis is not an appropriate choice of downturn periods for
leasing exposures. We sincerely doubt that a potential leasing-associated downturn period may
have a much worse impact (than five- to eight-fold of the observed impact during the financial
crisis) to justify for this wide gap. However, our portfolio analysis only compares the UL and the
regulatory capital requirement because it is designed to cover the UL. In practice, lessors (and
other financial institutions) do not only have to deal with the UL of their portfolio, but also the
EL. The VaR (as the sum of the EL and the UL) may not be in a comparable magnitude as the
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UL alone. Whether the EL is also comparably low depends primarily on the individual internal
strategies of the lessors. If the trend persists that lessees as firms have in general low credit qual-
ity, as e. g. reported by Sharpe and Nguyen (1995), it may not be surprising to observe a high
EL. The low level of the ULs in our portfolio analysis only supports the proposition that losses
from leasing exposures are typically not unexpected. The asset recovery analysis confirms that
the characteristics of leasing, such as legal ownership, internal expertise of the assets, etc. play
in favour for the lessors. For some asset types, it may even reach an equivalent downturn LGD
of 25%.
2.6 Lowest Bound on Risk Weight Reduction
The previous section not only confirms the adequateness but also the excessive conservativeness
of the Basel capital requirement for leasing exposures, complementary to Schmit (2004, 2005);
Pirotte and Vaessen (2008); Eisfeldt and Rampini (2009). This section concentrates on the other
end of the discussion. For the relevant regulatory authorities, any change in the regulation will
have some systematic effects which may have some negative impacts. In many respects, a
finance lease is similar to a loan secured with a physical asset. Bayless and Diltz (1988) report
that financial institutions do not differentiate capital leases (comparable to finance leases) and
debts in terms of loan decision. It is debatable whether a change in the regulation regarding
leases will trigger a behaviour shift from financial institutions.
A treatment change favouring leases will have either a positive or negative effect on the
lease’s RW. 0% RW reduction will not change any behaviour, but 100% RW reduction will.
So, in-between there has to exist a critical boundary, in which a treatment change will still not
trigger a change in behaviour. We look for this bound of which a treatment change will still
be considered neutral, i. e. no incentive for institutions to favour offering leases over debts. The
decision whether to offer leases or debts should not depend on the regulatory capital requirement,
but rather the associated risk profile. If institutions start to favour one instrument due to its low
2.6. LOWEST BOUND ON RISK WEIGHT REDUCTION 41
capital requirement despite its (potentially high) risk, the regulatory framework may create an
unintended portfolio shift in the system which ultimately can lead to an overall higher systematic
risk. Regardless of how the treatment change takes form, the relevant authorities may evaluate
the impact of their recommendation against the bounds from this essay. The two highlighted
aspects (adequateness and neutrality) play a central role in the further analysis. For this purpose,
this section consists of three parts: 1) an impact analysis on the eligibility of leased assets as
collateral under the SA; 2) an impact analysis on the notion of neutral capital requirements; and
3) a robustness analysis by a reverse stress test on the previous results.
We first consider the possibility that physical assets are eligible for the SA. In particular, this
implies that lessors are allowed to apply the risk mitigation techniques under the comprehensive
approach for an eligible financial collateral type (CRR Art.223). If the exposure is secured and
its collateral is eligible, independently from the fact whether it is a lease, then the institution can
adjust the EAD amount by subtracting the estimated value of the security at the 1% percentile
(distressed collateral value) from the initial EAD. At least for leasing exposures, there are some
arguments defending the recognition of physical assets as eligible collaterals. A leasing asset’s
pool can arguably be considered high-quality security, not only due to the legal ownership or the
higher seniority, but also the easier repossession process (Eisfeldt and Rampini (2009)), the high
recovery rate (Schmit (2004); De Laurentis and Riani (2005)), the prepayments and the terminal
options, which reduce the overall risk (Realdon (2006)), and many other reasons.
Table 2.21 serves as a foundation for the asset pool’s value in the tail region of the value
distribution. The volatility adjustment in the regulatory risk mitigation technique considers dif-
ferent liquidation periods (CRR Art.224). Since the sell time point is not known in our dataset,
this cannot be investigated without further assumptions. The concern is that some asset types
cannot be sold properly in a timely manner during a downturn period, which has been thor-
oughly discussed in the previous section. Seizing and selling the leased assets do not always
have a high priority in the workout process. Lessors may yield a higher recovery rate by not
seizing the leased assets. For our analysis, the results from table 2.21 can be used as a proxy for
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Table 2.22: The asset-specific adjustment factors after 5% MoC based on the asset pool simu-
lation.
1% percentile recovery rates Adjustment Factor after 5% MoC
RR 1−RR
Commercial vehicles 0.7477 0.2523 0.27
Passenger cars 0.6312 0.3688 0.39
Machinery & industrial equipment 0.7525 0.2475 0.26
Computers & business machines 0.6056 0.3944 0.42
Other & unknown 0.7045 0.2955 0.32
a distressed collateral value (CRR Art.225). Assuming that the initial collateral value is equal to
the initial exposure amount (which is mostly the case for leases), we can interpret the volatility
adjustment as a haircut for the assets. The exposure after the haircut adjustment is defined as:
EAD∗ = EAD · (1−RR1%).
To account for misspecified models or assumptions, inadequate data quality, or unaccounted
bias, we adjust our result with a 5% MoC. Note that these values in table 2.22 are similar to
common LGD values and can also be interpreted as downturn LGDs. If physical assets become
eligible for the RW reduction, the appropriate haircut can at most be between 26% and 42%
according to our analysis, as shown in table 2.22. On the other hand, if the physical asset type
remains ineligible for the SA, any planned treatment change under the SA may have a reduction
effect of at most these factors (otherwise it will not be adequate). However, this analysis alone
only considers the collateral value but ignores the possibility of a higher default rate due to a
downturn event. In the SA, this should be captured by the assigned RWs depending on the credit
quality and the asset class.
Although the adjustment factors in table 2.22 cover the adequateness aspect, it is difficult
to see whether it creates an incentive for institutions to favour offering leases over debts. In the
second part of this section, we argue that the A-IRBA capital requirements can be considered
neutral for the institutions. The rationale is that any arguments defending the low risk profile
of leases should be reflected in the forms of either lower PD or lower LGD, which are the main
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Table 2.23: Lowest bounds for the expected effect from a treatment change, in various segmen-
tations, based on the portfolio simulation. Multiplying LB with the SA capital requirements will
yield the A-IRBA capital requirements.
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 All years
Global 0.4941 0.5731 0.6683 0.7242 0.7649 0.6678
Retail 0.5220 0.5802 0.6675 0.7601 0.8232 0.6706
Corporate 0.4797 0.5658 0.6633 0.6964 0.7245 0.6260
Commercial Vehicles 0.4987 0.5640 0.6785 0.7840 0.8718 0.7054
Passenger Cars 0.5566 0.6032 0.7047 0.7300 0.7413 0.6833
Machinery & Industrial Equipment 0.4277 0.5100 0.6012 0.6645 0.7093 0.6048
Computers & Business Machines 0.7205 0.7954 0.9128 0.9205 0.9474 0.8755
Other and Unknown 0.4605 0.5218 0.6271 0.6560 0.6652 0.6089
Finance Lease 0.4852 0.5640 0.6562 0.7216 0.7685 0.6667
Operating Lease 0.5291 0.6290 0.7604 0.7415 0.7355 0.6831
components of the A-IRBA. Note that the results on tables 2.16-2.20 incidentally also confirm
that the A-IRBA capital requirements are adequate to cover for the UL. So, any treatment change
for the SA, which reduces the SA capital requirement to at most the A-IRBA capital requirement,
can be considered as both adequate and neutral.
We set the lowest bound (LB) of the effect of a treatment change for leases as the ratio of
the regulatory capital requirement of a leasing portfolio using the A-IRBA and the SA.
LB =
C%A−IRBA
C%SA
,
where C% denotes the regulatory capital requirement ratio for the respective approach. These
bounds can also be calculated for more granular segmentation. Note that the choice of the
solvency ratio does not matter since the same factor appears twice at both the numerator as well
as the denominator.
The capital requirements based on the SA tend to be stable over time and independent from
the economic environment. The reason is that the portfolio compositions in our simulation do
not change drastically, and the SA capital requirements are based mostly on portfolio com-
positions. On the other hand, the A-IRBA capital requirements react sensitively towards the
PD and LGD inputs. This characteristic explains the variation of the LB throughout time, as
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Table 2.24: Global and asset-specific lowest bounds for expected effect from a favouring treat-
ment change after 5% MoC. After multiplying these factors to the SA capital requirements, the
resulted capital requirements remain adequate and neutral.
LB all years after 5% MoC
Global 0.6678 0.70
Commercial vehicles 0.7054 0.74
Passenger cars 0.6833 0.72
Machinery & industrial equipment 0.6048 0.64
Computers & business machines 0.8755 0.92
Other & unknown 0.6089 0.64
shown in table 2.23, which is exceptionally high during the financial crisis. Interestingly, the
retail-specific LBs are overall higher than the corporate-specific one. It implies that the regu-
latory treatment for retail exposures using the SA is quite lenient (no substantial improvement
by using the A-IRBA), but quite harsh for corporate exposures. The high LB for computers &
business machines (almost 90%) indicates that the difference between both approaches is most
likely negligible, while the other asset types seem to produce more consistent LBs, which are ca.
60%-70% globally. Even the contract type does not seem to contribute to the variation in LBs.
For a lessor specialised only in office equipment, a different regulatory treatment to leasing may
be appropriate. Compared to other specifications, the only specification in asset types gives a
different level of LBs. Including 5% MoC to account for potential misspecification of model
or assumptions, inadequate data quality, or unaccounted bias is appropriate, which results in the
higher LBs, as shown in table 2.24. These values consider any unexpected increase in both PD or
LGD during a downturn period. Any treatment change for leases should not have higher impacts
to the point that the remaining RWs are reduced to below these values. To judge whether these
values are substantial, the SME supporting factor of 0.7619 can be compared directly with the
0.70 LB after 5% MoC from table 2.24. A 70% LB means a 30% RW reduction for the relevant
exposures.
To close this section, we finally confirm these LBs independently using the reverse stress
test method. In short, we multiply the SA’s capital requirement of an exposure by a given factor
and investigate whether the portfolio meet various conditions: (UL) the SA capital requirement
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Table 2.25: Reverse Stress Test based of three benchmarks: The required capital after linear
reduction of risk weight is sufficient to cover for the Unexpected Loss (UL), the Value-at-Risk
(VaR), and the simulated Maximum Portfolio Loss (MPL).
Benchmark Simulation type Minimum Factor
UL
Global simulation 0.15
Max of all years 0.19 (2008)
Max of asset type and years 0.17 (p.cars 2008)
VaR
Global simulation 0.37
Max of all years 0.52 (2008)
Max of asset type and years 0.58 (p.cars 2008)
MPL
Global simulation 0.42
Max of all years 0.58 (2008)
Max of asset type and years 0.63 (p.cars 2008)
covers the UL, (VaR) the SA capital requirement covers both the EL and the UL, and (MPL) the
SA capital requirement covers the maximum of simulated portfolio losses. Using brute force,
we look for the minimum factor which meets these conditions. The simulation type will be
varied as well, either in the global dataset, a specific year, or a specific asset type. Compared to
the previous analysis, the minimum factor in this reverse stress test assumes that the treatment
change reduces the RW linearly. Any other risk weight reduction methods may give a different
result.
We would like to highlight the fact that the calibrated LBs, in table 2.24 with the 5% MoC,
are higher than the minimum factors shown in table 2.25, which confirms the adequateness
aspect. The neutrality aspect is implied directly from the construction of the LB. Note that
our simulation neither takes loss provision nor profit from non-defaulted contracts into account.
In other words, we confirm the adequateness even if the lessor calculates its loss provision
inadequately or cannot earn any profit due to a downturn event.
2.7 Conclusion
This essay reviews the adequateness of the existing Basel framework for leases while taking
the finalisation of Basel III into account. In particular, we are interested in the UL of leasing
exposures. To achieve this goal, we use a Monte Carlo based method to simulate a leasing
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portfolio and to quantify the associated UL, similar to the non-parametric methodology by Carey
(1998); Schmit (2004, 2005). For this purpose, we use a dataset of 2.4 million lease contracts
active during 2007-2011 from twelve major European leasing companies with contracts over 25
European countries. To our knowledge, this is the largest leasing dataset used for credit risk
research in the literature to date.
Although a slight overestimation in the Basel capital requirement is to be expected by design,
our result can no longer support the proposition that the framework is only slightly conservative.
The simulation results show that the Basel capital requirements exceed five to eight-fold of the
associated ULs. Based on the fact that the Basel framework is designed to cover for the UL,
we conclude that the current regulatory requirement for leases is quite excessive. Furthermore,
the SA capital requirement is only weakly risk-sensitive for leasing. SA lessors are at a dis-
advantage compared to IRBA lessors. Although our results are not new (compare with Schmit
(2004, 2005); Pirotte and Vaessen (2008); Eisfeldt and Rampini (2009)), a change in regulatory
treatment favouring lease exposures is unlikely without a further impact analysis. The regula-
tory framework should remain neutral in the sense that no incentives are created for institutions
to favour offering leases over debts, which may have a (potentially negative) systematic effect
in the overall lending market. We calculate the maximum reduction if any treatment change is
planned under the adequateness and neutrality conditions. Our results show that any treatment
change should not have a reduction effect of more than 30% to ensure both the adequateness and
the neutrality aspect of the regulatory capital requirement. A reverse stress test ensures that such
a reduction would not endanger the capability of lessors to cover for their ULs.
Chapter 3
Is the Regulatory Downturn LGD Adequate?
Performance Analysis and Alternative Methods
Thomas Hartmann-Wendels, Christopher Paulus Imanto
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3.1 Introduction
After long discussions and consultation processes, the European Banking Authority (EBA)
published the final regulatory technical standard (EBA/RTS/2018/04) and the final guidelines
(EBA/GL/2019/03) on the appropriate estimation of downturn Loss Given Default (LGD)1 un-
der the Advanced Internal Rating-Based Approach (IRBA). The technical standard relies on the
basic idea that downturn LGD estimates shall be based on macroeconomic proxies. During
downturn periods, LGDs are expected to rise systematically, and this effect needs to be reflected
in the capital requirement.
Shortly following the publication of EBA/RTS/2018/04, which specifies the definition of
an economic downturn, the guideline EBA/GL/2019/03 is also published to set the appropri-
1LGD is defined as the fraction of loss to its exposure at the default time point. Loosely speaking, the downturn
LGD is intended to be the expected LGD during downturn periods, i. e. during crises.
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ate methodologies for estimating the downturn LGD. Since an economic downturn is already
defined in the IRBA framework, there are two distinct downturn definitions. The IRBA relies
on the calculation of the expected loss conditioned on a single systematic factor (also known
as the latent variable X) and the definition of an economic downturn is traditionally defined as
the event, where the latent variable takes a conservative value (X =−Φ−1(0.999)). In contrast,
the macroeconomic based downturn definition is set to be the worst macroeconomic realisation
over the last 20 years. This inconsistency in the downturn definition can potentially result in a
risk underestimation. The required 99.9% confidence level will likely not be reached with the
downturn LGD based on the aforementioned guideline.
The consistency itself was never a rigid technical requirement within the IRBA. However,
any standards and practices potentially leading to a risk underestimation cannot be ignored, es-
pecially as regulatory policies. At the bare minimum, the macroeconomic based downturn defi-
nition should be at least as strict as the latent variable based one. To provide a quick judgement,
one can directly compare the frequency of such a downturn period under a particular definition.
The latent variable based downturn period occurs on average once every 1,000 years, while the
macroeconomic based one occurs once every 20 years.
Existing conditional LGD estimation methods based on latent variables (see Frye (2013) for
a summary of some existing models) usually focus on a market-based LGD dataset, i. e. the LGD
values based on the price at which the defaulted debt instruments are traded shortly after default.
For defaulted instruments with a long workout process (typically in years), many papers fail to
see any significant effects of macroeconomic variables on realised LGDs (see section 3.2.4 for
details). This fact suggests that a (downturn) LGD estimation based on systematic factors (ei-
ther by a latent variable or macroeconomic proxies) will in general not perform well for workout
LGD instruments. Finding systematic patterns in a workout LGD data can be challenging. Be-
fore constructing a latent variable based conditional LGD estimation method for the use in the
IRBA framework, it is necessary to study the relationship between expected LGD and X . We
believe the main issue lies in two key points: the time reference (vintage point) and the workout
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duration. For defaulted exposure, the final LGD is realised at the end of the workout process.
During the workout period, the state of the economy may fluctuate and can impact the poten-
tial LGD systematically. Theoretically, more than one time-point may be needed to model the
workout LGD. The central idea is to incorporate a latent variables time series in the LGD model
(instead of only one latent variable referenced to a particular time point).
This essay can be divided into two main parts: 1) the sensitivity analysis between the latent
variables time series and the expected LGD, and 2) the performance of some specific (latent
variable based) downturn LGD methods compared to the downturn LGD from the guideline.
With the view that the LGD is influenced by a time series of latent variables, we analyse
how sensitive the expected LGD is towards these latent variables. In the first part of this essay,
we investigate the impact of the yearly systematic factors towards the LGD. This analysis is
directly related to the popular discussion whether LGD models by vintage of default or vintage
of recoveries are more appropriate. Based on a database containing 186,000 resolved default
cases between 2000 and 2017, our results confirm that the LGD sensitivities towards the latent
variables vary with the default age. This analysis reveals an interesting relationship between the
latent variables and the (workout) LGD.
In the second part of this essay, we construct some basic latent variable based downturn LGD
estimation methods and test their performance measured by two parameters: the survival chance
of a bank and the LGD overestimation in case of survival (referred to as waste). We evaluate
these various downturn LGD standards in terms of their ability to ensure the bank´s survival at
a confidence level of 99.9%. The second performance measure is based on the idea that capital
requirements should not be excessively high. The reasoning behind it is that increasing capital
requirements brings not only benefits but also social costs. If banks’ survival can be assured
with a confidence level of 99.9%, the benefits do not outweigh the social costs any longer.
We measure the performance through simulations by randomly drawing a portfolio to rep-
resent a bank and estimate the downturn LGD of each exposure in its portfolio based only on
past information. The bank survives if its downturn LGD is higher than its realised LGD on
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that year. Our alternative methods for downturn LGD can uphold the 99.9% required survival
chance, while the advanced IRBA only shows an 81% survival chance. In comparison with the
foundation IRBA, our methods pass the performance test by survival chance, but our methods
are superior in terms of waste (our methods: 13-16%, foundation IRBA: 22%).
The remainder of this essay is structured as follows: section 3.2 discusses the theoretical
foundation, the current standard, and empirical works, which give supporting evidence on the
systematic dependence of LGD; section 3.3 derives our methods, both the theory and its cali-
bration, including the data description; section 3.4 shows the result from the given model and its
interpretation as well as the implication for the regulation; section 3.5 compares various latent
variable based downturn LGD estimation methods with the foundation and the advanced IRBA
by Monte Carlo simulations; and lastly, section 3.6 concludes this essay.
3.2 Background and Literature Review
This section starts with some background on the regulatory capital charge with LGD focus and
highlights some of the theoretical arguments against the macroeconomic based downturn LGD
estimation methods. Furthermore, we review the literature on latent variable models with the
main purpose to estimate the downturn LGD. Aside from the theoretical works, many papers
discuss the (in-)significance of macroeconomic variables in an LGD estimation. It seems that
there are some convincing arguments against a macroeconomic based downturn LGD estimation.
3.2.1 Regulatory Capital Charge
One of the main purposes of regulatory capital requirements is to ensure that institutions have
adequate capital to cover their losses, even in the case of a downturn period. In the credit risk
context, the potential loss is generally split into the expected and the unexpected loss. The
expected loss has to be covered by the loss loan provision, while the capital requirement covers
the unexpected loss, i. e. the loss that exceeds the expected loss up to a 99.9% confidence level.
3.2. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 51
The unexpected loss (UL) can be calculated by subtracting the expected loss (EL) from the credit
value-at-risk (VaR). Instead of calculating the VaR directly, the IRBA framework is constructed
to estimate the conditional expected loss under a distressed value of a single systematic factor,
i. e. the latent variable X . The asymptotic equivalence between both parameters is proven by
Gordy (2003) under certain assumptions. Thus, the minimum capital charge (CC) should be at
least as big as the difference between the two components.
CC ≥UL =VaR99.9%−EL∗ (E1)
Gordy
= E[Lossi|X =−Φ−1(0.999)]−EL∗
Since EL is commonly defined as the product of exposure at default (EAD), PD, and LGD,
the derivation of the conditional EL can be factorised to conditional expected EAD (or short:
conditional EAD), conditional PD, and conditional expected LGD (or short: conditional LGD).
In most cases, the (conditional) EAD is assumed to be constant for a given exposure.
In the IRBA, the conditional PD is given as a closed formula dependent on the latent variable
X (which is set to X = −Φ−1(0.999)) to represent a downturn period. In contrast, the condi-
tional LGD is to be determined separately (through the foundation IRBA or the advanced IRBA)
independent from X . Note the difference between the conditional LGD (a theoretical object with
an unknown form which describes the dependency of LGD from X) and the downturn LGD (the
evaluated conditional LGD at a predefined downturn severity, including the way the regulation
requires to estimate this value). Even though a closed formula for the conditional LGD does
not exist in the IRBA framework yet, any conservative estimation for regulatory downturn LGD
(estimated conditional LGD evaluated at X = −Φ−1(0.999)) should replace this parameter to
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ensure a sufficient loss coverage.
UL≤PDX ·DLGD−PD ·DLGD
where PDX :=E[Di|X =−Φ−1(0.999)],
DLGD≥E[LGDi|X =−Φ−1(0.999)],
and PD :=E[Di],
(E2)
where Di is a Bernoulli-distributed default indicator for borrower i and Φ is the distribution
function of the standard normal distribution. The PDX calculates the expected default rate under
a distressed state of the economy. We refer DLGD as the regulatory defined downturn LGD
and not to be confused with the conditional LGD evaluated at X = −Φ−1(0.999) to replicate a
downturn period. Regardless of what methods or standards are chosen for DLGD, the inequality
in E2 needs to be fulfilled to reach the 99.9% confidence level.
3.2.2 Current Regulatory Downturn LGD Standard
With the requirement E2 in mind, the EBA recently published a regulatory technical standard
on downturn EBA/RTS/2018/04 and shortly after, a downturn LGD guideline EBA/GL/2019/03.
The downturn LGD is set to be the long-run average LGD with a downturn add-on. The insti-
tutions are required to estimate downturn LGDs for their exposures when using the advanced
IRBA. For the specification of a downturn period, the EBA proposes the worst case of macroe-
conomic proxies in the latest 20 years span. Hence, this procedure can differentiate between
different types of downturn periods e. g. a downturn period caused by a high unemployment rate
or a downturn period caused by industry distress. In a simplified form, the DLGD is equal to
DLGD = E[LGDi| worst case of M over the 20 years span ]. M denotes a variable vector of
the relevant macroeconomic variables as proposed in EBA/RTS/2018/04. From this point, we
shorten the conditional expectation with E[ · |X ] or E[ · |M], where both conditions on X or M
are meant to be the extreme cases to represent the (regulatory-defined) downturn periods.
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Both X and M are intended to describe the state of the economy. However, the substitutability
of X through a selection of macroeconomic variables M is questionable. A loss underestimation
is unavoidable if the macroeconomic downturn definition is more lenient than the latent vari-
able’s downturn definition. The standard relies on the assumption that DLGD := E[LGDi|M]≥
E[LGDi|X ] is true (referring to E2). With the choice of 20 years span, E[LGDi|M] should be
approximately E[LGDi|X = −Φ(0.95)]. Due to the monotonic nature of E[LGDi|X = x] as a
function of x, the asserted loss underestimation can be easily seen.
Another way to compare between M and X is simply to calculate their expected frequencies.
The minimal requirement to reach the 99.9%-confidence level is to include the most severe
realisation of the chosen macroeconomic variables within 1,000 years period. Of course, such a
dataset do not exist.
The substitutability of X by macroeconomic proxies is not supported by empirical evidence.
Koopman et al. (2011) report that over 100 macroeconomic covariates are not sufficient to re-
place the need for latent components. Another work by Betz et al. (2018) shows that macroeco-
nomic variables, in general, are not suitable to capture the true systematic effects when modelling
LGD.
Conclusively, it seems desirable that under the current regulatory framework the capital re-
quirement is conditioned on the value of X :
CC ≥UL = E[Di|X ] ·E[LGDi|X ]−EL∗, (E4)
where the condition X is to be understood as X = −Φ−1(0.999). In other words, the capital
requirement is calculated to cover for the most severe economic condition. The EL∗ in E4
represents the calculated expected loss, to differentiate it from the EL, which represents the
true expected loss. It is important that the sum of UL and EL∗ should exceed the E[Lossi|X =
−Φ−1(0.999)]. So a mismatch between EL and EL∗, which typically occurs due to different
methodologies between capital regulation and accounting standard (IRBA vs IFRS 9), does not
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influence our result.
3.2.3 Discussion on Existing Latent Variables Based LGD Models
As long as the IRBA rests on the conditional PD formula derived by Vasicek (1987), modelling
the (downturn) LGD using a latent variable approach is preferable from a technical perspective.
In this section, some of LGD models based on the latent variable approach in the literature are
reviewed.
Early attempts to model the conditional LGD with latent variables can be found for example
in Frye (2000a), Pykhtin and Dev (2002), and Pykhtin (2003). The central idea of the LGD
modelling by the latent variable approach is that a common systematic factor drives both de-
fault events and the expected LGD. In their models, the LGD is influenced by a single-factor X .
Aside from single-factor LGD models, many papers introduce multi-factor models to accommo-
date the demand for more model flexibility. These factors can be assumed to be independent,
such as Pykhtin (2004), or with a particular dependence structure, such as Schönbucher (2001).
The variations using a latent variables time-series may also assume a point-in-time dependency
structure, as found in Bade et al. (2011), or an autoregressive process, as found in Betz et al.
(2018).
While the conditional PD formula is derived from modelling an abstract asset value Ai of a
borrower i, the conditional LGD can be modelled through an abstract collateral value Ci as well.
Without loss of generality, the collateral value can be replaced by the general loan’s capability
of recovering a fraction of the outstanding debt value. In the plain vanilla model,
Ai = p ·X +
√
1− p2 ·ZAi , p≥ 0,ZAi ∼N (0,1)
Ci = q ·X +
√
1−q2 ·ZCi , q≥ 0,ZCi ∼N (0,1).
(M1)
ZAi and Z
C
i denote the idiosyncratic or synonymously the (loan-)specific risk factors of the bor-
rower i, which are independent of each other and the latent variable X . The parameter p itself is
3.2. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 55
popularly known in its quadratic form p2 (asset correlation). The scaling of the coefficients using
the euclidean norm is solely to ensure Ai to be standard normally distributed as well, analogously
for Ci. In this model, the default event is defined as an asset shortfall. Under this assumption, the
asset correlation is closely related to the default correlation between two random borrowers. As
a side note, Frye (2008) points out the potential difference between asset correlation and default
correlation.
The borrower i defaults in the model if the value Ai drops below the threshold Φ−1(PDi).
This also ensures that the default rate is exactly PDi. Consequently, the conditional PD of the
borrower i given X is P(Ai ≤ Φ−1(PDi)|X), which results directly in Vasicek’s conditional PD
formula:
PDX =P(Ai ≤Φ−1(PDi)|X)
=Φ
(Φ−1(PDi)− p ·Φ−1(X)√
1− p2
)
=: gA(X)
(E5)
Note that the function gA is invertible and differentiable in X , which is the sufficient conditions
to identify the distribution of PDX and guarantees its existence. The extreme cases p ∈ {0,1}
render the function gA to be constant and therefore not invertible. Thus, they are ruled out.
One of the obstacles in modelling the systematic impact in LGD is to identify the rela-
tionship between LGD and X . An additional assumption on the connection between X (or Ci)
and LGD is necessary to calculate the conditional LGD, i. e. the specification of the function
gC(X) := E[LGDi|X ]. The simplest one is the linear relationship introduced by Frye (2000a),
Frye (2000b), and Pykhtin and Dev (2002). The linearity implies the conditional LGD,E[LGDi|X ],
to be normally distributed. Motivated by the restriction of LGDi ≥ 0, an exponential transfor-
mation can be used to ensure a log-normally distributed E[LGDi|X ], as can be found in Pykhtin
(2003) and Barco (2007). Other suggestions include application of a beta distribution, such as
work from Tasche (2004), or modelling LGD directly from PD, found in the work of Giese
(2005), Hillebrand (2006), as well as Frye and Jacobs Jr (2012). Furthermore, Frye (2013) sug-
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gests that modelling the systematic risk in LGD can be replaced by modelling the default rates
in LGD instead. We avoid selecting a particular gC since it is solely the deciding factor to de-
termine the distribution of E[LGDi|X ] and therefore the value E[LGDi|X = −Φ−1(0.999)] as
well.
3.2.4 Literature Review on the Systematic Dependency of LGD
This section reviews the empirical evidence on the systematic dependency of LGD in the liter-
ature. There is an impression that workout LGDs indeed behave differently than market-based
LGDs. Evidence for a systematic dependency can be observed in papers showing that macroe-
conomic variables or latent variables are significant predictors for LGD. Here, we differentiate
the results for the workout LGD and the market-based LGD to highlight the contrast.
The emerged pattern in the literature seems quite apparent. Systematic factors are generally
good predictors to estimate the market-based LGD, but it is not so clear for the workout LGD.
Specifically, we review 1) empirical papers for LGD estimations using macroeconomic covari-
ates using a market-based LGD dataset or 2) using a workout LGD dataset; moreover, 3) papers
dealing with the influence of systematic factors through latent variables on LGD.
The amount of published papers using a market-based LGD dataset, such as corporate bonds
data, is overwhelming in comparison to papers using a workout LGD dataset. Varma and Cantor
(2004) show the significant effect of macroeconomic variables for estimating the market-based
recovery rates of North American corporate bonds. Bruche and González-Aguado (2010) use
corporate bonds data to show the dependency of recovery rates on a selection of macroeco-
nomic variables. Chava et al. (2011) find strong industry effects in their default and recovery
models using the Moody’s ultimate recovery database on bonds. Khieu et al. (2012) report a
highly significant impact of GDP growth and industry distress in an OLS regression model for
estimating 30-day post-default trading prices for bank loans. Jankowitsch et al. (2014) indicate
the significance of market and industry default rates as well as the federal funds rate in the US
corporate bond market. Leow et al. (2014) show how macroeconomic variables improve the
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LGD estimate, which is based on forced sales amount of mortgage and final recovered amount
on personal loans, in a two-stage model and an OLS regression model for UK retail loans data.
Mora (2015) studies the macroeconomic dependence of recovery rates on defaulted debt se-
curities, which are based on their post-default trading prices, and shows a high susceptibility
of industry-related variables. Nazemi et al. (2017, 2018) use 104 macroeconomic covariates
within a support vector machine-based regression model and a fuzzy decision fusion approach
to improving corporate bonds recovery rate prediction. The significant macroeconomic effects
on market-based LGD is undeniable considering the vast amount of empirical evidence, which
implies a high systematic sensitivity of the market-based LGD.
In this segment, we review papers, which use workout LGD data (occasionally market-based
LGD data might be included as well). Acharya et al. (2007) observe the industry distress effect
in the recovery rates of bank loans, high-yield bonds, and other debt instruments. Still, macroe-
conomic variables such as GDP, S&P stock return, or bond market condition are not significant
determinants of recoveries in the presence of industry variables. Caselli et al. (2008) use data
on Italian bank loans for SME and real estate finance to verify the macroeconomic relation in
LGD. They find that the GDP has less explanatory power than expected. Using German loan
data, Grunert and Weber (2009) report that national and regional GDP growths do not show sig-
nificant effects in their OLS model. Hartmann-Wendels and Honal (2010) analyse the LGDs of
mobile lease contracts and find a macroeconomic dependency only in the vehicles segment. Bel-
lotti and Crook (2012) show significant impacts of bank interest rates and unemployment level
in their OLS model using recovery rates from credit cards data, which are calculated based on
the sum of repayments made 1-year post-default. Tobback et al. (2014) report that the influence
of macroeconomic variables on LGD depends on the model selection for a dataset containing
revolving credit lines secured by real estates or corporate loans. Krüger and Rösch (2017) show
the variation of macroeconomic effects to US corporate loans LGD in different quantile regions.
Yao et al. (2017) apply a supply vector machine methodology for estimating the credit card’s
LGD, which is fitted using 24-months post-default accrued interests and overdue fees. They find
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a high relevance of the macroeconomic variables for the estimation accuracy. Apart from credit
cards, significant effects of macroeconomic covariates are rarely observed in the workout LGD.
Lastly, we discuss papers, which identify systematic effects through means other than macroe-
conomic proxies, typically through the latent variable approach. To our knowledge, the earliest
paper discussing the systematic sensitivity of LGD is Frye (2000b). With his method, one can
calculate the correlation between the LGD and the latent variable implied from the single risk
factor model, which is comparable to the parameter q from the model M1. Using US corporate
bonds data, Frye (2000b) estimates pˆ = 23% and qˆ = 17%. Düllmann and Trapp (2004) use a
database, which contains bonds, corporate loans, and debt instruments in the US and they report
pˆ ≈ 20% and a 2%− 3% recovery rates’ systematic sensitivity depending on the distribution
assumptions. Betz et al. (2018) adapt random effects using a Bayesian finite mixture model to
measure the latent variables. However, their results are not directly comparable with the pa-
rameters p or q from the model M1. Nonetheless, they claim that the latent variable approach
measures the true systematic effects in LGD better than a selection of macroeconomic variables.
While papers studying LGD’s systematic effects using macroeconomic proxies are abundant,
there is still a severe need for further research in the LGD’s systematic effect based on latent
variables. As explained in section 3.2.1, estimating the downturn LGD using macroeconomic
proxies instead of latent variables is flawed. However, studies on the relationship between latent
variables and LGD are uncommon.
3.3 Methods and Data
This section introduces an expansion of the traditional single-risk factor model. The central idea
is that a defaulted loan with a high workout duration gets influence from the systematic factor
throughout its workout process. During this period, the systematic factor affects the potential
LGD (or the recovery capability in general) as long as the default is unresolved.
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3.3.1 Theoretical Framework
3.3.1.1 Expanded Single-Risk Factor Model
In this model, the recovery capability Ci,td is set to be a function of the latent variables Xtd
(the state of economy at the default year),Xtd+1, . . . , and Xtd+T (the state of economy at the
resolution year), where T denotes the workout duration. However, the impact of each latent
variable towards the recovery capability Ci,td is unknown.
The issue is that the LGD is observable only at the end of the workout process. In the course
of the workout process, costs and recoveries can be realised, but most of the components remain
uncertain until the resolution time, such as recoveries from unsold collaterals or future legal fees.
Thus, the final LGD reflects the accumulated impact of the systematic factor during the whole
workout duration. To isolate the systematic influence towards the LGD for each workout year
is a difficult task, especially if only the final LGD is observable. The simplest possible model
which incorporates the time-series of latent variables, would be
Ai,td = p ·Xtd +
√
1− p2 ·ZAi ,
Ci,td = qtd ·Xtd + . . .+qtd+T ·Xtd+T +
√
1−||q||22 ·ZCi ,
where 0 < p < 1 and ZAi ,Z
C
i ∼N (0,1).
(M2)
The coefficient q = (qtd , . . . ,qtd+T ) is an element inside the (T +1)-dimensional unit circle ex-
cluding the origin. The vanilla model M1 is a special case of the expanded model M2. The spe-
cific model M1 would be an LGD model by vintage of default, in particular for q = (1,0, . . . ,0).
Unlike other latent variable based models in the literature (see section 3.2.3), we do not impose
any assumption on the dependence structure of the latent variable time series (Xt)t∈N, i. e. how
Xt and Xs are dependent to each other for any given year t and s. Note that this model still relies
on a single-factor, since (Xt)t∈N describes a time-series of one systematic risk factor.
The coefficient p describes the sensitivity of the asset value Ai,td towards Xtd . The restriction
for p to be positive is economically necessary to reflect the fact that financial distress causes
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a higher default rate. Similarly, the coefficients qtd , . . . ,qtd+T describe the sensitivity of Ci,td
towards the latent variables during the workout years. The restriction of qt to be positive (for
each t) is not necessary from a technical point of view. A negative qt only implies negative
correlation between Xt and Ci,td . This case may be rational from an economical perspective for
a large gap between t and td . The signs and magnitudes of qtd , . . . ,qtd+T give hints on which
vintage models have the most explanatory power.
There are economic arguments supporting a high qtd as well as those supporting high qtd+T .
Loosely speaking, the coefficient q gives information, which year within the workout duration is
the most "responsible" for the systematic effects in the realised LGD. It is not clear beforehand,
how the coefficients q will behave when the model is fed with workout LGD data. Different
arguments supporting different propositions exist:
1. High systematic sensitivity at the default year (in line with the vintage of default). The
empirical evidence on a high PD-LGD correlation (such as Frye (2003); Altman et al.
(2004)) ties a loan’s LGD to its default time rather than to the rest of the workout periods.
The fact that the default occurred in a downturn year contributes to the low market value
of the collateral and the low cure chance of the defaulted obligor. This translates directly
into a high qtd . This proposition is related closely to the plain vanilla model M1, which
performs well for the market-based LGD.
2. High systematic sensitivity at the resolution year (in line with the vintage of resolu-
tion/recovery). The largest portion of a typical bank loan portfolio consists of secured
loans. The collateral usually accounts for the predominant share of the recoveries and the
workout process often stops soon after the collateral is sold. This implies that the LGD is
tied mostly to the resolution time, which means a high qtd+T .
3. High systematic sensitivity near the default year (a weaker version of the vintage of
default). Alternatively, one may argue that cash inflows (but also outflows) are relevant
factors for calculating LGD. These transactions occur most often in the first years after
the default event, which implies a high qtd or qtd+1. Eventually, this parameter continues
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to decrease as the default gets older.
The model developed in this essay can principally cover each conceivable time pattern of re-
coveries. The previous three recovery structures are likely to be the most common ones. We
emphasise that the model does not exclude the market-based LGD. The model is intended to
cover a typical bank, which may have a mixed portfolio containing exposures with workout
LGDs and exposures with market-based LGDs.
3.3.1.2 Estimation Techniques
It is necessary to find out the latent variables impact on the LGD values to design an adequate
downturn LGD estimation based on a latent variable approach. The coefficient q decodes in
which workout year the LGDs are particularly sensitive towards the latent variables. There
are two central issues regarding any estimation technique of q: 1) the uncertainty about the
dependence structure of (Xt)t∈N, and 2) the uncertainty about the relationship between X and
LGD (or equivalently between Ci,td and LGD). In this essay, both uncertainties will remain open
to avoid any unintentional influence on the result.
The maximum likelihood method, similar to Frye (2000b), is applied to estimate p. Accord-
ing to Gordy and Heitfield (2002), the maximum likelihood method produces less bias (coming
from a lack of data) than the method of moments. The likelihood function can be derived through
the theoretical distribution of the conditional PD, i. e. the distribution of gA(Xtd ) :=E[Di|Xtd ] (see
E5). We have established that the function gA is invertible and differentiable in X . The change-
of-variable technique produces the density function of PDX = E[Di|Xtd ], which is
fPDX (y) = fX(g
−1
A (y)) ·
∣∣∣dg−1A (y)
dy
∣∣∣
=ϕ
(Φ−1(PDi)−√1− p2Φ−1(y)
p
)
·
√
1− p2
p
·
∣∣∣dΦ−1(y)
dy
∣∣∣, (E6)
where ϕ is the density function of the standard normal distribution. If the parameter PDi is
known, the estimation of p is reduced to a one-dimensional problem. The maximum of the
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likelihood function can be approximated numerically, which yields the estimated p. By applying
the estimated p in the equation E5, the implied Xt can be calculated for each year t.
A similar approach to estimate q would require the information on the joint distribution of
(Xt)t∈N, referring to the first uncertainty mentioned above. It seems unrealistic and overly sim-
plified to assume that the latent variables are intertemporally independent or follow a particular
Markovian process, i. e. today’s state is only influenced by that of yesterdays. A non-Markovian
behaviour of the (Xt)t∈N seems to be more realistic. However, specifying one can be challenging
and testing whether it is true even more difficult.
By using the realisations of E[LGDi|Xtd , . . . ,Xtd+T ] and (Xt)t∈N, the coefficient q can be
estimated via a regression methodology. At this point, we are confronted with the second
uncertainty mentioned above. In contrast to the function gA, the exact form of the function
gC(Xtd , . . . ,Xtd+T ) := E[LGDi|Xtd , . . . ,Xtd+T ] is not known2. Choosing a particular form of gC
seems arbitrary. With different asset and exposure types, various jurisdictions, or even the insti-
tution’s internal strategy, the correct form is most likely complex.
Even though gC remains unknown, we can safely assume that this function is locally smooth,
i. e. (at least one time) partially differentiable, at a chosen value x := (xtd , . . . ,xtd+T ). The idea
is to construct its Taylor series representation at the chosen value x. This value x can serve
both as an evaluation point as well as a conservative value representing a downturn event. Two
possibilities emerge on the function behaviour at the evaluation point: either 1) the function gC
is linear (or similar to one) or 2) the function is substantially different from a linear function.
Avoiding this step by taking an assumption may substantially simplify many things, but it puts
our analysis in the same bucket as the currently existing models in the literature. Since this essay
aims to offer an alternative to the current downturn LGD methodology, which potentially results
in a fatal LGD underestimation, this amount of thoroughness is necessary.
In the first case, the Taylor series representation only contains the first partial derivative and
2A simple linear relationship or restrictions on possible LGD values are the typical assumptions in the literature
(section 3.2.3).
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the conditional LGD can be written as
E[LGDi|Xtd , . . . ,Xtd+T ] = gC(xtd , . . . ,xtd+T )+
td+T
∑
s=td
∂gC(xtd , . . . ,xtd+T )
∂Xs
(Xs− xs) and
E[LGDi|Xtd , . . . ,Xtd+T ] = µ−σ
(
qtd Xtd + . . .+qtd+T Xtd+T +
√
1−||q||22ZCi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ci,td
)
.
(E7.1)
Both parameters µ and σ are intended to be the sum of the constant terms and a scaling
factor to fulfil the unit circle requirement of q. Note that E[ZCi |Xtd , . . . ,Xtd+T ] = E[ZCi ] = 0. The
mean and standard deviation of the portfolio LGDs may serve as estimators for both µ and σ.
However, this should not be confused with the LGDs at the loan level.
By looking at the structure of both equations in E7.1, the OLS regression method would
require data samples, in which the idiosyncratic factor ZC is zero or minimal. The OLS method
consequently produces an indirect estimation of q, which is σ̂qt for all t. This requirement
can be achieved by constructing samples of E[LGDi|Xtd , . . . ,Xtd+T ] from a large portfolio. In
a large (fine-grained) portfolio, the idiosyncratic risk converges to zero and is intertemporally
uncorrelated. Thus, the property that the OLS estimator is unbiased (from σqt) is guaranteed by
the Gauss-Markov theorem.
In the other case, where the function gC is believed to be non-linear in at least one of its
parameter at the evaluation point, then the Taylor series representation would produce a non-
zero rest term R(Xtd , . . . ,Xtd+T ).
E[LGDi|Xtd , . . . ,Xtd+T ] =gC(xtd , . . . ,xtd+T )+
td+T
∑
s=td
∂gC(xtd , . . . ,xtd+T )
∂Xs
(Xs− xs)+
R(Xtd , . . . ,Xtd+T )
(E7.2)
The information on the rest term R(Xtd , . . . ,Xtd+T ) (in short: R) should reside in the OLS residu-
als and the intercept. A problem occurs if the downturn impact on R is far stronger than the linear
effect, then the coefficients q do not hold much information weight for the conditional LGD. In
this particular case, the coefficient q may be biased and the result (in form of a downturn LGD
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estimation) will likely to fail the performance tests (see section 3.5).
3.3.2 Parameter Estimation
The data should consist of observed default rates as well as observed LGDs by year and rating.
The methodology estimates the parameter p, then the implied latent variables X , and then the
parameter q, in the exact order.
3.3.2.1 Estimating p
By using the observed default rates of a given rating segment r ∈ R and a given year t ∈ T ,
samples of E[Di|Xt ] can be generated by the arithmetic average of default dummies of a given
rating r in a given year t, denoted by (Yr,t)r∈R ,t∈T . The sets R and T denote the set of available
ratings and years in the data with n = |R ×T |. A generated sample Yr,t is non-representative
and biased if there are too few samples in a given (r, t)-segment. Therefore, only samples with
at least 100 resolved defaults (chosen arbitrarily) in each segment are generated. The density
function of Yr,t is theoretically known from E6, so the log-likelihood function is
l(p) = log
(
∏
r,t∈R×T
fYr,t (PDr, p)
)
=− n
2
log(2pi)− 1
2p2 ∑r,t∈R×T
(
Φ−1(PDr)−
√
1− p2 Φ−1(Yr,t)
)2
+
n
2
log(1− p2)−n log(p)+n log( d
dy
Φ−1(Yr,t)
)
.
The maximum likelihood estimator for p is the solution of pˆ= argmaxp∈(0,1) l(p), which can be
solved numerically. We set PDr = 1|T | ∑t∈T Yr,t to simplify the problem into a one-dimensional
numerical task.
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3.3.2.2 Estimating Xt
Given pˆ, we can estimate (Xt)t∈T by using the equation E5. For a given rating r ∈R and a given
year t ∈ T , X̂r,t is defined as the solution of
Yr,t = gA(Xr,t) =Φ
(Φ−1(PDr)− pˆ ·Φ−1(Xr,t)√
1− pˆ2
)
in Xr,t .
Since gA is invertible and therefore a bijective function, there is only one single solution to the
equation above for a given PDr and pˆ, which is
X̂r,t =Φ
(Φ−1(PDr)−√1− pˆ2 ·Φ−1(Yr,t)
pˆ
)
.
The solution X̂r,t represents the implied latent variable of a system at year t for an asset class
with the rating r. The global latent variable Xt , independent from the rating, can be represented
by an arithmetic average or a weighted average (weighted by the number of obligors with rating
r in the data) of Xr,t . However, a weighted average would under-represent loans from bad ratings
since there are typically not many of them. Hence, X̂t = 1|R | ∑r∈R X̂r,t .
3.3.2.3 Estimating q
The samples of E[LGDi|Xtd . . . ,Xtd+T ] are required to have minimal idiosyncratic effect as ex-
plained in section 3.3.1.2. The idiosyncratic risk factor converges to zero as the number of loans
increases. This is achieved by bundling defaulted loans from the population, which are defaulted
in td and resolved in td +T , to calculate the arithmetic average of the realised LGD, which will
be denoted by (Ltd ,td+T )td ,td+T∈T . For a given pair (td , td +T ), the sample Ltd ,td+T is generated
in our analysis only if there are at least 100 default cases in this category.
In general, LGD is defined as the quotient of the realised loss and the outstanding amount
at default. We consider four different LGD definitions in our analysis, which are pre-calculated
in the dataset: 1) discounted LGD with the principal advance (additional loan typically to help
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the obligor’s recovery) as loss, 2) discounted LGD with the principal advance in the recov-
ered amount, 3) nominal LGD with the principal advance as loss, and 4) nominal LGD with
the principal advance in the recovered amount. The 3-Months EURIBOR rate at the default
date is chosen for the discounting factor. To avoid extreme outliers, LGD is capped within the
[−200%,300%]-interval (smaller intervals do not change the result). The results are quite robust,
regardless of LGD definition choice.
The OLS coefficients estimate σ̂qt in the linear case E7.1. In the non-linear case E7.2, the
coefficients sum up the linear effects of both σqt and R. The remaining non-linear effects reside
in the OLS residuals and its intercept. We denote the linear effect RL and the non-linear effect
(both from the intercept and residual parts) RNL := RNL,I +RNL,R that are originated from R. The
OLS regression is tasked to minimise the remaining idiosyncratic risk ZC and RNL.
∀td , td +T ∈ T :
Ltd ,td+T = (µ+RNL,I)+
td+T
∑
s=td
(−σqs+RL,s︸ ︷︷ ︸
βs
)
Xs+
(−σ√1−||q||22ZC +RNL,R︸ ︷︷ ︸
ε
)
.
(E8)
In the linear case (RL = RNL = 0), E8 assumes ε ∼N (0,σ2ε = σ2−σ2||q||22). Estimating µ and
βs is equivalent to solving coefficients of the OLS regression model, which allows us to solve σ
and therefore q algebraically using the residuals’ standard error.
σˆ=
√√√√σ2ε+ td+T∑
s=td
β2s
∀t : qˆt =−βtσˆ .
In the non-linear case, the estimate qˆt contains the information of RL as well. Without know-
ing the form of the function gC, its extraction from qˆt is not possible. However, there is no
compelling reason to extract RL,s from βs. The more important concern is whether RNL is sig-
nificantly different from zero. Without overcomplicating the issue, it is sufficient to test for the
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required 99.9% survivability of the resulted downturn LGD methodologies in the context of this
essay (see section 3.5) regardless whether the rest term R is substantial.
For robustness purposes, we introduce the reduced model as well from E8 to
∀td , tr ∈ T :
Ltd ,tr =(µ+RNL,I)+
(−σqtd +RL,td︸ ︷︷ ︸
βtd
)
Xtd +
(−σqtr +RL,tr︸ ︷︷ ︸
βtr
)
Xtr+
(−σ√1−q2td −q2tr ZC +RNL,R︸ ︷︷ ︸
ε
)
.
(E9)
This model only includes the default and resolution time. Note that OLS regression methodolo-
gies deliver a non-robust result if the explanatory variables are highly correlated. By reducing
the model to E9, observing a high correlation of the explanatory variables is unlikely. Solving
for qtd and qtr can be done similarly
σˆ=
√
σ2ε+β2td +β
2
tr
qˆtd =−
βtd
σˆ
∧ qˆtr =−
βtr
σˆ
.
The estimated coefficients qˆ from E8 and E9 should not lead to two different conclusions. If they
do, it confirms the high dependency between the explanatory variables, i. e. the latent variables
are intertemporally dependent.
3.3.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We obtain two databases: 1) the PD and Rating Platform and 2) the LGD and EAD Platform,
from Global Credit Data (GCD)3. They contain the observed number of defaults counted by
banks within a predefined segment and any information related to credit failures in contract
3GCD is a non-profit association owned by its member banks from around the world and active in data-pooling
for historical credit data. As of 2020, it has 55 members across Europe, Africa, North America, Asia, and Australia.
For details: https://www.globalcreditdata.org
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level leading to LGD and EAD. All participating banks are obliged to specify default and loss
in the same way to ensure data comparability within the sample.
3.3.3.1 PD and Rating Platform
In the PD and Rating Platform, the numbers of defaulted and non-defaulted loans for defined
segments from 1994 until 2017 are reported. These numbers are low before 2000, so the data
from these early years may not as representative as the following years. Starting from 2000, the
yearly number of loans rises to over 50,000 and reaches its peak to over 710,000 in 2014. The
dataset composition on rating, asset class, or industry segment fluctuates yearly.
The platform contains pooled numbers of defaulted as well as non-defaulted loans in various
segments. In total, the dataset contains over 6.2 million non-defaulted loan-years distributed over
the 18 years interval. Assuming that the typical duration to maturity or default time is about two
years, the dataset contains information on over 3 million different loans internationally. Three
of the most represented asset classes are: SME (50.71%), Large Corporate (22.14%), and Banks
and Financial Companies (14.67%) and three of the most represented industries are: Finance
and Insurance (15,33%), Real Estate, Rental, and Leasing (14,88%), and Wholesale and Retail
Trade (13,62%)4.
Figure 3.1 shows the observed default rates in the dataset throughout the years between 2000
and 2016. Global Credit Data (2019b) has a dedicated report regarding this dataset. The dataset
classifies every default into defined segments of
• asset class: SME, Large Corporate, Banks and Financial Companies, Ship Finance, Air-
craft Finance, Real Estate Finance, Project Finance, Commodities Finance, Sovereigns,
Public Services, Private Banking;
• industry: Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry, Fishing and its Products, Mining, Manu-
facturing, Utilities, Construction, Wholesale and Retail, Hotels and Restaurants, Trans-
4Counted in loan-years. Assuming the typical duration to maturity or default time is similar throughout the
segments, the composition remains unchanged when counted in number of loans.
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Figure 3.1: Observed default rates in the global population and segmented by asset class,
industry, and rating
portation and Storage, Communications, Finance and Insurance, Real Estate, Rental and
Leasing, Professional, Scientific and Technical Services, Public Administration and De-
fence, Education, Health and Social Services, Community, Social and Personal Services,
Private Sector Services, Extra-territorial Services, and Individual; and
• rating: mapped to S&P rating categories (from AAA to C), as well as defaulted.
In each category, figure 3.1 shows the observed default rates of the 25% best and the 25% worst
segment, as well as the median (only if there are at least 100 loans in the particular subcategory).
3.3.3.2 LGD and EAD Platform
The LGD and EAD platform contains extensive information about credit failures on loan level
for non-retail exposures. The LGD is pre-calculated based on the realised loss per outstanding
unit applying a variation of LGD definitions (discounting the recovery cash flows or by includ-
ing/excluding principal advances). Variation in the LGD definition does not affect the results
significantly.
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Figure 3.2: Histogram and Boxplot of the realised LGD
The dataset contains over 186,000 defaulted loans after 2000, both resolved (92.5%) and
unresolved cases (7.5%). The number of resolved loans between 2000 and 2017 with non-
zero exposure is 161,365 from 93,775 different obligors with an average EAD of e3 million.
Three of the most represented asset classes are SME (62.57%), Large Corporate (16.61%), and
Real Estate Financing (12.42%). Three of the most represented industries are Manufacturing
(16.44%), Real Estate, Rental, and Leasing (15.94%) and Wholesale and Retail Trade (14.01%).
LGD samples outside the [0,1]-interval are possible and are not rare for workout LGDs.
Typically, the realised workout LGDs in loan level inhibit the bimodal distribution, as also shown
in figure 3.2 for our dataset. The mean of realised LGDs (referenced by default year) are highly
correlated with the observed default rate as shown by figure 3.3. However, some of the defaults
in the dataset are not resolved yet, resulting in low average realised LGDs in the last five years.
A report regarding the LGD distribution of Large Corporate exposures in this dataset and a study
for a downturn effect in the LGD pattern are conducted by the Global Credit Data (2017, 2019a).
A long workout duration is often associated with a high average LGD. As figure 3.4 shows,
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Figure 3.3: Observed default rates and realised loss given default for each year
this is not only true for the LGD’s mean, but also its deviation from average. This figure depicts
an increasing LGD’s mean when it is categorised by its workout duration in years (rounded to
one decimal place).
3.4 Result
With the observed default rates, the maximum likelihood method gives an estimated pˆ= 27.95%
(equivalent to an asset correlation of pˆ2 = 7.81%). For a comparison, Frye (2000b) reports a p
of 23% (for bonds) and Düllmann and Trapp (2004) report a p to be ca. 20% (for bonds and
loans). Within the EU capital regulation CRR, p2 is equivalent to R under the Art.153-154 of the
CRR with predefined values between 3% and 24% depending on asset classes and the historical
PD.
Figure 3.5 depicts the implied latent variables time-series. One of the important aspects of
a latent variables approach is that it measures the change of default rates relative to the mean
rather than the default rate itself. During the global financial crisis, which started in 2007, the
72 CHAPTER 3. REGULATORY DOWNTURN LGD
Figure 3.4: Mean LGD trend based on the workout duration
downturn effect is observed soon after the Lehmann fall in 2008. The implied latent variables in
both years are at the lowest points compared to others. In comparison, the implied latent variable
in 2017 is high due to the low observed default rate in 2017, as shown in figure 3.1.
3.4.1 LGD’s Systematic Sensitivity
Our method for estimating q is designed such that for every pair (td , tr) ∈ R 2, a sample is gen-
erated. A potential issue may occur for defaulted loans with an extraordinarily long workout
duration because such cases are rare compared to defaults with one or two years workout du-
ration. To avoid a potential bias originated from these extreme cases, samples with excessively
long duration are excluded. About 95% of the resolved defaults in the database have workout
durations less than six years, and we choose this to be the cutting point. We successively extend
the maximum workout duration length in the analysis to replicate a portfolio of a random finan-
cial institution. Due to the model design, the result is to be interpreted as a portfolio rather than
a single exposure.
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Figure 3.5: Estimated latent variables
The results presented in table 3.1 show a systematic sensitivity of the expected LGD towards
a particular default year during its workout duration. The discussion of whether LGD is to be
analysed by vintage of default or vintage of recovery can be answered. Acquiring a sensitivity
coefficient of q = (1,0, . . . ,0) is an argument for vintage of default, while a coefficient of q =
(0, . . . ,0,1) or (0, . . . ,0,−1) speaks for vintage of resolution. None of the patterns emerges,
which suggests that a single vintage point may not be adequate to explain the expected LGD.
In particular, the expected LGD is highly sensitive towards the systematic factor soon after its
default date, but this sensitivity mostly diminishes with increasing default age. Note that these
values stand for the sensitivity towards the systematic factor and not for the expected LGD
itself. They may hold some explanatory power on the downturn add-on for LGD, but not on
the downturn LGD itself. The results confirm that loans, which are defaulted during a downturn
period, will be expected to perform worse (LGD-wise) than loans, which are resolved during a
downturn period given a similar workout duration. Thus, the financial crisis has different impacts
on the LGD depending on the default age of the exposures. Table 3.2 shows that there is some
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Table 3.1: LGD’s systematic sensitivity coefficient towards the latent variables from different
years during the workout period. qt is the sensitivity of expected LGD towards Xt and σ2ε is the
variance of the residuals. T represents the workout duration, so each row can be understood as
banks’ limit strategies for workout duration.
qtd qtd+1 qtd+2 qtd+3 qtd+4 qtd+5 σ
2
ε
T = 0 0.3472 0.0005
T ≤ 1 0.3834 0.0779 0.0012
T ≤ 2 0.3796 0.2745 -0.2418 0.0035
T ≤ 3 0.4093 0.3347 0.0702 -0.1045 0.0065
T ≤ 4 0.4040 0.3288 0.1101 0.0895 -0.1817 0.0080
T ≤ 5 0.4344 0.3188 0.1345 0.0839 -0.0370 0.1934 0.0094
slight variation to our results depending on how LGD is calculated. However, this difference is
negligible, and it ultimately leads to the same conclusion.
The systematic sensitivity at the first default year qtd should approximately range between
34% to 44%, based on our results. Interestingly, it is higher than the estimated p= 27.95%. Both
parameters p and q can be compared directly when analysing the systematic sensitivities of Ai,td
and Ci,td . However, the systematic sensitivities of PD and LGD also depend on the functions gA
and gC. Without specifying the function gC, the systematic sensitivities of PD and LGD cannot
be compared.
Nevertheless, the fact that the estimated value of qˆtd is possibly higher than pˆ is alarming.
Assuming the function gC behaves similarly as gA as a function of Xtd , it can be concluded that
an economic shock would have a more severe effect on the LGD than the PD. In less technical
words, the downturn impact at the default year towards the LGD is expected to be more severe
than towards the PD.
As explained in section 3.2.1, a downturn LGD estimation needs to be latent variable based
to be consistent with the conditional PD under the IRBA. The results show that E[LGDi|X ] is
not only sensitive towards the latent variables at its default time (Xtd ) but also to latent variables
during its whole course of the workout process (Xtd+1, . . . ,Xtr ). In the regulatory context, two
downturn LGD methodologies are required: 1) downturn LGD estimation for non-defaulted
exposures and 2) for unresolved defaulted exposures.
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Table 3.2: LGD’s systematic sensitivity coefficient towards the latent variables from different
years during the whole workout period, using various other LGD definitions. qt is the sensitivity
of expected LGD towards Xt and σ2ε is the variance of the residuals. T represents the workout
duration, so each row can be understood as banks’ limit strategies for workout duration.
Discounted LGD, Principal Advance in Recovered Amount
qtd qtd+1 qtd+2 qtd+3 qtd+4 qtd+5 σ
2
ε
T = 0 0.2769 0.0006
T ≤ 1 0.3906 -0.0495 0.0015
T ≤ 2 0.3967 0.2447 -0.3156 0.0047
T ≤ 3 0.4387 0.3273 0.0228 -0.1421 0.0091
T ≤ 4 0.4287 0.3293 0.0835 0.0777 -0.2662 0.0116
T ≤ 5 0.4720 0.3379 0.1170 0.0994 -0.0741 -0.0078 0.0132
Nominal LGD, Principal Advance in Recovered Amount
qtd qtd+1 qtd+2 qtd+3 qtd+4 qtd+5 σ
2
ε
T = 0 0.2198 0.0005
T ≤ 1 0.3842 -0.1447 0.0013
T ≤ 2 0.3940 0.2067 -0.3836 0.0045
T ≤ 3 0.4430 0.3100 -0.0083 -0.2045 0.0088
T ≤ 4 0.4241 0.3214 0.0903 0.0380 -0.3352 0.0115
T ≤ 5 0.4578 0.3443 0.1547 0.0726 -0.1276 -0.1021 0.0134
Nominal LGD, Principal Advance as Loss
qtd qtd+1 qtd+2 qtd+3 qtd+4 qtd+5 σ
2
ε
T = 0 0.2749 0.0004
T ≤ 1 0.3765 -0.0222 0.0011
T ≤ 2 0.3774 0.2382 -0.3268 0.0033
T ≤ 3 0.4216 0.3287 0.0362 -0.1584 0.0062
T ≤ 4 0.4088 0.3312 0.1187 0.0559 -0.2466 0.0077
T ≤ 5 0.4373 0.3431 0.1815 0.0626 0.0841 0.0803 0.0087
For non-defaulted exposures, the CC at year t should generally be
CC ≥ E[Di|Xt ] ·E[LGDi|Xt , . . . ,Xt+T ]−EL∗,
with a random workout duration T + 1 (note that E[Di|Xt ] = E[Di|Xt , . . . ,Xt+T ] because Di is
a point-in-time variable). The formula assumes that the year t is a downturn period with an
expected default rate of E[Di|Xt ] and an expected LGD of E[LGDi|Xt , . . . ,Xt+T ]. While Xt is
typically assumed to have a conservative value, the variables Xt+1, . . . ,Xtd+T and T are not ob-
served yet.
76 CHAPTER 3. REGULATORY DOWNTURN LGD
Table 3.3: LGD’s systematic sensitivity coefficient towards the latent variables only on default
and resolution years. qt is the sensitivity of expected LGD towards Xt and σ2ε is the variance of
the residuals. T represents the workout duration, so each row can be understood as banks’ limit
strategies for workout duration.
qtd qtr σ2ε
T = 0 0.3472 0.0005
T ≤ 1 0.3834 0.0779 0.0012
T ≤ 2 0.4734 -0.1567 0.0036
T ≤ 3 0.5408 -0.0320 0.0067
T ≤ 4 0.5534 -0.1078 0.0083
T ≤ 5 0.5770 0.2069 0.0092
For unresolved defaults, the CC has far less unknown variables
CC ≥ E[LGDi|Xtd , . . . ,Xt , . . . ,Xt+T ]−ELBE∗,
given its default year td with a remaining random workout duration T +1 and a calculated loan
loss provision per exposure unit ELBE∗. The past latent variables (Xtd , . . . ,Xt−1) lie in the past
and are highly relevant for the LGDi. The future latent variables (Xt+1, . . . ,Xt+T ) as well as the
workout duration T remain unobserved.
The multiple latent variables approach for the regulatory capital requirement has additional
merits. Such an approach can capture various stress scenarios, e. g. a downturn event lasting
for two or three years (Xt+1 = Xt+2 = −Φ−1(0.999)) or a volatile state of economy (Xs≥t ∼
N (0,σ2 ≥ c) for a given positive constant c > 1). Analysing the appropriateness of these as-
sumptions on the latent variable time series is on its own an interesting topic.
3.4.2 Robustness Analysis
The estimated coefficients qˆ from E8 and E9 should not lead to different conclusions. Otherwise,
it is evidence for a non-robust estimate qˆ mainly due to highly correlated explanatory variables.
Thus, we expect a relatively high valued qtd and a comparably low valued qtr to maintain the
same conclusion, as concluded from the previous analysis.
The pattern found in table 3.3 is a confirmation to the robustness of the previous results.
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While the systematic sensitivities at the default year td are high regardless of the cutting point,
the sensitivities at the resolution year are relatively low in comparison.
3.5 Alternative Downturn LGD Estimations
The results obtained from the previous section suggest that incorporating multiple latent vari-
ables from several workout years for a downturn LGD estimation can have more explanatory
power. While the early years after default are shown to be more relevant than the later years, it
is not yet clear whether incorporating only the early default years is sufficient to reach a con-
servatism level of 99.9%. In a simulation, this requirement is equivalent to 99.9% survivability,
i. e. only 0.1% chance of an LGD underestimation in expectation.
Four basic downturn LGD estimation procedures based on a latent variable approach are
chosen for the performance analysis. A Monte Carlo simulation is applied to measure their
performance and compare them with the current regulatory downturn LGD method. This sim-
ulation is constructed using the LGD and EAD platform, which covers defaults from 2000 to
2017. Within this time interval, banks will most likely identify 2008 or 2009 as the worst down-
turn period under the EBA/RTS/2018/04. The idiosyncratic risk will not be evaluated since the
focus of downturn LGD methods is to measure the systematic risk. It is necessary to measure
the performance parameters independent from any bias correction methods (if any bias in the
data exists). Thus, neither bias correction nor margin of conservatism will be applied.
3.5.1 Various Approaches for Downturn LGD
The performance of the following downturn LGD estimations is compared for the year t (we
refer t as today). Up to the time point t, the latent variables are assumed to be available. We
are only interested in the exposures, which will be resolved today. Other exposures do not
contribute to the portfolio’s LGD for the year t. In practice, it is unknown whether a defaulted
exposure will be resolved today. For regulatory purposes, this specification will be generalised
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later. The general idea underlying these estimations is to estimate LGDs using the past latent
variables. The latent variable for today will be stressed, i. e. a downturn period is assumed for t
(Xt :=−Φ−1(0.999)). The downturn LGD estimations are defined as follows:
1. A forward-looking single-factor estimation (in line with the vintage of resolution). This
procedure assumes that the expected LGD depends only on the (fully-weighted) today’s
latent variable, which will be stressed (set to−Φ−1(0.999)). The conditional PD is derived
with this assumption in mind.
E[LGDi|Xt =−Φ−1(0.999)] = µˆ− σˆ
(
1 ·Xt +0 ·ZC︸ ︷︷ ︸
loan-specific risk is set to zero
)
. (A1)
2. A backward-looking single-factor estimation (in line with the vintage of default). This
procedure assumes that the expected LGD depends on the (fully-weighted) default year’s
latent variable. The latent variable is stressed only if the default year is t.
E[LGDi|Xtd , and if t = td : Xtd =−Φ−1(0.999)] = µˆ− σˆ
(
1 ·Xtd +0 ·ZC
)
. (A2)
3. A three-years-factors estimation (a mixture of the vintage of default and the vintage
of recovery). Compared to the previous methods, this estimation method incorporates
multiple latent variables. The result shown in the previous section supports the proposition
that the expected LGD is most sensitive towards the latent variables in the first three
default years. If the default age is shorter than three years, the last latent variable will be
stressed. Otherwise, only the first three realised latent variables after default are included
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in the estimation. This procedure weights the relevant latent variables equally5.
E[LGDi|Xtd , . . . ,Xtd+2, and if t ≤ td +2 : Xt =−Φ−1(0.999)] =
µˆ− σˆ
(min(td+2,t)
∑
s=td
√
1
min(3, t− td +1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
equal weight on each relevant workout year
·Xs+0 ·ZC
)
. (A3)
4. A complete-history based estimation (no particular vintage point). Different from the
previous method, this approach incorporates the complete history of past latent variables
within the workout duration and stresses only today’s latent variable. All latent variables
are equally weighted.
E[LGDi|Xtd , . . . ,Xt−1, and Xt =−Φ−1(0.999)] =
µˆ− σˆ
( t
∑
s=td
√
1
t− td +1︸ ︷︷ ︸
equal weight on each workout year
·Xs+0 ·ZC
)
.
(A4)
The constraint of only using right-censored data has to be accounted for in the simulation,
i. e. only information up to t can be used for estimations. Both the required parameters µˆ and σˆ
can be estimated by the expected value and the standard deviation of the institutions’ portfolio
LGD, which can be estimated solely from past information. In practice, right-censored data will
be heavily influenced by resolution bias, which generally leads to an underestimation.
The proposed downturn LGD procedures assume a linear or semilinear relationship between
E[LGD|X ] and X . If the function gC is indeed non-linear, then it would imply that the rest term
R in E7.2 has a substantial effect and it will be reflected in the performance of these procedures
in the simulation. As a side-note, the true nature of the function gC only plays a secondary
role. The 99.9% survivability is the necessary requirement for the use of such a downturn LGD
procedure regardless of the form of gC. Conversely, we do not argue that a good performance is
sufficient evidence for the linearity of the function gC.
5Using the estimated values of q from the previous section might induce too much overfitting.
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It is not difficult to give first estimate whether these methods are conservative. We can look at
the number of exposures in a random portfolio which are affected by the stressed latent variable
varies in these proposed methods. A1 is the most conservative (likely to be borderline excessive)
and is also in line with the IRBA’s conditional PD. A2 is the least conservative because it stresses
the latent variable only if the loan defaults in the current year. Based on the results in table ??,
we argue that A3 can cover most of the necessary information to construct an adequate downturn
LGD estimate. The last procedure A4 includes the remaining latent variables as well. From its
degree of conservativeness, A2 is the least conservative, then A3, followed by A4, with A1 to
be the most conservative one.
It is important to mention that there is a flaw in all latent variable based methods. A latent
variable is an abstract mathematical object, and its economic interpretation is not rigid. In the
ASRF model, the latent variable could be represented by the global economic situation. How-
ever, this is quite vague. A large part of section 3.2 is dedicated to explaining the issues related to
the conflict between the macroeconomic based approach and the latent variable-based approach
to outline the difference. Although it might be not satisfying only to have a vague interpretation,
a latent variable based approach is unavoidable for consistency with the IRBA.
3.5.2 Institution’s Survival Chance and Waste
This essay introduces two concepts for performance measurement: the institution’s survival
chance and waste. What survivability represents and why it is chosen is obvious. With waste, we
want to measure the LGD overestimation, since an overly conservative downturn LGD implies
a higher capital requirement. From the banks’ perspective, higher capital requirements are as-
sociated with higher weighted average capital costs (WACC), as empirically shown by Kashyap
et al. (2010); Cosimano and Hakura (2011); Miles et al. (2013). Van den Heuvel (2008) shows
a surprisingly high welfare cost of capital requirements. Mikkelsen and Pedersen (2017) argue
that increasing capital requirements is a trade-off between benefits and social costs. In the case
of downturn LGD methodologies, a trade-off between survival chance and waste occurs. At
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some point, the bank’s survival chance is sufficiently large that being even more conservative
only increases social costs without the benefits.
Per definition, an institution survives the year t if the regulatory CC at t is at least as high as
the realised loss at t. In the LGD context, an institution survives LGD-wise if the (regulatory)
downturn LGD at t given the portfolio composition at t is at least as high as the realised LGD for
all defaults resolved at t on the portfolio level. If the calculated downturn LGD is lower than the
realised one, we refer to this event as a failure. A high survival chance is compulsory for a well
designed regulatory rule. For the use in the IRBA, an overall survival rate of 99.9% is required
to avoid any risk underestimation.
For a particular method to estimate downturn LGD (or any loss in general), its waste de-
scribes the degree of the LGD overestimation. Per definition, the downturn LGD should always
be higher than the expected LGD. Thus, some degree of overestimation from realised LGD is
not surprising and theoretically necessary to act as a margin of conservatism. In particular, we
define the waste of a survived institution as the difference of the calculated downturn LGD mean
and the realised LGD mean for a particular portfolio at time t.
wastet = min(0,Downturn LGDt −Realised LGDt).
An over-conservative rule would obviously produce higher downturn LGD estimations than the
realised LGD in expectation, e. g. setting the downturn LGD to be equal 100% for all case would
ensure high survivability but a high waste as well.
3.5.3 Performance Test
As downturn events occur unexpectedly, institutions are required to anticipate a downturn event
anytime. For each t, the parameters µ and σ can only be estimated using available data up to
t. The realised LGDs from resolved defaults build the basis of the simulation. For each year
before t, we calculate the portfolio LGD’s mean and standard deviation to acquire µˆ and σˆ. This
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information is available for institutions at the time t. In our view, a loss database of five years
would be the absolute minimum to calculate any decent estimate. Therefore, we evaluate the
performance test only from 2005 onwards.
For each iteration, 1,000 default cases are randomly drawn from the defaults population6,
which are resolved in the year t. The process is repeated 10,000 times. One iteration can be
interpreted as the LGD realisation of a default portfolio of a random institution in the year t. The
simulated institution does not survive in the year t LGD-wise, if its estimated downturn LGD
for the year t (e. g. by applying A1-A4) is lower than the average realised LGD of its portfolio.
Subsequently, if the simulated institution survives, the difference between the downturn LGD
mean and the realised LGD mean for its portfolio will be the associated waste in the year t.
The average of the survival rates is calculated as a geometric mean, while the average of the
waste is an arithmetic mean, due to the nature of each parameter. Considering that any loan-
specific information is omitted and the models have to deal with right-censored data with an
expected underestimation, the performance of methods A3 and A4 are on average extraordinarily
high. Except for A2, the survival chance is overall comparable. Note that the IRBA requires
99.9% survivability, which renders any method with a lower survival rate to be worthless.
According to table 3.4, the complete-history based estimation method A4 performs best and
is even sufficient for a large portfolio without any additional loan-specific information. Remark-
ably, this procedure ensures high survivability even during the financial crisis and the post-crisis
periods. The sufficiency of the first three years after default is supported by the 97% survival
chance of the three-years-factor estimation method A3. Although this performance is not ade-
quate in terms of 99.9% survivability, it is remarkable to see that two additional years of latent
variables have almost reached the goal.
As shown in table 3.4, the realised portfolio’s LGD at t does not necessarily follow a system-
atic pattern. The long-run average LGD (µˆ) does not reach its peak in 2008-2009, but somewhat
6The number of randomly drawn default cases has to be large enough to isolate the systematic effect. However,
not too large that a non-trivial granularity add-on might be needed later. The validity for a smaller portfolio will also
be analysed in section 3.5.5.
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Table 3.4: Survival chance and waste of different downturn LGD estimation models in % for
each year from 2005 until 2017. µˆ and σˆ are the estimated portfolio’s realised LGD mean and
standard deviation based on historical data up to each year. A1 is the forward-looking single-
factor estimation, A2 is the backward-looking single-factor estimation, A3 is the three-years-
factor estimation, and A4 is the complete-history based estimation.
µˆ Survival Chance
(σˆ) (Waste)
A1 A2 A3 A4
2005
16.09 100 99.98 100 100
(4.48) (12.90) (3.64) (7.15) (8.62)
2006
16.55 100 99.64 100 100
(4.35) (12.35) (2.58) (6.01) (7.69)
2007
17.00 100 99.98 100 100
(4.36) (13.20) (3.91) (8.65) (9.83)
2008
16.98 100 100 100 100
(5.17) (14.10) (6.21) (11.58) (13.22)
2009
17.46 100 100 100 100
(4.23) (10.23) (5.42) (9.35) (10.16)
2010
18.09 100 95.64 100 100
(3.57) (8.49) (2.10) (6.56) (7.25)
2011
18.56 100 97.05 100 100
(3.81) (9.83) (2.40) (6.79) (7.84)
2012
18.67 100 99.15 100 100
(4.73) (12.18) (3.13) (7.55) (9.79)
2013
18.72 100 99.81 100 100
(5.29) (14.69) (3.91) (8.76) (11.43)
2014
18.56 100 9.32 99.09 100
(5.93) (11.72) (0.69) (3.41) (6.93)
2015
18.85 100 7.56 93.96 100
(5.81) (11.55) (0.60) (2.38) (5.87)
2016
18.76 100 0.09 73.05 99.98
(6.17) (11.03) (0.33) (1.30) (4.04)
2017
18.76 100 6.97 100 100
(6.01) (15.38) (0.45) (4.23) (6.60)
Average
100 32.23 97.08 100
(12.13) (2.72) (6.44) (8.41)
lagged likely due to workout duration and other unknown factors, as shown in the second col-
umn of the table. An LGD time-series by vintage of default typically has a high peak in 2008,
but the peak of an LGD time-series by vintage of resolution wanders off in a later period. The
portfolio composition and the bank’s workout strategies play a significant role when the peak is.
Among the procedures with a high survival rate, the results report less average waste by
the three-years-factors methods A3 (6%) and the complete-history based estimation A4 (8%)
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than the forward-looking single-factor method A1 (12%). The waste value can be interpreted as
the average amount of LGD overestimation in an average year, provided failure does not occur.
Lastly, the unsatisfactory performance of the method A2 confirms that it is not the systematic
factor of the default year specifically, which influences the LGD, but rather the whole workout
duration.
3.5.3.1 Comparison to the Foundation IRBA
The performance as seen in table 3.4 does not mean much if it is not compared to a benchmark
and the results cannot offer a meaningful contribution to answer the question whether a change in
regulation will worth the cost and time. This section concentrates on the comparison towards the
foundation IRBA while considering the recent change in the Basel Accord as well. The finalised
Basel III, as suggested by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2017a), forbids the use
of advanced IRBA for some asset classes. This section highlights the overall better performance
of our method compared to the foundation IRBA within the relevant asset classes. By limiting
the simulation to a particular asset class, we indirectly also show that the methods also work well
for specialised banks. In particular, the performance of A1-A4 is compared with the downturn
LGD assigned using the foundation IRBA, considering collaterals and haircuts in the finalised
Basel III document as suggested by Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2017a).
The relevant asset classes for the foundation IRBA, which are available in the dataset, are
Large Corporate, Banks and Financial Companies, Sovereigns, and Private Banking. All re-
quired assumptions are taken generously, including collaterals are assumed to be always eligible
and financial collateral’s haircut is assumed to be 0%. With generous assumptions, the simu-
lation should produce the least amount of waste for the foundation IRBA. Nonetheless, both
A3 and A4 still produce significantly lower waste than the regulatory downturn LGD under the
foundation IRBA, while maintaining a similar survival chance.
It is not surprising that the foundation IRBA will achieve the 99.9% survival rate on average
since it is generally a very conservative approach. However, even under generous assumptions,
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Table 3.5: Comparison of survival chance and waste of different downturn LGD estimation
models with the foundation IRBA for relevant asset classes in % for each year from 2005 until
2017. µˆ and σˆ are the estimated portfolio’s realised LGD mean and standard deviation based
on historical data up to each year. A1 is the forward-looking single-factor estimation, A2 is
the backward-looking single-factor estimation, A3 is the three-years-factor estimation, A4 is the
complete-history based estimation, and F-IRBA is the LGD assigned according to the foundation
IRBA.
µˆ Survival Chance
(σˆ) (Waste)
A1 A2 A3 A4 F-IRBA
2005
21.23 100 100 100 100 100
(7.66) (23.80) (5.02) (10.49) (14.55) (22.10)
2006
20.24 100 100 100 100 100
(8.23) (25.90) (4.01) (7.83) (14.04) (18.92)
2007
19.68 100 100 100 100 100
(8.66) (34.14) (14.87) (23.58) (26.55) (31.08)
2008
17.96 100 100 100 100 100
(9.54) (26.30) (15.24) (21.89) (24.67) (23.34)
2009
19.09 100 100 100 100 100
(7.79) (21.39) (12.76) (19.59) (21.12) (23.39)
2010
20.01 100 100 100 100 100
(6.96) (19.76) (6.24) (15.84) (17.03) (22.02)
2011
20.76 100 100 100 100 100
(6.60) (22.47) (9.45) (17.07) (18.94) (25.52)
2012
20.13 100 100 100 100 100
(7.07) (17.82) (4.12) (10.99) (14.21) (19.90)
2013
20.61 100 100 100 100 100
(6.40) (18.83) (6.42) (12.25) (15.12) (21.78)
2014
20.21 100 92.64 100 100 100
(7.08) (17.13) (1.55) (8.21) (11.74) (18.02)
2015
20.68 100 0.27 99.26 100 100
(6.36) (12.60) (0.27) (2.39) (6.31) (13.74)
2016
20.68 100 2.96 99.63 100 100
(6.22) (12.44) (0.34) (2.43) (5.66) (14.87)
2017
20.81 100 100 100 100 100
(6.15) (22.96) (5.90) (13.01) (14.65) (27.70)
Average
100 48.11 99.91 100 100
(21.19) (6.63) (12.74) (15.74) (21.72)
table 3.5 confirms that the LGD based on the foundation IRBA is wasteful compared to other
methods. In fact, its performance is similar to A1 on average, both the survival chance and
the waste. However, it is also worth noting that A1 is adapting to the economic situation as
more information is available. It can be observed that its waste values are only higher than the
foundation approach’s waste values only during 2005-2008. It may suggest a more accurate
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estimation by A1 if more data is available compared to the foundation IRBA. In summary, the
LGD estimation is overestimated by about 22% under the current foundation IRBA, whereas the
method A3 by approximately 13% and the method A4 by about 16% while maintaining high
survivability of 99.9% as required in the IRBA.
3.5.3.2 Comparison to the Advanced IRBA
Similarly to the previous simulation, we compare our proposed methods with the advanced
IRBA. The finalised Basel III Accord largely limits the use of the advanced IRBA. According
to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2017a), supervisors may permit the use of
the advanced IRBA to the corporate asset class with a consolidated revenue of less than e500
million. In our dataset, the relevant asset class would be the SME. We assume that each SME
exposure in the dataset fulfils the corresponding requirement for the use of the advanced IRBA.
Although the EBA has spent a lot of effort to harmonise the calculation of capital require-
ments under the advanced IRBA, institutions still have some leeway in determining their down-
turn LGD estimates. Choosing a particular downturn LGD model appropriate for the advanced
IRBA may reduce the representativeness of our analysis. Therefore, we choose three methods,
each representing a different level of conservatism. A low level (L) represents the regulatory
minimum for the downturn LGD estimation per guideline. A mid level (M) stands for the down-
turn LGD estimates that fully implement the intent of the EBA’s downturn LGD guideline. A
high level (H) represents the most conservative downturn LGD estimate that the EBA has pro-
posed, especially when an (M)-type estimation is not possible. The simulation will be done
with the application of the LGD input floors (as proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (2017a)) and without them.
Beside the downturn LGD method, the guideline EBA/GL/2019/03 offers a reference value
as well. Even though this value is legally non-binding, it arguably serves as a guide for the
supervisors. Any institution with a strong intention to minimise its capital requirement will try
to produce a downturn LGD estimate near to this reference value. Anything significantly below
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this value will be a red light for the supervisors and it might induce stricter supervision. Thus,
the reference value can be seen as the regulatory minimum for the downturn LGD estimation.
This value is calculated by the arithmetic average of the yearly realised LGD mean (by vintage
of default) in the two most severe downturn years of all available loss data. We assume that the
LGDs in the two most severe downturn years are also the two maximum LGDs observed. Let
LGDs,t be the realised LGD average of all exposures defaulted in year s and resolved up to year
t (today), LGDmax,t the maximum and LGDmax2,t the second maximum LGD over all possible
s≤ t.
DLGD :=
LGDmax,t +LGDmax2,t
2
(A-IRBA-L)
In general, IRBA banks are required to analyse the relationship between LGD and some
other external factors, especially the downturn impact on the LGD. The (M)-level downturn LGD
estimation in this essay is represented by the maximum realised LGDs without an additional
margin of conservatism in the whole SME population, since this margin seems to be arbitrary
and calibration segments are chosen individually. Overall, this is a simplification of the proposed
downturn LGD estimation in the EBA/GL/2019/03. The logic behind this estimate is that most
banks will most likely identify 2008 as a downturn period for the SME calibration segment,
given our dataset.
DLGD := LGDmax,t (A-IRBA-M)
The guideline also sets a conservative limit which serves as a backstop downturn LGD,
when everything else fails. In the worst case, where downturn impacts cannot be observed nor
estimated, the institution has to set the downturn LGD estimate in the concerned calibration
segment to be at least as conservative as the long-run average LGD with an add-on of 15%
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capped at 105%. This estimate is often viewed as extremely conservative.
DLGD := min
(
105%,
∑s≤t LGDs,t
|{s|s≤ t}| +15%
)
(A-IRBA-H)
The results shown in table 3.6 are alarming. Briefly, the downturn LGD methods as proposed
in EBA/GL/2019/03 (A-IRBA-L and A-IRBA-M) are inadequate to ensure the 99.9% survival
chance and are even lower than the theoretical 95% survival rate. Most of the failures happen
in the post-crisis period. Most likely, banks will identify 2008/2009 as the downturn periods in
compliance with EBA/RTS/2018/04. Even though institutions are required for thorough impact
assessment in compliance to EBA/GL/2019/03, the information on the downturn impact associ-
ated with the financial crisis is simply not available in 2010. Unfortunately, the impacts observed
from the past are not as severe as the financial crisis. Even the A-IRBA-M estimate only shows
a survival rate of 81% without input floors mostly due to failures during post-crisis periods.
The inclusion of input floors brings the survival chance to 99.4%. On the one hand, this is a
reassurance that the advanced IRBA will work with input floors as intended, assuming banks will
at least adopt an (M)-type estimate. On the other hand, this high survivability is only guaranteed
by some rudimentary constants. It is likely that the input floors, as introduced in the Basel III
reforms, will be outdated in the future. Moreover, input floors generally give the wrong incentive
for low-risk banks to increase their risks.
In comparison, the method A4 gives a stunning precision towards the required 99.9% sur-
vivability, without any input floors. As expected, the A-IRBA-H is sufficiently conservative as
well, but with a 10% LGD overestimation compared to a 5% waste from the A4.
3.5.4 Generalisation under Workout Duration Uncertainty
Each defaulted exposure needs an estimated downturn LGD in the IRBA. The method A4 re-
quires latent variable components Xtd , . . . ,Xtr as inputs. In practice, the resolution time tr is
unknown. Therefore, some of the required latent variable components are not available. By
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Table 3.6: Comparison of survival chance and waste of different downturn LGD estimation
models with Advanced IRBA for SME asset class in % for each year from 2005 until 2017. µˆ
and σˆ are the estimated portfolio’s realised LGD mean and standard deviation based on historical
data up to each year. A1 is the forward-looking single-factor estimation, A2 is the backward-
looking single-factor estimation, A3 is the three-years-factor estimation, A4 is the complete-
history based estimation, A-IRBA-L is the downturn LGD calculated according to the advanced
IRBA with a low level of conservatism, A-IRBA-M with a medium level of conservatism (which
is the likely representation of most banks), and A-IRBA-H with a high level of conservatism.
The displayed results are the simulations without the application of LGD input floors, but the
averages for the simulations with the application of LGD input floors are presented in the last
row.
µˆ Survival Chance
(σˆ) (Waste)
A1 A2 A3 A4 A-IRBA-L A-IRBA-M A-IRBA-H
2005
14.54 100 99.80 100 100 90.98 93.43 100
(3.60) (9.60) (2.72) (5.52) (6.49) (1.36) (1.47) (13.48)
2006
15.33 100 86.66 100 100 89.78 92.20 100
(3.18) (7.79) (1.31) (3.90) (4.77) (1.37) (1.48) (12.97)
2007
16.14 100 73.21 99.99 100 84.13 89.02 100
(2.94) (6.81) (1.09) (3.94) (4.64) (1.27) (1.42) (12.71)
2008
16.62 100 100 100 100 99.21 99.33 100
(4.02) (10.69) (4.02) (8.81) (10.06) (2.27) (2.34) (13.26)
2009
16.86 100 99.99 100 100 86.78 88.17 100
(3.43) (8.00) (4.00) (7.31) (7.99) (1.47) (1.54) (12.41)
2010
17.27 100 64.81 99.98 100 62.01 62.68 100
(2.86) (5.70) (1.12) (4.06) (4.74) (1.07) (1.08) (11.85)
2011
17.56 100 16.23 99.12 99.97 13.52 15.23 100
(3.66) (6.14) (0.66) (3.15) (4.20) (0.62) (0.64) (9.82)
2012
18.36 100 42.08 99.11 100 70.72 98.57 100
(3.73) (7.09) (0.96) (3.22) (5.14) (1.33) (2.90) (10.57)
2013
18.48 100 65.08 99.99 100 93.26 100 100
(4.86) (10.67) (1.33) (4.95) (7.60) (2.25) (5.10) (10.65)
2014
18.61 100 1.52 85.86 99.99 59.83 99.78 100
(5.15) (8.79) (0.49) (1.86) (4.63) (1.24) (3.70) (7.88)
2015
18.79 100 6.39 93.05 100 97.75 100 100
(5.37) (10.43) (0.57) (2.16) (5.29) (2.63) (5.53) (8.83)
2016
18.69 100 1.78 98.81 100 99.94 100 100
(5.82) (11.80) (0.38) (2.50) (5.31) (3.31) (6.22) (8.82)
2017
18.47 100 0 33.36 99.60 99.88 100 100
(6.01) (11.23) (-) (0.57) (2.25) (2.63) (5.54) (7.65)
Average
100 31.63 90.12 99.97 73.75 80.85 100
(8.83) (1.56) (4.00) (5.62) (1.76) (3.00) (10.84)
Average 94.62 99.40 100
with input floors (4.12) (5.25) (10.84)
assuming tr is today, A4 can be calculated. If the resolution time is indeed today, then the 99.9%
survivability is ensured according to the result in the previous section. If the resolution time lies
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in the future, then the loss is not realised yet.
3.5.5 Validity for Medium-sized Banks
In the theoretical model, fine granularity is generally assumed. Per definition, an infinitely
fine-grained portfolio does not carry any idiosyncratic risk. The closed formula for the condi-
tional PD under the IRBA is intended for such a portfolio. In practice, portfolios from small or
medium-sized banks violate this requirement easily. The concept of granularity add-on under
the IRBA is also discussed in the literature (see Gordy and Lütkebohmert (2013)), and a similar
concept is introduced as a part of the previous version of the IRBA under the Basel II Accord.
This issue applies to downturn LGD models as well. Although a granularity add-on to our LGD
estimation methods is not the scope of this essay, a benchmark is required to get a first grasp,
whether our LGD methods may contain a severe granularity issue.
Based on the results presented in table 3.4 and 3.5, only the methods A3 and A4 have the
potentials to be used for regulatory purposes. To represent medium-sized banks, we study how
some arbitrarily low amounts of resolved cases per year (n) affect the average survival chance
and the average waste.
Both methods A3 and A4 assume the linearity or semi-linearity of the function gC. An
estimation method directly implied from the true form of gC would ensure a faster convergence
rate with minimum waste. Although finding the true form of gC is an interesting research topic,
the results show that there might be only a little benefit. In fact, the results in table 3.7 suggest
that the method A4 reaches the 99.9%-confidence level for a fairly small n. The regulatory
downturn LGDs, both from the foundation and the advanced IRBA with input floors, show a
comparable convergence rate. Especially for the foundation IRBA, the waste values do not
change much. Compared to other methods, the foundation approach does not give an incentive
for large banks to diversify their portfolio.
Based on these results, we argue that even medium-sized banks can sufficiently cover their
potential downturn LGD with our methods according to the simulations. Furthermore, banks
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Table 3.7: Average survival chance and average waste in % when only n default cases are
resolved per year. A3 is the three-years-factor estimation, A4 is the complete-history based
estimation, F-IRBA is the LGD assigned according to the foundation IRBA, A-IRBA-L is the
downturn LGD calculated according to the advanced IRBA with a low level of conservatism
and LGD input floors, A-IRBA-M with a medium level of conservatism and LGD input floors,
and A-IRBA-H with a high level of conservatism and LGD input floors. (I) is calculated in the
global population, (II) only for relevant asset classes in the foundation IRBA, and (III) only for
SME asset class.
n
Average Survival Chance
(Average Waste)
A3 A4 A3 A4 F-IRBA A3 A4 A-IRBA-L A-IRBA-M A-IRBA-H
(I) (II) (III)
100
88.40 96.34 94.57 98.73 99.99 78.70 89.83 79.98 88.38 99.02
(7.19) (8.72) (13.09) (15.84) (21.72) (5.30) (6.39) (5.36) (6.09) (10.95)
200
92.32 98.88 96.51 99.71 100 83.81 95.45 85.21 93.78 99.91
(6.77) (8.50) (12.91) (15.77) (21.73) (4.63) (5.89) (4.73) (5.58) (10.86)
300
93.70 99.54 97.48 99.92 100 86.42 97.58 88.17 96.07 99.98
(6.63) (8.44) (12.82) (15.73) (21.72) (4.37) (5.75) (4.49) (5.43) (10.85)
400
94.65 99.77 98.21 99.99 100 87.72 98.65 90.11 97.21 100
(6.56) (8.42) (12.79) (15.73) (21.71) (4.24) (5.68) (4.35) (5.35) (10.84)
500
95.43 99.90 98.77 99.99 100 88.79 99.15 91.29 97.96 100
(6.52) (8.42) (12.77) (15.74) (21.72) (4.15) (5.65) (4.27) (5.31) (10.84)
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
1000
97.08 100 99.91 100 100 90.12 99.97 94.62 99.40 100
(6.44) (8.41) (12.74) (15.74) (21.72) (4.00) (5.62) (4.12) (5.25) (10.84)
suffering from a high default rate after a downturn period will most likely have higher n, ensuring
a near-convergence state. When there is no downturn period, n will most likely decrease, which
results in a lower overall potential loss.
3.6 Conclusion
A regulatory technical standard (EBA/RTS/2018/04) and a guideline (EBA/GL/2019/03) are
published by EBA to guide institutions on how to estimate the downturn LGD. The downturn
definition relies on signales from macroeconomic proxies. As argued in section 3.2.2, the cur-
rent downturn LGD standard cannot theoretically reach the conservatism degree as traditionally
required under the IRBA due to a mismatch in the downturn definitions. This inconsistency po-
tentially results in a capital requirement below the VaR at 99.9% confidence level. Even though
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estimating downturn LGD using macroeconomic proxies is easy to understand and appears to
be logical, the guarantee of loss coverage with a 99.9%-level of confidence would require a
historical data of 1,000 years, which is practically impossible to acquire.
The goal of this essay is not only to confirm our hypothesis that the downturn LGD proposed
by the guideline is inadequate but also to provide an alternative. A downturn LGD estimation
based on latent variables would address the problem. Since workout LGDs behave differently
compared to market-based LGDs, we argue that the systematic influence on the expected LGD
cannot be referenced to a single vintage point. Our analysis confirms that a random downturn
event has a different impact degree towards the potential LGD of a defaulted instrument de-
pending on the default age. We observe a decreasing pattern in the systematic sensitivity of the
expected LGD, as the default gets older.
The message captured from the preliminary analysis is that the downturn LGD estimation
should include latent variables from the past as well. This discovery helps us construct some
downturn LGD estimation alternatives which are based on latent variables: forward-looking
single-factor (A1), backward-looking single-factor (A2), three-years-factor (A3), and complete-
history based estimation (A4). These methods are compared directly with the foundation and
advanced IRBA, taking the Basel III reforms into account. We test with a Monte Carlo simula-
tion whether an average bank will be able to survive from 2005 until 2017 LGD-wise (required
downturn LGD is greater than realised LGD).
Without the LGD input floors, the survival rate of the advanced IRBA in the SME asset
class is worryingly only 73%-81%. With the LGD input floors, it can reach 94%-99%. Apart
from the fact that LGD input floor values will likely be outdated after some years and are prone
to create wrong incentives, they almost reach the required 99.9% as traditionally required in
the IRBA. In the global population, the three-years-factor estimation method (A3) achieves 97%
survivability with a ca. 6% LGD overestimation. The complete-history based estimation method
(A4) achieves the 99.9% survivability in a portfolio containing only defaulted exposures with
a ca. 8% LGD overestimation. For asset classes relevant for the foundation IRBA, both the
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three-years-factor estimation method (A3) and the complete-history based estimation method
(A4) are on par with the foundation approach in term of survivability. However, both of our
methods show a significantly lower LGD overestimation (12-16%) compared to the foundation
approach (22%).
For an adequate public policy regarding capital requirements, regulators need to revise the
aforementioned standard and guideline. More research with focus on a latent variable based
downturn LGD estimation is needed. The unpopularity of latent variable based approach lies in
the fact that the interpretation of latent variables is often vague. This essay shows that there is at
least an alternative and the risk underestimation issue can be solved.
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Chapter 4
How A Credit Run Affects Asset Correlation
and Financial Stability
Christopher Paulus Imanto
University of Cologne, Albertus-Magnus-Platz, 50923 Cologne, Germany
4.1 Introduction
Widespread concern about the solvency and liquidity of the banking sector has led firms to
increase their liquidity. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) describe this phenomenon as a "run" due
to its similarities to a traditional bank run. Likewise, Gorton and Metrick (2012) refer to it as a
run on repos. If the intention is solely to get adequate liquidity to bridge a period of uncertainties,
the type of financial instruments should only play a secondary role. In fact, higher demand
for various types of financial instruments can be observed: asset-backed commercial essays
(Acharya and Schnabl (2010)), revolving lines (Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010)), term loans
and credit lines (Cornett et al. (2011)), repurchase agreements (Gorton and Metrick (2012)),
etc. Whether the borrowers’ motivation has purely originated from the uncertainty in the money
market is not essential in this essay. The primary concern is the consequence which is the
systematic shift of banks’ portfolio compositions. In return, this structural shift may destabilise
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the financial system.
We are particularly interested in the link with the Basel III framework, especially the Internal
Ratings-Based Approach (IRBA). The underlying foundation of this approach is the asymptotic
single-risk-factor (ASRF) model, which models the asset value movements of obligors. An asset
correlation describes the co-movement of asset values between two random obligors, which is
assumed to be constant over time in the ASRF model. The current IRBA applies a predetermined
correlation coefficient for this parameter ranging from 3% to 24% depending on the asset class
and its default rate. The fact that this coefficient has not been recalibrated since its introduction
with the Basel II Accord is concerning. It means that the current correlation coefficient was
not determined with a dataset covering the financial crisis. If asset correlations increase due
to a credit run, there might be a need to introduce the concept of a downturn asset correlation.
However, the framework needs to be the ASRF model to ensure applicability in the IRBA.
Research essays in the literature covering this topic are often incompatible with the ASRF
model. As an example, Lee et al. (2012) use the CAPM’s β as a proxy for the asset correlation.
Both parameters describe the systematic risk, so it can be argued that the proxy is an appro-
priate substitute. In their analysis, a significant increase in asset correlations can be observed
in 2007, supporting our hypothesis. The applicability of this result to justify a higher correla-
tion coefficient in the IRBA context is questionable. Other essays in the literature with various
methodologies show inconsistent estimations (see Chernih et al. (2006); Hashimoto (2009) for
literature surveys). A large body of essays even contradicts the underlying relationship between
the asset correlation and the default rate/firm size (see section 4.3).
The economic question in this essay is whether the financial crisis has had any impact on
the asset values’ co-movement in the financial system, while the technical question is whether a
change in banks’ portfolio composition (due to a credit run) can cause an increase in the asset
correlation parameter which in return implies an underestimation of the IRBA capital require-
ment. A time-dependent asset correlation is difficult to estimate if we take into account that the
methodology choices may produce inconsistent estimations in the literature. On the other end,
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only a limited amount of methodologies can be applied if the methodology has to be directly
compatible with the ASRF model to ensure a possible application in the IRBA.
This essay proposes adjusted default rates, i. e. default rates weighted by the exposure
amount of the loans. Theoretically, its use in the ASRF model forces the exposure amount
to play a role in the estimation. Some corporates may max out their existing credit lines, while
others may take new loans or resort to other financial instruments. Within the adjusted model,
the estimated asset correlation is referred to as the adjusted asset correlation as well to differ-
entiate from the traditional version. This simple adjustment does not substantially change the
interpretation of the parameter itself. We use an aggregated default rates database as well as
a credit loss database from over 50 international large banks provided by Global Credit Data
(GCD). The same analysis can also be conducted with default rates datasets from external rating
agencies, such as Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s, which may offer a more transparent and objec-
tive result. However, a dataset acquired from mostly IRBA banks can be seen as an advantage
within this analysis1. Since the primary goal is the revision of the IRBA, it is only appropriate
to use a dataset based on portfolios of (typical) IRBA institutions as well.
The increased adjusted asset correlation due to a credit run can be confirmed in the model.
Interestingly, the adjusted asset correlation of a high-rated SME asset class is less susceptible to
a credit run, but this asset class inhibits a rather high adjusted asset correlation compared to other
asset classes. Depending on the severity and duration of the credit run, an (absolute) difference
of up to 2% in the adjusted asset correlation can be observed. 2% may not sound much, but this
difference means a 50% relative increase in some cases. To control our analysis, we simulate
a credit run during an average year. The increase in the adjusted asset correlation is no longer
significant. An important factor driving the increase in the adjusted asset correlation is the ratio
of average initial exposure of healthy and non-healthy debts. As demand in the money market
rises, it causes a higher concentration of unhealthy exposures which drives the adjusted asset
correlation up.
1Most GCD members are large banks with more incentives to apply for the IRBA.
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To sum up, the key contributions are two-fold: 1) a theoretical foundation to adjust the
ASRF model accommodating the systematic shift in the portfolio’s composition and 2) con-
firmation that a systematic change of behaviour influences the asset correlation as the IRBA’s
input parameter. This essay is structured as follows: section 4.2 deals with the background on
the credit run and the asset correlation, section 4.3 reviews the literature on asset correlation
research in the relevant context, section 4.4 introduces the ASRF model and the proposed ad-
justment followed by the methodology on the confidence interval for an asset correlation, section
4.5 discusses the dataset used and the pre-calibration process to acquire all the necessary input
parameters, section 4.6 shows the results and analyses the impact magnitude, and section 4.8
concludes this essay.
4.2 Background
4.2.1 Credit Run
Many studies report irregularities in lending behaviours in the pre-crisis period. Acharya and
Schnabl (2010) show a constant increase in the total outstanding amount of asset-backed com-
mercial essays since 2004 (shortly after the announcement of new accounting rules), which
reached its peak at the end of 2007 (marking the start of the subprime mortgage crisis). This
peak can also be observed for other financial instruments. Cornett et al. (2011) report a peak
in the dollar amount of new term loans and new credit lines at the beginning of 2008. They ar-
gue that this liquidity hoarding behaviour was motivated by concern about the liquidity of loans
and securitised assets. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) study US firms’ statements on revolving
lines draw-downs and report that firms drew on their credit lines to ensure that they had access
to funds when there was widespread concern about the solvency and liquidity of the banking
sector. The effect of this rising demand for lending shortly before the financial crisis on the asset
correlation parameter remains ignored. Corporates tend to take new loans or max out their exist-
ing credit lines to ensure sufficient liquidity. Such behaviour dries up the lender’s liquidity and
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is detrimental to the market. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) argue that these additional credit
line draw-downs were part of the "run" on banks which is, unlike old-style bank runs, instigated
by short-term creditors, counterparties, and borrowers, who are concerned about the liquidity
and the solvency of the banking sector. Gorton and Metrick (2012) describe this run as a run on
repos since it took place within the securitised banking system and was driven by the withdrawal
of repos. The term credit run is aimed at generalising the phenomenon to be independent of the
financial instrument type. In the pre-crisis period, a credit run may be difficult to differentiate
from a credit boom. Both describe soaring demand for liquidity (through loans or other financial
instruments), but the difference lays in the borrower’s intention. As observed during the finan-
cial crisis, this behaviour change puts the money market in distress, which in return negatively
influences financial stability.
The change in the borrowers’ behaviour generally leads to a systematic composition shift
of the lenders’ portfolios. Firms with steady revenues independent from the system may not
have the urgent need to engage in credit run behaviour, while other corporates with questionable
liquidity or with a low credit rating are more likely to engage in such behaviour. Thus, during
a credit run, potential borrowers are more likely to be those who desperately need the liquidity.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, reacting to money market uncertainty by taking the necessary
precautionary measures to survive should never be seen as a decision only poor firms take nor
a hint of low creditworthiness. Thus, there is no small chance that the asset mix on the macro
level structurally shifts with the behaviour change on the borrowing decision. It is simply more
likely for a bank’s potential customer to have a lower credit quality (than their current rating may
suggest) following a credit run. Consequently, institutions’ credit portfolios are proportionally
riskier compared to previous years, despite the institutions’ unchanged internal risk strategy. The
clustering of borrowers with a low credit risk profile in the portfolio directly impacts the default
risk of the portfolio. If this high concentration of a particular borrower type becomes a trend, it
leads to higher systematic risk.
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4.2.2 Asset Correlation
The asset correlation within the banking regulation context describes the co-movement of asset
values between obligors. Beside the probability of default (PD), the loss given default (LGD),
and the exposure amount at default (EAD), the asset correlation is one of the main parameters
of the IRBA with a direct impact on the calculated capital requirement. The asset correlation is
often used to measure the systematic risk as well. A high asset correlation, i. e. a high probabil-
ity of co-movement between borrowers’ asset values, can be associated with a high probability
of a co-default, which in return can be associated with a high probability of mass default. This
parameter, as the name suggests, is a correlation from a technical perspective. Hence, all prop-
erties and technical issues related to a correlation are also inherited for an asset correlation.
For a given time interval, only one estimate can be produced. Without further assumptions, a
time-dependent asset correlation would theoretically need the moving time-window procedure.
Unfortunately, such a procedure only produces non-robust estimates if data is scarce.
The ASRF model, which is based on Merton’s debt valuation model (Merton (1974)), mainly
assumes that the asset correlation is constant over time. There is a good argument that a macro-
economic event may have a direct influence on the asset correlation of an asset class within a
financial ecosystem, which is motivated by the changing asset composition in the ecosystem.
Therefore, a credit run can be linked to an increase in the asset correlation, but not necessarily
the other way around, an asset correlation increase is not always caused by a credit run. Relaxing
the assumption within the ASRF model is challenging, considering that asset correlations from
empirical studies show some inconsistencies which may have originated from the model itself.
In contrast to other risk parameters, e. g. default rates or recovery rates, asset correlation
cannot be directly observed as a variable over time. In the earliest version of the IRBA, the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (2001) set the asset correlation to a flat 20%. In the current
version, as stated by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2017a), the predetermined
asset correlation can range from 3% to 24% depending on PD, asset class, and some other
factors. Henneke and Trück (2006) give a chronological evolution of the asset correlation until
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Basel II, from which point the rule has not been updated until now. The negative relationship
between PD and asset correlation is embedded in the asset correlation formula in the IRBA.
However, the number of empirical studies with contradicting results grows, not only concerning
the dependency with some factors but also regarding the estimated values (see section 4.3).
Independent from the ASRF model as the foundation of the IRBA formula, the estimation
methods for asset correlations are numerous across the literature. Some require additional as-
sumptions or models, e. g. by an indirect proxy or an underlying distribution assumption. In
most cases, the compatibility with the ASRF model is questionable. Düllmann et al. (2007) use
equity value correlation towards the index value as a proxy for the asset correlation parameter.
This approach has drawn some criticism, such as De Servigny and Renault (2002), who argue
that an equity value-based methodology is not sufficient to model a default correlation. Other
methods include Lee et al. (2012), who take the CAPM’s β as a proxy for the parameter, or
Curcio et al. (2011), who fit losses to a particular distribution (in this case, to a beta distribution)
and match these losses with the IRBA formula to acquire an implied asset correlation. However,
the assumption on the loss distribution defeats the purpose of the IRBA. The ASRF model is
initially built using an asset correlation to estimate (unknown) losses. With the compatibility
of any alternative models or proxies for the asset correlation in the literature being questionable
(especially as an application for capital regulation), using these results as a foundation for an
asset correlation recalibration may not be adequate.
With these difficulties in mind, this essay does not aim to offer a better and more robust
estimate or a time-dependent asset correlation within the boundary of the ASRF model, but
rather a technical solution to detect an asset correlation shift following a credit run. For the sake
of usability in practice, we investigate the magnitude of this effect, which ultimately may give
clues as to how much the downturn add-on should be and if it is indispensable. The aim is to
ensure that the increase in the asset correlation during a downturn period is sufficiently captured,
under the presumption that the link is true.
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4.3 Literature Review
It is important to understand that many uncertainties shroud asset correlation research. Plenty of
essays suggest that the asset correlation in the IRBA formula needs a recalibration. The number
of empirical studies that cannot confirm the negative relationship between PD and asset correla-
tion grows, directly contradicting the predetermined formula for the asset correlation parameter
in the IRBA. As the number of empirical studies on asset correlation grows, the uncertainty to-
wards the one which was calibrated for the IRBA also grows. Not only are the aforementioned
relationships problematic, but surveys of estimated asset correlations from various empirical
studies also show that the estimated asset correlation values are spread very broadly (see Chernih
et al. (2006); Hashimoto (2009)), which only makes the whole issue worse.
There are two prominent factors which are known to have a direct relationship with the asset
correlation: PD and firm size. While there are some essays with the same conclusion, there are
many others with contradicting results. Negative dependency between asset correlation and PD
(mostly measured by credit rating) are shown in Lopez (2004); Chernih et al. (2006). An unclear
or mixed relationship between asset correlation and PD can be observed in Gordy and Heitfield
(2002); Düllmann and Scheule (2003); Frye (2008); Bams et al. (2012); Haddad (2013); Düll-
mann and Koziol (2014); Bams et al. (2019). Both Dietsch and Petey (2004); Vozella and Gabbi
(2010) report a positive relationship between asset correlation and PD. Others argue that the
relation might be U-shaped, such as reported by Hamerle et al. (2003); Hashimoto (2009); Lee
et al. (2012). Curcio et al. (2011) provide evidence from Italian data that certain conditions may
cause the inverse relationship between PD and asset correlation to dissipate.
The relation to firm size is contradicting as well. The IRBA applies a lower asset correlation
for SMEs and a higher one for other asset classes, implying a positive relationship between asset
correlation and firm size. There is some variation on the definition of firm size in the literature
(asset size, sales revenue, turnover, or number of employees). Several essays, such as Düll-
mann and Scheule (2003); Lopez (2004); Hahnenstein (2004); Chernih et al. (2006); Hashimoto
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(2009); Lee et al. (2012); Düllmann and Koziol (2014), report a positive or mostly positive rela-
tionship between asset correlation and size. Dietsch and Petey (2004) report a decreasing pattern
for asset correlation towards firm size, but observe a high asset correlation for large SMEs (with
a turnover of e7-40 million). Similarly, Bams et al. (2019) argue that the asset correlation of
SMEs is lower than required in the IRBA. Vozella and Gabbi (2010) report a monotonic negative
relationship without exception and show the least amount of asset correlation for large SMEs (a
turnover ofe10-25 million). As observed in Bams et al. (2012); Haddad (2013), there is no clear
pattern of asset correlation when grouped by size. Further, Düllmann and Scheule (2003) argue
that positive dependency with firm size can be rationalised with the more flexible diversification
opportunity of large firms compared to SMEs.
Literature surveys, such as e. g. Chernih et al. (2006); Hashimoto (2009), report a substantial
variation in the estimated values for asset correlations. Some estimated asset correlation values
can be close to zero, while others report an estimated asset correlation of over 50%. The origin
of the dataset, its size, ans the methodology choice may contribute to the high variance. There
are two common choices for the dataset: asset value-oriented datasets or default rates-oriented
datasets. Some prominent examples of papers using asset values as input are Lopez (2004);
Hamerle et al. (2004); Düllmann et al. (2007); Vozella and Gabbi (2010); while others use
historical default rates or migration matrices such as Gordy and Heitfield (2002); Düllmann and
Scheule (2003); Frye (2008); Hashimoto (2009); Bams et al. (2019). The compatibility of using
asset values to represent a bank’s portfolio is questionable. De Servigny and Renault (2002)
argue that an equity value model is not sufficient to estimate the asset correlation parameter.
The methodology choices also play a big role. As the asset correlation comes from the ASRF
model, it serves as a main component in the model and can be derived by exploiting the theo-
retical density function of the conditional PD. Frye (2000b) introduces the maximum likelihood
(ML) estimation method as he points out that the density function of the conditional PD can be
derived. Another statistical method, such as the method of moments (MM), can replace the ML
method in most cases. However, Gordy and Heitfield (2002) show that a persistent downward
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bias for asset correlation estimations by ML or MM exists. In their simulations, they show that
the bias by MM is, in general, slightly worse than by ML in scarce datasets. There are also ap-
proaches exploiting regression techniques as found in Hamerle et al. (2003, 2004). Others rely
on commercial risk management software such as KMV (Lopez (2004)), CreditRisk+ (Dietsch
and Petey (2004)), or CreditMetrics (Hahnenstein (2004)). A copula-based technique can also
be found, such as in Vozella and Gabbi (2010), by assuming a Gauss copula, or using the CAPM
to derive asset correlations from the firm’s β, as shown in Lee et al. (2012). Given sufficient data
points, the correlation of asset values (mostly equity values) between firms can also be calcu-
lated, as found in Chernih et al. (2006); Düllmann et al. (2007). The methodology choice may
not matter if the resulting asset correlations are primarily used for understanding the systematic
risk. However, the methodology choice may be limited if the intention is a sound and consistent
application in the IRBA. Although the compatibility is questionable, the estimation results in
Lee et al. (2012) exhibit a significant increase in the asset correlation of 2007 compared to the
average, signalising a potential impact from a credit run.
4.4 Methodology
The main idea behind the IRBA is to calculate the expected loss of a position given a single
systematic factor, which is supposed to be approximately equal to the value-at-risk with certain
assumptions (see Gordy (2003)). Loss as a random variable can be factorised into a default indi-
cator (D), remaining exposure, and loss fraction from the remaining exposure. These parameters
are directly associated with the PD, the EAD, and the LGD.
E[Loss|X ] = E[D ·Remaining exposure ·Loss fraction|X ]
(∗)
= P(D = 1|X) ·EAD ·E[LGD|X ]
(4.1)
For (∗) in (4.1) to be true, two conditions need to be met: (∗.1) EAD has to be constant (therefore
independent from any factor) and (∗.2) both PD and LGD are independent for a given value of
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the systematic factor (X). In the IRBA, the term P(D = 1|X) is calculated by the conditional
PD formula based on the ASRF model, and the term E[LGD|X ] is the downturn LGD based
on the institution’s internal model. The conditional PD formula requires the asset correlation
as an input parameter. In short, it defines how the asset values of two firms correlate to each
other, which affects the probability of co-defaults. Although the asset correlation is exclusively
calculated for calibrating the IRBA, it is also often used as a measure of the systematic risk.
The reason is that co-defaults lead to mass defaults, which is a primary component of a financial
crisis.
The rationale behind the assumption (∗.1) is that a loan’s remaining exposure is in most
cases considered a constant amount from the micro perspective (e. g. a single loan). From the
macro perspective (the bank’s portfolio or the debt mix in a financial ecosystem), the amount of
total debt is certainly not independent from the systematic factor. Since (4.1) is the foundation
of the IRBA, this is the first motivation leading to the hypothesis that a variation of the total
amount of debt may have an impact on the asset correlation.
So, what exactly is the consequence if the assumption (∗.1) is wrong? From a technical
perspective, the three components in (4.1) are not easily factorisable even if (∗.2) is true. The
correlation effect from EAD is therefore lost, which implies a risk underestimation in the current
IRBA. During a credit run, the outstanding amount in banks’ portfolios increases and, therefore,
their capital requirements as well. However, the amount of debts in banks’ portfolios are artifi-
cially increased, although there are not many new obligors in the system. If the total debt amount
and the number of obligors do not change proportionally, the asset correlation will change. To
illustrate this, a small and isolated financial ecosystem consisting of only one borrower with
many loans would have a 100% co-default probability and also a 100% asset correlation (since
there is only one single obligor). Since the current IRBA’s asset correlation has not been up-
dated since the IRBA introduction, there is a mismatch between the predetermined regulatory
asset correlation and the real asset correlation during a credit run. Although the question of how
to calculate the current asset correlation or a downturn asset correlation is also non-trivial in
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itself.
To accommodate the effect of a credit run in an asset correlation estimation, we propose
an adjustment to the model. The main idea is to redefine the PD, ensuring the adjusted model
only has two distinct factors (adjusted PD and LGD), rather than including all three factors (PD,
LGD, and EAD). Let us assume that banks are only allowed to issue new debts with an initial
outstanding ofe1, which means a borrower would need to get 100 new loans to lende100. This
adjustment is only a new perspective on looking at the default rate parameter without changing
the risk profile of the debt. Looking back at (4.1), the conditional expected loss would be:
E[Loss|X ] = E[D ·Remaining exposure ·Loss fraction|X ]
(∗.2)
= P(D = 1|X) ·1 ·E[LGD|X ]
(4.2)
In this particular case, both the conditional PD and the PD have to be defined in the 1-Euro loan
context. From the technical point-of-view, adjusting the ASRF model in the 1-Euro loan context
allows fluctuation in the exposure amount over time to affect the PD time series and therefore the
asset correlation. From this point, the word adjusted is used to refer to the 1-Euro loan context,
thereby setting it apart from the traditional context.
The conditional PD is derived from the ASRF model by looking at the asset value’s return
Ai,t of a firm i at year t, which is affected by a systematic factor Xt and an idiosyncratic factor
Zi,t . Per definition, the systematic factor and the idiosyncratic factor are independent. In the
model, both factors are traditionally assumed to be of standard normal distribution.
Ai,t = p ·Xt +
√
1− p2 ·Zi,t .
Per definition, the firm i defaults if and only if Ai,t falls below a certain thresholdΦ−1(PDi). The
threshold is deliberately chosen to be Φ−1(PDi) to ensure that the PD of firm i is equal to PDi.
In the 1-Euro loan context, the adjusted PD and the PD are in general not equal if there is any
dependency between creditworthiness and initial credit amount. Regardless of the context, the
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correlation of Ai,t and Xt is p. So, for two homogeneous random firms, their asset correlation is
p2. The asset correlation is mostly denoted by ρ in the literature and by R in the IRBA. The use
of p instead of ρ (= p2) in the model has the slight advantage that it can identify the rare case
of an anti-systematic pattern (negative p) in some sectors. This slight modification in the ASRF
model can also be found in Frye (2000b); Bams et al. (2012, 2019); Haddad (2013). For a given
Xt = x, the conditional PD can be derived as follows:
P(Di,t = 1|Xt = x) = P(Ai,t <Φ−1(PDi)|Xt = x)
= P(p ·Xt +
√
1− p2 ·Zi,t <Φ−1(PDi)|Xt = x)
= P
(
Zi,t <
Φ−1(PDi)− p · x√
1− p2
)
=Φ
(Φ−1(PDi)− p · x√
1− p2
)
=: g(x),
(4.3)
where Φ is the distribution function of the standard normal distribution.
As pointed out by Frye (2000b), the function g(x) in (4.3) is invertible with respect to x.
Therefore, its density can be calculated by the change-of-variable technique.
fPD|X(x) = ϕ(g−1(x)) ·
∣∣∣−√1− p2
p
· dΦ
−1(x)
dx
∣∣∣,
where ϕ is the density function of the standard normal distribution. Therefore, given this density
and samples (either in the form of historical default rates or the number of defaulted loans), the
ML method can determine the unknown parameters, which are the PD and the parameter p. To
avoid a high-dimensional and overly complex model which may cause unreliable estimations in
ML methods as, e. g. addressed by Sur and Candès (2019), PD as well as its adjusted variant will
be assumed to be known in this essay. However, compared to other methods, the ML method
still generates smaller biases for estimating asset correlations than other statistical approaches,
as pointed out by Gordy and Heitfield (2002). The curse of dimensionality may play a role in
why asset correlations estimated in the literature are so different from each other (see section
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4.3).
Let PDr,a,t denote the observed default rate of rating r ∈ R , asset class a ∈ A , and year
t ∈ T and PDr,a the average default rate of rating r of a particular asset class a, which serves
as a proxy for the probability of default PDi of firm i2. The amount of available data (observed
default rates) within a given rating r and asset class a is denoted by nr,a, which sums up to N. The
parameters p = (p1,1, . . . , pnr,na) can be acquired through the optimisation of the log-likelihood
function. The result of the optimisation problem is the square root of the asset correlation for
each rating category and asset class. Note that the calculation only requires the PDs of each
category as inputs.
l(p) = log
(
∏
r,a,t
fPD|X(PDr,a,t)
)
=− N
2
log(2pi)−∑
r,a
( 1
p2r,a
∑
t
(Φ−1(PDr,a)−
√
1− p2r,aΦ−1(PDr,a,t))2
− nr,a
2
log(1− p2r,a)+nr,a log(pr,a)
)
+N∑
r,a,t
log
(∣∣∣dΦ−1(x)
dx
∣∣∣
x=PDr,a,t
) (4.4)
The minimum of the log-likelihood function l(p) can be calculated numerically. By applying the
historical default rates in PDr,a,t , the calculation yields the asset correlation p2 and by applying
the adjusted default rates, the calculation yields the adjusted asset correlation p2ad j.
There is not a substantial difference in the interpretation, which sets p2ad j from p
2 apart. The
crucial element which differentiates the adjusted asset correlation from the traditional version
is whether the initial outstanding amount is accommodated in the model or is assumed to be
constant. A default of a e2 loan will be counted once in the PD calculation, but twice in the
adjusted PD. Nevertheless, the adjusted asset correlation is also associated with an asset co-
movement, which influences co-default and mass defaults, and therefore the financial stability.
Confidence intervals for (adjusted) asset correlations can be acquired by bootstrap-based
methods, such as in Cassart et al. (2007). Unfortunately, bootstrap-based confidence intervals
2Indexing through all the available asset classes and ratings has its reasons. The asset correlation is known to be
dependent on firm size and PD. See section 4.3 for more information.
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depend on the choice of sample size and iteration size, which produces an non-robust confidence
interval. However, the ML method is known to be consistent, i. e. an ML estimator always
converges to the true parameter in probability, and the ML estimators are asymptotic normal. In
our context, it means
pˆ→N (p, 1
N · I (p)),
where pˆ denotes the ML estimator of p (in either traditional or adjusted version) and I (p)
denotes the Fisher information, i. e. the variance of the score function. Note that, given the
distribution, a confidence interval can be easily constructed. However, we cannot ignore the fact
that it requires the true asset correlation p as an input, which is unknown. Typically, pˆ can be
used as a proxy in practice.
By looking at the structure of the log-likelihood function in (4.4), we can see that for each
rating r and asset class a the variables pr,a are separated from another rating and asset class. This
fact ensures that the Hessian matrix H , i. e. the second partial derivative of l(p), is a diagonal
matrix, which simplifies a majority of the derivation. The diagonal component of the Fisher
information (of a given r and a) is derived as follow:
I (pˆ)r,a =−Hr,a = nr,a
( 1
1− pˆ2r,a
+
pˆ2r,a
(1− pˆ2r,a)2
− 1
pˆ2r,a
)
+∑
t
(3β2r,a
pˆ4r,a
− 3βr,aΦ
−1(PDr,a,t)
pˆ2r,a
√
1− pˆ2r,a
+
βr,aΦ−1(PDr,a,t)(√
1− pˆ2r,a
)3 + Φ−1(PDr,a,t)21− pˆ2r,a
)
for βr,a := Φ−1(PDr,a)−
√
1− pˆ2r,a ·Φ−1(PDr,a,t).
Due to the fact that the Fisher information is a diagonal matrix, a more robust confidence interval
can be constructed by replacing N with the respective population number of each segment nr,a.
Thus, the confidence interval of pˆ with a confidence level α for a given rating r and asset class
a is
pˆr,a±
tnr,a−1;1− α2√
nr,aI (pˆ)r,a
.
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Respectively, the confidence interval for the asset correlation is its square, which is
pˆ2r,a+
t2nr,a−1;1− α2
nr,aI (pˆ)r,a
± 2pˆr,atnr,a−1;1−
α
2√
nr,aI (pˆ)r,a
. (4.5)
However, the resulted confidence interval should be understood only as an estimate. Note that
the distribution used to derive (4.5) is an asymptotic distribution. Whether this distribution can
be used to estimate the downturn asset correlation is not a trivial question. One may have the idea
of applying α = 99.9% into one-side of the formula in (4.5). In comparison to the PD and the
LGD, there is no guarantee that the asset correlation and the systematic factor have a monotonic
relationship. In non-technical words, it is unknown whether the asset correlation will on average
increase/decrease as the systematic factor gets better/worse. There is no guarantee that the worst
asset correlation only occurs in the worst downturn period. Nevertheless, there is much need for
research to be done on the asset correlation and how the systematic factor influences it.
In summary, there are two methodologies introduced in this section: 1) the method to calcu-
late the adjusted asset correlation and 2) the ML-based confidence interval for the asset correla-
tion. The adjusted asset correlation is represented by p2ad j, which can be acquired from solving
the optimisation problem in (4.4). The confidence interval is the given interval in (4.5).
4.5 Data and Calibration
To calculate the adjusted asset correlation, information on defaulted as well as on non-defaulted
loans are necessary. The adjusted PD calculation requires information on the composition of de-
faulted and non-defaulted loans in the financial ecosystem. Although datasets on defaulted loans
are difficult to acquire, they are still available. In contrast, (detailed) datasets on non-defaulted
loans are very sensitive. Banks that offer their datasets on defaulted loans do not necessarily offer
information on their whole portfolio as well. As explained, it is more appropriate to use default
data from IRBA banks. Such datasets are more representative in the context of our analysis. The
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credit databases from GCD fulfil this requirement3.
GCD provides two sets of databases: 1) the PD and Rating Platform and 2) the LGD and
EAD Platform. The first one gives information on historical default rates of particular asset
classes. The second one gives detailed information on defaulted loans. All participating banks
are obliged to specify default and loss similarly, ensuring data comparability within the sample.
Complementary to the following section, dedicated reports regarding these datasets are also
provided by Global Credit Data (2019a,b).
4.5.1 Data Statistics
Banks are required to classify their exposures in predefined facility asset classes as well as to
map them into S&P ratings. In this essay, we only consider SMEs and large corporates (LC)
as well as financial institutions (FI). Other asset classes are excluded due to their small size.
Thereby, the dimension of the parameters is minimised to limit a potential bias. The ratings are
summarised into three larger categories: A (includes AAA to A-), B (includes BBB+ to B-),
and C (includes CCC+ to C). The country classification is extensive and contains hundreds of
different entries. The most represented regions are North and West Europe as well as North
America. Although there are some arguments to restrict the datasets only to a particular region,
finding out the exact regional asset correlation is not the scope of this essay. Furthermore, there
are hints in the literature, such as found in Bams et al. (2019), suggesting that segmenting the
dataset into too many categories may produce "jumps" in the asset correlations of neighbouring
segments.
The number of GCD members may have an indirect influence on the number of loans in the
dataset, but the demand and supply of the money market should be the main factor influencing
the documented number of loans. Table 4.1 displays the amount of non-defaulted and recently
defaulted loans (less than one year) in the PD and Rating platform. The remaining defaulted
3GCD is a non-profit association owned by its member banks from around the world and active in data-pooling
for historical credit data. As of 2020, it has 55 members across Europe, Africa, North America, Asia, and Australia.
For details: https://www.globalcreditdata.org
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Table 4.1: Number of loans in the PD and Rating platform. Only non-defaulted loans and
recently defaulted loans are included. Not-recent defaults are excluded to avoid double counting.
SME stands for Small and Medium sized Enterprise, LC stands for Large Corporate, and FI
stands for Financial Institution. LC and FI are combined similar to how these asset classes are
treated in the IRBA. Rating categories A (includes AAA to A-), B (includes BBB+ to B-), and
C (includes CCC+ to C) are simplified S&P rating categories.
SMEs
Sum
LCs and FIs
SumA B C A B C
2000 308 29,492 657 30,457 2,458 11,135 333 13,926
2001 606 32,261 476 33,343 2,776 10,555 458 13,789
2002 419 28,203 432 29,054 2,818 9,180 434 12,432
2003 386 28,578 452 29,416 4,221 9,216 265 13,702
2004 622 28,989 607 30,218 6,109 10,605 261 16,975
2005 715 26,454 648 27,817 8,755 16,520 419 25,694
2006 9,553 79,750 2,842 92,145 18,409 53,295 1,849 73,553
2007 8,568 166,091 4,970 179,629 27,068 91,431 2,173 120,672
2008 14,825 209,070 9,199 233,094 29,468 100,519 3,427 133,414
2009 15,087 245,157 16,631 276,875 33,031 154,113 6,211 193,355
2010 16,188 274,051 19,396 309,635 36,872 140,610 7,990 185,472
2011 12,929 268,032 17,853 298,814 39,270 156,320 7,066 202,656
2012 12,548 256,733 14,736 284,017 91,877 158,897 6,015 256,789
2013 13,948 225,490 15,604 255,042 95,696 155,765 5,868 257,329
2014 26,278 271,455 21,352 319,085 105,925 167,396 5,619 278,940
2015 26,273 270,866 20,431 317,570 99,285 156,980 5,137 261,402
2016 25,853 178,657 8,266 212,776 26,469 97,856 3,476 127,801
2017 17,958 165,943 6,635 190,536 21,408 65,857 1,353 88,618
loans population (older than one year) is already counted in the year before, so they are excluded
to avoid double-counting. In practice, non-recent defaulted loans in the workout process will still
be part of the portfolio waiting to be resolved or cured. However, these older defaulted loans do
not directly influence default rates. Note that the fluctuation in the number of loans in table 4.1
is not necessarily a hint for an increase of loan demand in general, but for an increase of loan
issuance (or buyouts) by IRBA banks.
Figure 4.1 depicts the historical default rates in the dataset. The peaks in the graph mark the
financial crisis with a high default rate relative to other years. The year, the duration, and the
severity of the financial crisis may vary depending on the asset class and the rating group. Note
that figure 4.1 only shows default rates in the traditional sense. The adjusted default rates (in the
1-Euro loan context) are most likely quite different.
The LGD and EAD platform offers detailed information on defaulted loans during their
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Figure 4.1: Observed default rates of SMEs, LCs and FIs, segmented by rating categories
workout processes. For the analysis, the proportion between the EADs of defaulted loans and
the EADs of healthy loans is an essential factor to identify a credit run. Unfortunately, this
platform only offers information about defaulted loans. The outstanding amount is defined as
either the lender outstanding amount at the origination date or the lender limit4. In table 4.2,
we can observe a higher outstanding amount in loans by obligors with a low rating. The default
amount is defined as the nominal outstanding amount at the default date, including any additional
drawn cash and mark-to-market adjustment. The default amount is on average not far from the
initial outstanding amount. Given that these amounts are not discounted, we can say that the
potential loss in present value can exceed near to the initial outstanding amount at origination
date. In contrast, it is difficult to acquire similar information on the initial outstanding amount
on healthy loans.
4.5.2 Calibration
We can assume that the initial outstanding amount is, in general, the obligor’s choice, which is
directly influenced by their need for liquidity and thus indirectly by their credit rating as well.
For corporates, lending may also often be motivated by their strategy for the optimal capital
structure. The total amount of debts outstanding circulating in a financial ecosystem is a central
factor for the adjustment. In particular, adjusted default rates require an initial calibration to
4To avoid double-counting, the lender outstanding amount of a syndicated loan only consists of the exposure of
the lender.
114 CHAPTER 4. CREDIT RUN AND ASSET CORRELATION
Table 4.2: Mean and standard deviation of log outstanding amount at origination date and log
default amount at default date for defaulted loans. Outstanding amount is the initial amount of
exposure in e at the issuance date. Default amount is the remaining exposure in e at default
date including additional drawn cash and mark-to-market-adjustment. SME stands for Small and
Medium sized Enterprise, LC stands for Large Corporate, and FI stands for Financial Institution.
LC and FI are combined similar to how these asset classes are treated in the IRBA. Rating
categories A (includes AAA to A-), B (includes BBB+ to B-), and C (includes CCC+ to C) are
simplified S&P rating categories.
Rating at Origination Obs. log(Outstanding Amount) log(Default Amount)
SMEs
A 294 5.11 4.98
(0.89) (0.95)
B 13,328 5.17 5.04
(0.87) (0.88)
C 2,784 5.28 5.17
(0.99) (0.99)
LCs and FIs
A 92 6.00 5.88
(1.41) (1.39)
B 4,431 5.95 5.81
(1.18) (1.19)
C 1,078 6.20 6.04
(1.20) (1.21)
consider the total outstanding amount in a system.
For this purpose, we shall define ωt as the ratio of average initial outstanding amounts of
non-defaulted loans to average initial outstanding amounts of defaulted loans at year t and λt
as the ratio of the total EAD to the total initial outstanding amount of defaulted loans at year t.
Note that both parameters are ex post parameters, prior to the default events.
ωt =
Outstanding AmountND(t)
Outstanding AmountD(t)
λt =
∑D(t)Default Amount
∑D(t)Outstanding Amount
,
where D(t) and ND(t) denote the set of defaulted and non-defaulted loans in a portfolio of a
particular year t respectively.
The importance of ωt is clear which is to explain the risk when the total exposure to un-
healthy borrowers unintentionally gets bigger due to the loan demand-supply dynamics in the
financial ecosystem. This parameter should be understood at the macroeconomic level. It does
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not describe the growth of an exposure of a particular borrower, but rather that borrowers from
a particular asset class category tend to ask for more loans.
While LGD describes the realised loss percentage from the EAD, the variable λt describes
the potential loss for each invested euro, given the exposure is defaulted at year t. Thus, (1−λt)
represents the fraction of the exposure which has been paid (or written off) up to the default date.
Both variables, ωt and λt , are typically not present in risk models (yet). By considering both,
the adjusted PD can be estimated. Subsequently, the potential impact in the asset correlation is
observable.
Let’s assume there are in total n(6= 0) loans in both D(t) and ND(t). Then, the adjusted PD
in the 1-Euro loan context, given a particular asset class and a credit rating, can be approximated
as follows:
PDad j,t =
Total Default Amount
Total Outstanding Amount
=
0+∑D(t)Default Amount
∑ND(t)Outstanding Amount+∑D(t)Outstanding Amount
=
λt(
∑ND(t) Outstanding Amount
∑D(t) Outstanding Amount
+1
)
≈ λt(
n·(1−PDt)
n·PDt ·ωt +1
)
=
λt ·PDt
ωt −ωt ·PDt+PDt .
(4.6)
By design, a credit run should decrease the ωt-value in the system. So, by varying the possible
value of ωt , we can study whether the variation of the ωt-value influences the system’s adjusted
asset correlation and the magnitude of this impact. In the special case where the outstanding
amount is not affected by the borrower’s PD, ωt should be equal to 1 for all t. This most
elementary case simplifies the approximation (4.6) to PDad j,t ≈ λt ·PDt .
Historically, the dataset shows that λt is slightly under 1 in most of the years, as depicted
in table 4.3. Defaults are rare in the high rating category. As a consequence, we can observe
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Table 4.3: Observed λt in the PD and Rating platform. λt denotes the ratio of total defaulted
amount to total initial outstanding amount of defaulted loans at year t. SME stands for Small and
Medium sized Enterprise, LC stands for Large Corporate, and FI stands for Financial Institution.
LC and FI are combined similar to how these asset classes are treated in the IRBA. Rating
categories A (includes AAA to A-), B (includes BBB+ to B-), and C (includes CCC+ to C) are
simplified S&P rating categories.
Default SMEs LCs and FIs
Year A B C A B C
2000 - 1.0000 1.0000 - - 1.0000
2001 - 0.9868 0.3713 - 0.9791 0.4371
2002 - 0.8003 0.9192 - 0.9461 0.9086
2003 - 0.8695 0.9369 - 0.6844 0.8419
2004 - 0.8342 1.0316 1.0000 0.9424 0.8769
2005 1.0546 0.5862 1.0462 0.8000 0.6476 1.3577
2006 0.9176 0.8368 0.6520 - 0.7751 0.9640
2007 0.8590 0.8497 0.8145 0.0526 0.6670 0.4986
2008 0.8396 0.8558 0.6927 1.1398 0.7058 0.8493
2009 0.5962 0.8116 0.7602 0.9035 0.8322 0.8313
2010 0.8640 0.7599 0.8505 0.9968 0.7260 0.8565
2011 0.8158 0.7835 0.9425 1.0690 0.8214 0.5827
2012 0.6604 0.8462 0.8187 0.7488 0.6812 0.6157
2013 0.5765 0.7016 0.8393 0.8292 0.9038 0.7809
2014 0.9551 0.8129 0.8916 1.3454 0.6949 0.8789
2015 1.6776 0.7815 0.8043 0.6185 0.7631 0.7265
2016 2.3781 0.7868 0.7632 0.3630 0.7834 0.6459
2017 0.9153 0.7063 0.5668 0.2251 0.7973 0.5504
a high variation in λt . For some years, λt is higher than 1 which implies a higher total default
amount than the total invested amount for those loans. Although such cases are rare, it is not
surprising that it can happen because default amounts are often conservatively estimated. For
the case ωt = 1 across all years, the associated adjusted default rates are depicted in figure 4.2.
The properties of the variable ωt as well as its typical value are unknown, as banks’ internal
strategies may have a direct influence. Banks with proper risk management strategies should
have some limitations on the allowed initial loan amount depending on the obligor’s credit rat-
ing. Banks may additionally adopt some counter-strategies when the obligor’s creditworthiness
worsens, such as decreasing the credit line’s limit or even terminating the loan agreement. These
strategies limit the exposure of potentially unhealthy loans, thus increasing the value of ωt . It is
most likely the case that ωt is individual from the bank’s perspective, but may also be affected
to some extent by external factors.
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Figure 4.2: Adjusted default rates of SMEs, LCs and FIs, segmented by rating categories
4.6 Result
4.6.1 The Adjusted Model
In this section, we first compare the estimated asset correlation in the traditional version with its
adjusted version in the 1-Euro loan context. The (traditional) asset correlation can be compared
directly with asset correlations in the literature as well as from the IRBA. The asset correlations
reported in the literature seem to be scattered, as reported by Chernih et al. (2006); Hashimoto
(2009). It may reach values as low as < 1% and as high as > 50%. Section 4.3 emphasises
that the negative relationship between PD and asset correlation, and the positive relationship
between firm size and asset correlation are not as clear as claimed by regulators. In the end, it is
not surprising to see a similar observation in this essay.
Table 4.4 shows a negative dependency between the asset correlation and the credit rating,
which implies a negative dependency between the asset correlation and the PD. However, the
asset correlations of rating categories B and C are not significantly different. The positive de-
pendency between the asset correlation and the firm size cannot be confirmed in our result,
especially for the rating category A.
In some of the categories, the adjustment has a significant impact, which is positive for the
rating category C but negative for the rating category A. Note that it can be observed from figure
4.2 that this asset category has far fewer data points compared to the data points needed in the
traditional model, as shown in figure 4.1. As less data implies a high variance, this may be the
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Table 4.4: The coefficient p in the traditional and adjusted version and its 95% confidence
interval. The asset correlation is the square of p. SME stands for Small and Medium sized
Enterprise, LC stands for Large Corporate, and FI stands for Financial Institution. LC and FI
are combined similar to how these asset classes are treated in the IRBA. Rating categories A
(includes AAA to A-), B (includes BBB+ to B-), and C (includes CCC+ to C) are simplified
S&P rating categories.
SMEs LCs and FIs
A B C A B C
pˆ 0.3364 0.2150 0.1869 0.3209 0.2734 0.2700
95% CI [0.3052,0.3675] [0.1992,0.1973] [0.1764,0.1973] [0.2426,0.3953] [0.2544,0.2924] [0.2513,0.2887]
pˆad j 0.2809 0.2163 0.2387 0.1533 0.2773 0.2836
95% CI [0.2546,0.3072] [0.2003,0.2323] [0.2205,0.2570] [0.1380,0.1715] [0.2571,0.2976] [0.2627,0.3044]
pˆ2 = ρ 0.1132 0.0462 0.0349 0.1030 0.0747 0.0729
95% CI [0.0931,0.1351] [0.0397,0.0389] [0.0311,0.0389] [0.0589,0.1563] [0.0647,0.0855] [0.0632,0.0833]
pˆ2ad j 0.0789 0.0468 0.0570 0.0235 0.0769 0.0804
95% CI [0.0648,0.0944] [0.0401,0.0540] [0.0486,0.0660] [0.0190,0.0294] [0.0661,0.0886] [0.0690,0.0927]
reason for this deviation.
4.6.2 Credit Run Scenarios
The goal is to answer the question on how a credit run affects the systematic risk (and thus influ-
ences the financial stability) in the context of the IRBA. To replicate a credit run in the model,
the adjusted model comes into play. As a reminder, the parameter ωt stands for the ratio of the
average outstanding amount from non-defaulted loans to the average outstanding amount from
defaulted loans. During a credit run, the portfolio compositions are systematically shifted due
to a change in the borrowing and lending behaviour. In the system, there are more (potentially)
unhealthy obligors engaged in a credit run, which can be simulated by increasing the denomi-
nator of the ωt during this period. Sufficiently capitalised corporates do not necessarily need to
increase their lending in periods with a liquidity bottleneck, while insufficiently capitalised cor-
porates do not have the same luxury. Thus, the numerator of the ωt can remain constant during
this period.
Although banks would be interested in measuring their individual ωt , this parameter should
be understood for a whole financial ecosystem in the context of this essay. In the context of the
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equation (4.1), this parameter captures the missing influence of the systematic factor in the EAD.
How the value of ωt fluctuated historically is challenging to investigate within our dataset. In a
credit run, we should expect a fall in the ωt value temporarily (the denominator increases while
the numerator stays constant). We set five different scenarios to capture the effect of a credit
run: 1) constant ωt over time, 2) ωt falls abruptly once before the financial crisis (2008), 3) slow
decrease of ωt before the financial crisis (2008) and slow stabilisation of ωt after the crisis, 4)
ωt decreases slowly before the financial crisis (2008) but neutralises quickly afterwards, and 5)
a control scenario which is an abrupt fall in an average year (2015).
The first scenario is motivated by the notion that ωt is likely to be constant over the year.
From a bank’s perspective, this is not unusual and is likely to be the case. All other scenarios
assume a non-constant ωt , which is equal to 1 in most of the time but can change in value due to
a systematic event, such as a credit run. In this essay, we assume the year 2008 to represent the
financial crisis. However, the duration and the severity of the credit run during this period may
vary for different financial instruments. The second, third, and fourth scenarios are a selection
of various possible cases that could occur. The difference between these three scenarios is the
duration of the credit run. Note that before the crisis, a credit run can be perceived as a credit
boom, which is not necessarily a negative signal for banks. This wrong interpretation of the
current economic situation may prolong the duration of the credit run. The same can also be
asserted for the normalising rate, i. e. the duration it takes for ωt to stabilise back to its previous
value. No doubt surviving banks have reacted appropriately and put stricter risk management
in place as a reaction to the financial crisis, which is an argument for a fast normalising rate.
However, an argument can be made that supports a slow normalising rate since any change in
risk strategy mostly only applies for new loans. Additionally, the last scenario investigates the
credit run effect in an average year with the sole purpose of being a control case for our result.
The choice for 2015 is influenced by the argument that any effects coming from the financial
crisis, the European sovereign crisis, or the introduction of Basel II have to be avoided. There is
also an argument against choosing an upturn year such as 2017 in the dataset as there are only
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Table 4.5: Evolution of adjusted p with scenario 1, where ωt is constant throughout the years.
To acquire the adjusted asset correlation, the coefficient p needs to be squared. ωt can be un-
derstood as the ratio of healthy and unhealthy exposures. SME stands for Small and Medium
sized Enterprise, LC stands for Large Corporate, and FI stands for Financial Institution. LC and
FI are combined similar to how these asset classes are treated in the IRBA. Rating categories
A (includes AAA to A-), B (includes BBB+ to B-), and C (includes CCC+ to C) are simplified
S&P rating categories.
Scenario 1: constant ωt
ωt
SMEs LCs and FIs
A B C A B C
1:0.50 0.226875 0.202986 0.217032 0.103267 0.255500 0.259945
1:0.75 0.258088 0.210509 0.229316 0.137463 0.270660 0.273406
1:1.00 0.280910 0.216297 0.238743 0.154768 0.277341 0.283584
1:1.25 0.298870 0.221064 0.246447 0.167934 0.282828 0.291791
1:1.50 0.313672 0.225155 0.252976 0.179803 0.287524 0.298669
1:1.75 0.326266 0.228753 0.258648 0.190443 0.291647 0.304586
1:2.00 0.337226 0.231977 0.263664 0.200021 0.295340 0.309771
1:2.25 0.346932 0.234905 0.268160 0.208696 0.298690 0.314383
1:2.50 0.355642 0.237593 0.272234 0.216608 0.301764 0.318533
1:2.75 0.363543 0.240081 0.275959 0.223870 0.304609 0.322301
1:3.00 0.370776 0.242398 0.279390 0.230576 0.307259 0.325753
a few defaults, rendering the parameter λt to have a higher deviation and therefore non-robust
results.
In the first scenario, we assume that there is no change in ωt , i. e. if there is any difference in
the choice of initial outstanding between unhealthy loans (those which default during its term)
and healthy ones (those which do not default), its ratio is assumed to be constant over time. At
the moment of the origination date, banks do not know whether loans will default, so a direct
control over ωt is not possible. Either most banks put a strict exposure limit on the borrowers
with a lower rating (thus there is a tendency for ωt > 1), or we can assume that borrowers with
a lower rating have more need on capital in expectation (thus ωt < 1 may occur naturally). The
case ωt = 0.5 (= 1 : 2.00) means that the average initial outstanding of loans, which are later
defaulted, is twice as much as the average initial outstanding of healthy loans. A low ωt value is
more interesting than a high one since a credit run implies a low ωt .
The adjusted p in table 4.5 first needs to be squared to acquire the adjusted asset correlation.
Table 4.5 shows a slow but steady increase in adjusted p as ωt decreases. The change rate is
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Table 4.6: Evolution of adjusted p with scenario 2, where ωt falls/rises abruptly in 2008, oth-
erwise ωt = 1. To acquire adjusted asset correlation, the coefficient p needs to be squared. ωt
can be understood as the ratio of healthy and unhealthy exposures. SME stands for Small and
Medium sized Enterprise, LC stands for Large Corporate, and FI stands for Financial Institu-
tion. LC and FI are combined similar to how these asset classes are treated in the IRBA. Rating
categories A (includes AAA to A-), B (includes BBB+ to B-), and C (includes CCC+ to C) are
simplified S&P rating categories.
Scenario 2: abrupt ωt change in 2008
ω2008
SMEs LCs and FIs
A B C A B C
1:0.50 0.287031 0.204823 0.239179 0.132065 0.269155 0.271588
1:0.75 0.282642 0.209617 0.236325 0.143392 0.272589 0.276134
1:1.00 0.280910 0.216297 0.238743 0.154768 0.277341 0.283584
1:1.25 0.280475 0.223424 0.243301 0.165431 0.282461 0.291762
1:1.50 0.280766 0.230530 0.248720 0.175331 0.287629 0.299916
1:1.75 0.281496 0.237451 0.254428 0.184549 0.292719 0.307756
1:2.00 0.282510 0.244127 0.260133 0.193173 0.297684 0.315178
1:2.25 0.283707 0.250545 0.265699 0.201280 0.302502 0.322159
1:2.50 0.285027 0.256707 0.271057 0.208934 0.307172 0.328708
1:2.75 0.286430 0.262628 0.276177 0.216187 0.311695 0.334845
1:3.00 0.287890 0.268320 0.281049 0.223083 0.316075 0.340599
also different throughout the rating categories. It seems that the high rating categories are more
susceptible to a change in p as the ωt decreases in value. Since the choice of the initial exposure
amount determines the value of ωt , the exposure amount (especially the EAD used in the IRBA)
is consequently an important factor as well. So together with the result, it is confirmed that the
exposure amount can affect the calibration of the asset correlation substantially. However, the
current IRBA sets values for asset correlations which were calibrated before the financial crisis.
Therefore, it is easy to conclude that the IRBA underestimates the correlation effect between
EAD and the systematic factor (see section 4.4). Moreover, since the estimated adjusted p
moves continuously with the variation of the value ωt , it implies that a minimum p should exist.
In other words, there exists an optimal value of ωt , at which the (adjusted) p is minimal.
In the second scenario, we start to evaluate how a credit run affects the adjusted p over time.
This particular case assumes that ωt = 1 is normative, but it falls rapidly in 2008 due to the
financial crisis and neutralises in 2009. The motivation for this particular case is to simulate a
sudden and quick credit run. The comparability to the first case is limited. A constant low ωt < 1
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over a long period, as observed in the first scenario, can be perceived to be far worse than the
short-term credit run in 2008 of the second scenario. On the other hand, a sudden change in ωt
over t can be seen as a shock which may further amplify the systematic effect.
The aggressive increasing pattern on the adjusted p as the ωt decreases for high-rated SMEs,
as shown in the first scenario, can no longer be observed in table 4.6. For other classes, the results
are comparable to the first scenario. Furthermore, it seems that there also exists a minimum of
possible asset correlations for the SME asset class, given a variation of ωt . From here onward,
this optimal ratio of healthy and unhealthy exposures is referred to as the optimal value of ωt .
Similarly, optimal values should also exist for LC and FI asset classes as well, but they are
probably higher than 2 (the maximum value of ωt in our calculation, since a higher value is less
plausible).
The optimal value only refers to the lowest systematic risk measured by the adjusted asset
correlation, but it does not say anything about other risk types. In this perspective, the optimal
value is only optimal for the financial system, but not necessarily for each bank as a part of the
system. From the micro perspective, the optimal ωt should always be infinite, i. e. the outstand-
ing amount of unhealthy loans should be minimal. The individual best possible strategy does
not necessarily bring the best outcome for the system. From the macro perspective, the sudden
increase in demand in the money market is mostly unavoidable. The best option is to reduce any
exposure cluster (if possible), e. g. by allocating these (potentially) unhealthy loans uniformly
through all of the system’s members. Depending on the value of the λt (the loss fraction from
each invested euro), the optimal value of the ωt will most likely be near 1 (or >1), as observed
in the second scenario. Only then the systematic risk is the lowest.
The third scenario depicts a credit run event with a slow transition as well as a slow nor-
malising rate. While the fall of the ωt value in the second scenario is prompt, the third one
assumes a transitional year before and after 2008. In 2007 and 2009, ωt is assumed to be in the
middle of the chosen value of ω2008 and 1. The idea is that a behaviour change in the lending
and borrowing strategies may not happen overnight. The increase in demand for liquidity by
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Table 4.7: Evolution of adjusted asset correlation with scenario 3, where ωt falls/rises slowly
in 2007-2008 and neutralises slowly in 2009, otherwise ωt = 1. To acquire adjusted asset cor-
relation, the coefficient p needs to be squared. ωt can be understood as the ratio of healthy and
unhealthy exposures. SME stands for Small and Medium sized Enterprise, LC stands for Large
Corporate, and FI stands for Financial Institution. LC and FI are combined similar to how these
asset classes are treated in the IRBA. Rating categories A (includes AAA to A-), B (includes
BBB+ to B-), and C (includes CCC+ to C) are simplified S&P rating categories.
Scenario 3: slow ωt change during 2007-2009
ω2008
SMEs LCs and FIs
A B C A B C
1:0.50 0.281647 0.192811 0.238616 0.130476 0.264291 0.278352
1:0.75 0.280001 0.204279 0.234743 0.142827 0.270178 0.277760
1:1.00 0.280910 0.216297 0.238743 0.154768 0.277341 0.283584
1:1.25 0.282651 0.227349 0.245249 0.166154 0.284406 0.291319
1:1.50 0.284689 0.237326 0.252427 0.176635 0.291076 0.299451
1:1.75 0.286811 0.246356 0.259591 0.186254 0.297320 0.307416
1:2.00 0.288932 0.254594 0.266472 0.195121 0.303167 0.315006
1:2.25 0.291021 0.262174 0.272976 0.203346 0.308660 0.322152
1:2.50 0.293060 0.269201 0.279081 0.211022 0.313843 0.328849
1:2.75 0.295048 0.275761 0.284799 0.218224 0.318756 0.335118
1:3.00 0.296979 0.281919 0.290145 0.225013 0.323421 0.340976
unhealthy borrowers may occur gradually. It is to be expected that they must try not only to take
new loans but also explore other options of financial instruments to satisfy their liquidity needs,
which overall requires time. Even though such an event will not likely be perceived as a shock
or at least only a mild shock, this scenario may be perceived to be worse overall than the quick
sudden fall in ωt . The reason lies in the duration of this anomaly.
The difference between the adjusted p from this scenario in table 4.7 and the previous sce-
nario in table 4.6 is quite small. The adjusted p grows slightly faster compared to the second
scenario, as the value of ωt falls. The optimal value of ωt also shifts slightly from the one in
the second scenario. From the perspective of the results, there is only a small difference in both
of the scenarios. The most difference can only be seen in the SME asset class. To get a bigger
picture, the result of the next scenario needs to be compared directly to the other credit run sce-
narios as well. However, the result gives the first hint that the duration of a credit run may not
be a crucial factor for the asset correlation. Regardless, it should not be underestimated.
The combination of the aforementioned two scenarios is the essence of the next scenario.
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Table 4.8: Evolution of adjusted asset correlation with scenario 4, where ωt falls/rises slowly in
2007-2008, otherwise ωt = 1. To acquire adjusted asset correlation, the coefficient p needs to be
squared. ωt can be understood as the ratio of healthy and unhealthy exposures. SME stands for
Small and Medium sized Enterprise, LC stands for Large Corporate, and FI stands for Financial
Institution. LC and FI are combined similar to how these asset classes are treated in the IRBA.
Rating categories A (includes AAA to A-), B (includes BBB+ to B-), and C (includes CCC+ to
C) are simplified S&P rating categories.
Scenario 4: slow ωt change in 2007-2008 then fastly neutralises in 2009
ω2008
SMEs LCs and FIs
A B C A B C
1:0.50 0.280853 0.197532 0.233990 0.125366 0.267205 0.278071
1:0.75 0.279890 0.206403 0.233513 0.140597 0.271543 0.278144
1:1.00 0.280910 0.216297 0.238743 0.154768 0.277341 0.283584
1:1.25 0.282607 0.225792 0.245683 0.167325 0.283348 0.290749
1:1.50 0.284555 0.234638 0.252980 0.178509 0.289219 0.298348
1:1.75 0.286591 0.242844 0.260137 0.188595 0.294858 0.305867
1:2.00 0.288637 0.250479 0.266965 0.197800 0.300247 0.313096
1:2.25 0.290664 0.257614 0.273400 0.206284 0.305392 0.319958
1:2.50 0.292659 0.264317 0.279436 0.214168 0.310312 0.326427
1:2.75 0.294612 0.270640 0.285087 0.221545 0.315025 0.332513
1:3.00 0.296522 0.276631 0.290379 0.228485 0.319547 0.338235
The combination of a slow transition ofωt in 2007 (similar to scenario 3) but a sharp normalising
rate in 2009 (similar to scenario 2) motivates the fourth scenario. The rationale is that banks
may not be aware of a credit run in 2007. However, as soon as the financial crisis occurs, the
(surviving) banks are likely to use an aggressive strategy and limit their exposures to low-rated
obligors immediately. From the duration perspective, the credit run is shorter in this case than
the third scenario. The overall comparability to other cases is limited. The result in table 4.8
shows almost no difference to the results in table 4.7. This highlights the fact that the strategies
to reduce the exposure to unhealthy loans are ineffective (in the systematic risk context) if they
are implemented after the financial crisis. In this particular scenario, the optimal values of ωt
can be observed to persist in the region close to 1 or higher than 1, similar to the previous two
scenarios.
All in all, it could be the case that the adjustment in the model itself causes higher asset
correlations in general, not necessarily triggered by the credit run scenarios. A conclusion that
a higher asset correlation is caused by the parallel combination of a credit run and a financial
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Table 4.9: Evolution of adjusted asset correlation with the control scenario, where ωt falls/rises
abruptly in an average year (2015), otherwise ωt = 1. To acquire adjusted asset correlation, the
coefficient p needs to be squared. ωt can be understood as the ratio of healthy and unhealthy
exposures. SME stands for Small and Medium sized Enterprise, LC stands for Large Corporate,
and FI stands for Financial Institution. LC and FI are combined similar to how these asset classes
are treated in the IRBA. Rating categories A (includes AAA to A-), B (includes BBB+ to B-),
and C (includes CCC+ to C) are simplified S&P rating categories.
Scenario 5: abrupt ωt change in 2015
ω2015
SMEs LCs and FIs
A B C A B C
1:0.50 0.284149 0.223041 0.250439 0.148226 0.281879 0.290016
1:0.75 0.281336 0.217770 0.241417 0.150189 0.278294 0.284424
1:1.00 0.280910 0.216297 0.238743 0.154768 0.277341 0.283584
1:1.25 0.281593 0.216644 0.239207 0.160142 0.277646 0.284959
1:1.50 0.282866 0.217981 0.241367 0.165700 0.278633 0.287475
1:1.75 0.284472 0.219889 0.244481 0.171208 0.280019 0.290591
1:2.00 0.286273 0.222138 0.248132 0.176574 0.281649 0.294022
1:2.25 0.288194 0.224594 0.252073 0.181766 0.283430 0.297593
1:2.50 0.290178 0.227171 0.256152 0.186776 0.285306 0.301209
1:2.75 0.292201 0.229817 0.260271 0.191609 0.287238 0.304804
1:3.00 0.294239 0.232495 0.264374 0.196274 0.289204 0.308341
crisis may be flawed. Without a control scenario, a credit run alone may be the only cause
for the increase in the asset correlation regardless of the economic situation. To test this, the
last scenario simulates a credit run during an average year. If the result shows an increase in the
adjusted p, it is then safe to conclude that the system’s portfolio composition (but not necessarily
the increase in the default rates) is responsible for the increase in the asset correlation. The last
scenario assumes an abrupt change of ωt without any transition in a year which is neiter a non-
crisis year nor in an upturn year. The year 2015 is chosen to represent an average year without
any significant influence from either the financial crisis, the European sovereign crisis, or the
introduction of Basel II.
The result in table 4.9 shows a significantly weaker effect of an abrupt increase of demand
in the loan market to the adjusted p for most of the asset segments compared to the previous
scenarios5. Conclusively, the presence of a higher default rate coupled with a lower value of ωt
affects the increase in the adjusted p, but not the fall of the ωt value alone. Interestingly, the
5Technically, it is no longer a credit run.
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Table 4.10: The adjusted asset correlation and its absolute difference between the case of ωt =
1 : 1 and ωt = 1 : 2. ωt can be understood as the ratio of healthy and unhealthy exposures. SME
stands for Small and Medium sized Enterprise, LC stands for Large Corporate, and FI stands for
Financial Institution. LC and FI are combined similar to how these asset classes are treated in
the IRBA. Rating categories A (includes AAA to A-), B (includes BBB+ to B-), and C (includes
CCC+ to C) are simplified S&P rating categories.
SMEs LCs and FIs
A B C A B C
Scenario 1: constant ωt
ωt = 1 : 1 0.078910 0.046785 0.056998 0.023953 0.076918 0.080420
ωt = 1 : 2 0.113721 0.053813 0.069519 0.040008 0.087226 0.095958
difference 0.034811 0.007029 0.012521 0.016055 0.010308 0.015538
Scenario 2: abrupt ωt change in 2008
ω2008 = 1 : 1 0.078910 0.046785 0.056998 0.023953 0.076918 0.080420
ω2008 = 1 : 2 0.079812 0.059598 0.067669 0.037316 0.088616 0.099337
difference 0.000902 0.012814 0.010671 0.013363 0.011698 0.018917
Scenario 3: slow ωt change in 2007-2009
ω2008 = 1 : 1 0.078910 0.046785 0.056998 0.023953 0.076918 0.080420
ω2008 = 1 : 2 0.083482 0.064818 0.071007 0.038072 0.091910 0.099229
difference 0.004572 0.018034 0.014009 0.014119 0.014992 0.018809
Scenario 4: slow ωt change in 2007-2008 then fastly neutralises in 2009
ω2008 = 1 : 1 0.078910 0.046785 0.056998 0.023953 0.076918 0.080420
ω2008 = 1 : 2 0.083312 0.062740 0.071270 0.039125 0.090148 0.098029
difference 0.004401 0.015955 0.014272 0.015172 0.013230 0.017610
Scenario 5: abrupt ωt change in 2015
ω2015 = 1 : 1 0.078910 0.046785 0.056998 0.023953 0.076918 0.080420
ω2015 = 1 : 2 0.081953 0.049346 0.061569 0.031178 0.079326 0.086449
difference 0.003042 0.002561 0.004571 0.007225 0.002408 0.006029
optimal value of ωt is 1 for almost all asset classes. In other words, an equal ratio of healthy
and unhealthy exposures in an average year is optimal, in the sense of a minimum amount of
systematic risk. The same cannot be asserted for a credit run during a downturn period.
The overall increase in the adjusted asset correlation is most likely caused by the fact that a
low ωt value tends to increase the volatility of the adjusted PD. Thus, it magnifies the systematic
effect even further than what may be observed in the PD time series (figure 4.1). It is clear
that the current regulation has been neglecting the asset correlation in the IRBA, and our results
show how sensitive this parameter in the adjusted model can be towards the increasing demand
for liquidity. However, the asset correlation jumps only if the increasing demand for loans is
coupled with a higher PD as well. Our results confirm that a change of composition shortly
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before the financial crisis drives the asset correlation up and thus accelerates the occurrence of
the financial crisis. The addressed risk underestimation does not originate from the institutions
or their miscalculation, but rather from the core of the model currently used in the IRBA and its
calibrated correlation coefficient.
The results confirm that the adjusted asset correlation increases with a credit run. The sever-
ity of a credit run may depend on various external factors, which makes it difficult to choose a
particular severity for a downturn asset correlation. For a direct comparison, we choose to com-
pare the cases ωt = 1 : 1 and ωt = 1 : 2 (chosen arbitrarily) for each scenario. We are interested in
the magnitude of the credit run effect towards the adjusted asset correlation. The second, third,
and fourth scenarios are especially important for this purpose. The first and last scenarios serve
only as control scenarios. Table 4.10 sums up the effect of a credit run for each scenario and
shows that the increase is similar (0.1% to 1.9%) for all asset classes in the credit run scenarios.
This increase is to be understood as an absolute difference6. There seems to be no pattern in the
relative difference. When the value of ωt falls during an average year (the control scenario), the
difference in the adjusted asset correlation is lower than 1%, which is negligible. Apart from the
first case, there is no evidence that there is any substantial increase for high-rated SMEs. Thus,
this asset class can be classified as the most secure in the event of a credit run in the systematic
risk context.
4.7 Discussion
The concept of a downturn asset correlation is as necessary as the concept of a downturn LGD
within the IRBA. Everything comes back to equation (4.1) which requires any following calcu-
lation to be conditioned to the systematic factor. Since the IRBA calculates the expected loss
conditional on the 99.9%-percentile of the systematic factor, the LGD and the asset correlation
should be calibrated accordingly. Based on our previous analysis, an absolute increase of 2%
6The term difference (including increase or add-on) in this context will be understood as an absolute difference
without reference of the term absolute.
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should be adequate to cover the downturn cases. However, we cannot ignore the fact that this
add-on is derived from the adjusted model, while the IRBA uses the traditional model with the
constant asset correlation assumption. The transferability between both versions of the models
is not yet obvious. Moreover, applying an add-on of 2% to the existing correlation coefficient in
the IRBA assumes that the current correlation coefficient in the IRBA is correct, which is also
questionable, as explained in section 4.3.
This 2% increase in the asset correlation can be easily translated to the increase in the condi-
tional PD because the IRBA ties the PD and the asset correlation directly. In this impact analysis,
we assume that the result in this essay is to some extent also representative for the retail asset
class, although our dataset does not contain retail exposures which are not classified as SME
exposures. Figure 4.3 depicts the impact of the 2% add-on towards the conditional PD, relative
to the PD. It shows that there is an absolute increase with a range from 0.3% to 3.5% in the
conditional PD. Interestingly, the impact is independent of the asset class, and it is lowest for
exposures with high creditworthiness and highest for exposures with low creditworthiness. An
underestimation of this magnitude is quite significant for the capital requirement, which is of
course also influenced by other factors within the formula. All in all, a revision for the IRBA
is not just a matter of recalibration, as explained in section 4.4. The issue lies deep within the
model itself. It is important to emphasise that the adjusted asset correlations suggested by the
result are based on assumptions, which are depicted here as scenarios.
This essay outlines the observation that asset correlations fluctuate over time, depending
on the demand in the money market. This observation contradicts directly the assumption in
the ASRF model that the asset correlation stays constant over time. The behaviour change of
lenders as well as of borrowers, especially in a credit run context, contributes to this fluctuation.
The results of this essay confirm the scepticism of the banking supervision agencies towards the
advanced approaches in the regulatory capital requirements. To restrict the impact of these ad-
vanced approaches towards the regulatory capital requirements, new tools have been introduced
in the Basel III reforms, such as the input and output floors. However, the output floor is just
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Figure 4.3: The absolute increase in the conditional PD using a 2% add-on for the correlation
coefficient compared to without add-on
a rudimentary way to bind the IRBA capital requirement to the SA capital requirement. The
suggested solution to apply an add-on of 2% on the current correlation coefficient acts only as a
sticking plaster rather than a long-term solution. Addressing the asset correlation core issue as
depicted in this essay continues to be irreplaceable to any short-term solution.
4.8 Conclusion
This essay addresses an issue regarding a particular risk parameter in the IRBA: the asset cor-
relation. Unlike the PD and the LGD, the asset correlation is predetermined in the capital re-
quirement regulation to particular values between 3% and 24%. These values have not been
updated since the introduction of the IRBA in the Basel II Accord. So the financial crisis has not
been taken into account with the calibration of these values. In the ASRF model, which serves
as the foundation of the IRBA, the asset correlation parameter is assumed to be constant over
time. However, there is evidence in the literature that the asset correlation may be volatile. For
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instance, Lee et al. (2012) show that asset correlations may vary over the years and, in particular,
the asset correlation associated with the year 2007 is highest. To arrive at this conclusion, they
use the CAPM’s β as an indirect proxy. However, the compatibility of the CAPM to the ASRF
model remains questionable.
Nonetheless, these results give the first hint that the asset correlation may be a dynamic pa-
rameter and can be influenced by the financial crisis. In the pre-crisis period, a systematic shift
in the lending and borrowing behaviour can be observed. This change is mainly motivated by
the worry of the solvency and liquidity of the banking sector. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010)
refer to the rising demand for liquidity shortly before the financial crisis as a "run" to describe
the tendency of firms to take more loans than usual or max out their available credit lines, which
is then referred to as a credit run in this essay to detach the concept from a particular financial
instrument. A credit run influences the available amount of loan exposures in the market and
indirectly changes the loan composition in banks’ portfolios. Those who are insufficiently cap-
italised and possibly with a low credit rating tend to take more loans. Hence, banks’ portfolios
tend to be less diversified as the exposure of a particular asset class is more likely and, at the
same time, the overall default rate of banks’ portfolios increases. During this period, the banks’
risk managements would not yet be able to observe the higher default rate as the defaults would
occur in the future.
In the IRBA context, there are currently no methods in the literature to support detecting
the effect of an external factor towards the asset correlation without taking strong assumptions.
This essay suggests an adjustment in the ASRF model, which is practically the current model
from a slightly different perspective. The ASRF model itself does not consider the dynamic
of the loan market’s composition as the asset correlation parameter is assumed to be constant.
The main result is clear: a credit run increases the asset correlations within the adjusted model,
which implies a risk underestimation in the IRBA. Although the impact and its magnitude in
the adjusted model are clear, how this result should be translated into the old model is not. The
magnitude may depend on the duration and severity of the credit run as well as on the PD shock.
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We observe up to an absolute increase of up to 2% in the adjusted asset correlation throughout
various credit run scenarios which may imply a relative increase over 50% in the adjusted asset
correlation for some asset classes. Assuming this result is transferable to the old model, it would
mean that the IRBA underestimates the conditional PD by 0.3 to 3.5 percentage points depending
on the PD input.
The core issue seems to lie in the model itself and its assumptions. Although the banking
supervision authorities introduced revisions of the Basel Accord which address their doubt on
the IRBA, some of these revisions are more of a short-term solution rather than a long-term one.
The results of this essay reinforce this doubt even further. In particular, it should be discussed
whether the concept of a downturn asset correlation may be a necessity. For now, a flat 2%
absolute increase in the correlation coefficient for the current version of the IRBA may solve this
issue (assuming the previous calibration is correct). However, it does not replace the need for a
long-term solution, and we implore more research to be done in a non-Merton-based alternative
to the IRBA.
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